THE ETHICAL THEORY OF DEMOCRITUS

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

That Democritus is not a Pre-socratic is a starting-point to be emphasised before any attempt is made to understand and explain at least two aspects of his philosophical activity: his epistemology and his ethical theory.

All the information we have about his life permits a chronological position between 470/460 BC - 370 BC[1]; he is probably a younger contemporary of Socrates (469 - 399 BC). The reasons which led scholars of previous generations to classify D. amongst Pre-socratics are obvious and reasonable but misleading for the estimation of his epistemological and ethical views.

His main work (it must be confessed), his physics, is correctly classified with that of the Pre-socratics; he is the last of the Ionian philosophers and scientists; his teacher, Leukippus, is not only from a systematic point of view but also chronologically a Pre-socratic. Leukippus' brilliant hypothesis about the atomic structure of the world was adopted by D., who tried to explain, expand and apply it in all fields of scientific knowledge. It is one part of his many-sided activity.

But an account of D.'s epistemology and ethical theory seems to be impossible unless it is explained as a reply to the Sophists,

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1. DL.ix.41 (VS68B5).
   S.Luria, Wann hat Demokrit gelebt? (in Hermes, 31 (1928) pp. 205-238.
   J. Ferguson, On the date of D. (in Symbolae Osloenses, 40 (1965) pp. 17-26.
   W.K.C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, II (1965) pp. 386-7.

especially Protagoras. His aim is clear enough: to reconstruct[1] confidence in the possibility of human knowledge, to overcome relativism and unlimited subjectivism in moral relations. He is a child of the Enlightenment but, of all the famous teachers of his generation, he survived; he lived long enough to see the results of the "demolition" of the old ideas. Any such demolition is accompanied by pains in the delivery of new ones.

On the other hand his experience of Pelop. War (431-404 BC) is a condicio sine qua non for the understanding of a number of fragments referring to social and political life in the city-states during the war and after it. These considerations, and other reasons to be mentioned in detail in the following pages, led me to think that D.'s ethical theory is a result of long experience and belongs to the later decades of his life. For similar reasons one might reach the same conclusion about D.'s epistemology.

In both these philosophical fields his work should be compared with that of Socrates. Not only in general terms, but also in some details surprising similarities can be traced in their views. Which influenced the other is difficult to say. But, as a matter of fact, they had in front of them similar problems and similar situations to live in and think of. At any rate, if for some expressions, in marginal points and in those of less importance, I had to answer the question of influences, I incline to the following formula: both were influenced by their environment or it was D. who was directly or indirectly the

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1. J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, London, [4](1968) [1914], p.157.

recipient.[1]

Nevertheless D. did not insist on the demand of defining moral ideas; he founded an optimistic critical epistemology and left this field behind him in order to found an ethical theory on good will, believing that it is the main or a necessary factor of moral life. It was enough, he thought, to begin his ethical theory with an axiom: what is true and good is well known to all as far as it concerns their practical life; the question is: how to act in accordance with that knowledge.[2]

To make sense of philosophical fragments is like deciphering coded messages. Disjecta membra lie in front of the student. His task is to decipher them, to ascribe to them the correct meaning given by their creator, to reconstruct a system. In his effort to understand these fragmentary pieces of thought, he has, instead of context, a family of fragments.

A first criterion is to find - if possible - their consistency, the coherence of those members with some leading ideas.

A second criterion is to find the compatibility of such a system with the remaining work of the same author.

A third one — and perhaps of more importance from the point of view of authenticity — is to ascertain the compatibility with what we call the "cultural or historical environment" of the author.

Philosophical terminology in D.'s days was in a state of flux, was being developed; a working vocabulary was a difficult problem for the

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1. See: DL ix.36 (VS68B116).

Cf. G.J.D. Aalders, The political faith of D. (in MNEMOSYNE, 4/3 1950, p. 305 footn. 15.

2. See: frf. 69, 173.

additional reason of an unprecedented philosophical upheaval. A great thinker, of course, will find the way to express his ideas; his ideas can survive, but vocabulary changes. In such a case a scholar's task is to understand not only what is expressed but what was meant to be expressed.

Moral ideas are generated only in the frame of a social structure and corresponding social relations. In D.'s days social life was closely connected with political life in the narrow frame and shortsighted view of Greek city-states. Unsolved and perplexed social problems were fervently debated, during a turbulent political life, in connection with educational ideas. So, ethical theories, political thought, and educational ideals are closely connected in the same system. On the other hand D.'s scientific views, especially his mechanistic explanation of the Universe, extended to a consistent theory of sensation and a rejection of "chance" and the gods, oblige us to pay attention to and give a short account of these aspects of his thought. From this two questions arise: what is, if any, the metaphysical foundation of Democritean ethics? is it compatible with his physics?

A final point: sometimes it is said that progress in every department is attained only by making good use of the experience of the past. In the case of our subject many contributions have been made by famous scholars; our task is to know their views but to return immediately to the original text; it is the <u>fons et origo</u> of what is to be said, the beginning and end of this inquiry.

INTRODUCTION

1. History of the problem. Some points for research.

Traditionally D.'s name is mainly mentioned in connection with his physics; it is a general belief that he expounded, generalised and improved his teacher's theory of atoms. Secondarily, his theory of knowledge has drawn the attention of scholars, who much less frequently have attempted an explanation or evaluation and appraisal of his moral philosophy.

The main factors leading to that result were the following:

a. D.'s moral philosophy was overshadowed by the more surprising and striking part of his own work.

b. D.'s moral doctrines are not mentioned at all in Plato's dialogues and Aristotle's systematic writings on ethics.

c. On the contrary, Socrates is presented (Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle) as the paramount personality in the field of ethics, and as pioneer and champion in the battle against subjectivism and relativism.

d. What we know about D.'s moral philosophy is fragmentary (nearly 230 fragments, preserved by later writers, mainly in John Stobaeus' Florilegium; many of these fragments have been excluded by some scholars as non-authentic (see paragraph 3 of this introduction).

e. Finally, another reason for misunderstanding, belittling and disparaging D.'s moral philosophy was that all efforts for a new study and explanation have generally started with the terminology and conceptual structure of later generations.

During the 1920's C. Bailey[1] in the preface to his monumental work on Epicurus' philosophy emphasised that: "as soon as one sets about that task (of writing about Epicurus) it becomes clear that it would be incomplete and unsatisfactory without an account of the atomic philosophers who preceded him". Having studied D.'s ethics as a condicio sine qua non for his main work, Bailey concluded (p.212): "The moral teaching of D. is not based on any profound metaphysical or ethical basis, nor is it, as far as we can judge from detached fragments, in any sense a complete system: it does not attempt to grip together the whole of life in any reasoned deductions from a simple principle..... (p.214): Finally he (Dem.) added, if only in loose connection, a moral theory to the physical".[2]

During the last decades another aspect of the problem was emphasised by social scientists or rather by left wing scholars and

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1. C. Bailey, "Greek Atomists and Epicurus", Oxford, 1928.
2. Zeller-Nestle (Die Philos. der Griechen, I.2. 1154) had summarised: "Drei Fragen sind es hauptsächlich um die sich auch heute noch der Streit über die demokritische Ethik dreht: (a) ob sie ein System bilde, (b) was allenfalls als der Kernpunkt dieses Systems bezeichnet werden könne, und (c) ob oder inwiefern ein Zusammenhang der Ethik mit der Physik Demokrits bestehe".

intellectuals who did their best to label Democritus as a forerunner of their own beliefs.[1]

It seems that the main points of the problem can be summarised as follows:

a. authenticity of the fragments

b. consistency of the fragments in themselves

c. compatibility of ethics with the whole Democritean system

d. place of Democritean ethics in the history of ethics.

For a better evaluation and correct explanation I think that more recent studies focusing light on special aspects of the whole subject might be very helpful. They can be classified in two groups:

a. Contributions to particular problems of D.'s ethical theory, political faith, religious faith, theory of cognition and knowledge.[2]

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1. U.E. Timoschenco, Materialisme de Democrite, La Pensée, 62 (1955).
   Grosju Grosew, Der Materialismus des Demokrits, ALTERTUM 4 (1958), 215ff.
   S. Luria, Zur Frage der materialistischen Begründung der Ethik bei Demokrit, Berlin, 1964.
   S. Luria, Democritea, Leningrad, 1970.

2. G.J.D. Aalders, "The political faith of D." In: MNEMOSYNE 4/3 (1950) 302-13.
   D. McGibbon, "The religious thought of D." In: Hermes 93 (1965), 385-97.
   Eric Wolf, Griechisches Rechtsdenken, II, 337 ff.
   G. Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in D." In: Philos. Review, 54 (1945) 578 ff. (part I),
   55 (1946) 53 ff. (part II).

b. Terminological explanations given by scholars whose main interest was concentrated on the history of some philosophical concepts and connections of language with philosophy.[1]

After all the elucidations mentioned above, taking one more source (Thucydides), important for useful comparisons, having in mind a principle of the philosophy of language (don't ask about the meaning but about the use of the words), I think that a research might be fruitful leading to the following points:

a. The Corpus of the fragments should be accepted as authentic and in D.'s own words or at least as mirroring his genuine thought.

b. They are consistent in themselves and compatible with the whole Democritean view of the World and of Life.[2]

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1. F. Heinimann, "Nomos und Phy^{s}is", Basel, 1945.
K.v.Fritz, "Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck", N. York, 1939.
C.E.v. Erffa, "Αἰδώς und Verwandte Begriffe".
In: Philologus, Suppl. 30/2 (1937) 197 ff.
C.J. Classen, "The Study of language amongst Socrates' contemporaries". In: PACA (1959) 33-49.

2. It should be remembered in this place that the problem of Freewill and the connected implications is a discovery of later centuries. See: P. Huby, "The first discovery of the Freewill Problem", Philosophy, 42 (1967) 353-62.

c. D.'s ethical theory will be explained in detail.

d. This theory can be classified side by side with Socrates', not with that of the Pre-socratics.[1] D. often expresses an ethic surprisingly close to that of Socrates; his aphorisms sometimes bear a striking resemblance to those recorded of Socrates (see e.g. frr. 45, 83, 171).

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1. Cf. Burnet, op.cit., p. 162ff.

2. Some remarks on the survival of D.'s ethical writings.

The question is closely connected with that of the authenticity of the surviving fragments. How and "why such an extraordinary number of short ethical frr. of Democritus were ready at hand for inclusion in Stobaeus' collection....for the real problem is to account for the ensuing gap of some 700 years until Stobaeus."[1]

The most famous historian of Greek Philosophy in our days accepts this remark as a general argument to justify his sceptism about the authenticity of the frr. attributed to Democritus.[2]

Let us follow the facts and testimonies on the problem:

1. Plato nowhere mentions Democritus at all.[3]

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1. Zeph Stewart,"Democritus and the Cynics", HSCP 63 (1958) 179-180.

2. Guthrie, History, II, 489 footn.3.

3. Diog. Laertius, IX 40: πάντων γὰρ σχεδὸν τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμνημένος ὁ Πλάτων οὐδαμοῦ Δημοκρίτου διαμνημονεύει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἵνδ' ἀντειπεῖν τι αὐτῷ δέοι....

This fact is used by Diogenes as a clear evidence that "Plato wished to burn all the writings of D. that he could collect...." (IX 40)

Perhaps it is only an exaggeration of Plato's opposition to D.'s theories, however it does suggest that D.'s books might not have found a place in the Academy's library, through which other writers survived.

But D. is undoubtedly a historical person; therefore Plato's silence (due either to ignorance or to refusal to recognise a "materialist" opponent) cannot be reasonably used as an argument that D. did not write on Ethics.

2. Aristotle mentions D.'s scientific work but not his ethical writings. It is difficult to explain his silence, given that coming from N. Greece he was more likely to have been acquainted (familiar) with D.'s ethical bobks as well. Hypotheses explaining this fact could be:

a. Aristotle did not recognise D.'s ethical writings as an important contribution in that field of thought. He himself ignores Isocrates' "ad Demonicum" (a pamphlet full of admonition similar (in form) to that coming from D.'s frr.). He ignores Xenophon too.

b. Aristotle disregarded D.'s ethical theory because of its materialistic foundation and lack of any allusion to teleological views; but he could have discussed D.'s materialism and rejected it.

c. Seemingly improbable but not (unbelievable: Aristotle did not know D.'s ethical writings.

3. Epicurus and his followers declared absolute independence from D.'s influence;[1] they accused him[2] of speaking carelessly or confusing

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1. Cicero, de nat. deorum, I.33.93: "Epicurus....in Democritum ipsum, quem secutus est, fuerit ingratus" (Usener, Epicurea, fr.235, p.175) Cf. Cicero, de finibus I.6.17 and I.6.21 (Usener, fr.234).

2. Diog. Laertius X.8 (Usener, fr.238, p.176. Arrighetti, Epicuro, p.421): Ληρόκριτον. (foolish man?). Cf. Plut. adv. Colot. 4 p.1108F (VS 68B 156).

life, and tried to emphasise Epicurus' improvements on D.'s theories.[1]

4. Only Cynics favoured D.'s ethics as far as they found interest in them and "it was among them and their allies that his frr. were preserved...and probably deformed for more convenient use."[2] Of more specific Cynic interest is D.'s valuation of pain and autarkeia - both Cynic bywords - and of athambia, his concern with Fortune (Stewart p. 181).

Stewart's argument is that Seneca in a number of passages similar (in content) to D.'s frr.[3] quotes his Cynic frimnd, Demetrius.

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1. Diog. of Oinoanda, fr. 6.II. 3 ff. w (Rhein Mus. 47 (1892) p.436; Chilton 12; Grilli 40:) ἐσφάλη δ'ἀναξίως ἑαυτοῦ Δ. τὰς ἀτόμους μόνας κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰπὼν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ νομιζεῖ.

(allusion to frr. 9, 125).

See also: D. of Oinoanda, fr. 33 III.2 (VS 68 A 50): ἂν γὰρ τῷ Δημοκρίτου τις χρήσηται λόγῳ, μηδεμίαν μὲν ἐλευθέραν φάσκων τοῖς ἀτόμοις κείνησιν εἶναι διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλας σύνκρουσιν αὐτῶν, ... Ἐπίκουρος δὲ εἰς φῶς ἤγαγεν παρεγκλιτικὴν ὑπάρχουσαν.

(Rhein. Mus. 47 (1892) p. 454; Chilton, p. 57; Grilli, p. 78).

2. Stewart, op. cit., p. 184.

3. DK 68B 117, 176, 210, 284, 175, 297, 55, 62, 174, 293, 244, 264, 144, 235, 4, 285, 191, 231, 295, 224, 283, 219.

But Stewart's parallels are not particularly imposing or persuasive (his hypothesis is a speculation only, as far as it concerns the role of Seneca's friend); and it should be noted that Seneca did not need a mediator, since he himself in another passage[1] mentions a whole and outstanding book by Democritus: "on Euthumia".

5. To this evidence add that:

a. D. was a provincial thinker; he was not known in Athens to his own surprise as he perhaps complains.[2] He visited Athens some time during the last decades of the fifth century B.C. and certainly before 399 B.C. (when Socrates was condemned to death), as is implied from the above reference.

b. Democritus had no famous disciples. Chance against which he fought[3] seems to have worked against his fame in both these respects (his provincialism and lack of well-known followers).

c. A general prejudice against materialism discouraged later thinkers from studying D.'s system and commenting on him.

6. From the above facts and remarks the following conclusions might be justified:

a. The cultural environment in Greece during the centuries after D.'s death was such that thinkers either ignored his theories or fought them or did not welcome them. Two philosophical schools at least with a long history and great influence (we know that) did not favour D.'s teaching for different reasons (Academy-Epicureans).

We can also imagine that other thinkers disliked theories with materialistic orientation.

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1. De tranquillitate animae II.3.
2. Diog. Laertius, IX 36 (DK 68 B 116).
3. frr. 119, 197 .

Democritus had dethroned Fortune, but during the centuries after his death it was deified not only by individuals but by whole communities.

b. Only Cynics from their point of view seemed to have found interest in some of D.'s ideas, in so far as they were helped by them.[1]

Therefore: D.'s ethical writings were destined under such conditions to be ignored, forgotten or corrupted.

But we have strong evidence from other sources that some copies of D.'s ethical book(s) survived by some way or another and reached the hands of later writers or collectors who lived during the first three centuries of our era and whose testimony should be accepted as reliable.

1. Seneca is very clear when writing "hanc stabilem animi sedem, Graeci euthumiam vocant, de qua Democriti volumen egregium est; ego tranquillitatem voco."[2]

This is the first item of information about the survival of one of D.'s ethical books; we find it nearly four centuries after his death. There are strong reasons to accept that Seneca had a copy of D.'s book at hand:

a. Seneca's expression is very clear affirmation for the existence of such a book, "On Euthumia", by Democritus.

b. It is also an expression of admiration (impossible if he had not read such a book).

c. Seneca was writing his own essay on the same subject; it is reasonable to assume that he had read a book on this subject written by a forerunner.

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1. Stewart, 180 ff.

2. De tranquillitate animi, II,3.

It should also be remembered that Seneca had some relations with Egypt and perhaps with the Library in Alexandria.[1]

2. At the end of the second century A.D. or at the beginning of the third, Clement of Alexandria giving a summary of the Abderites's views on the purpose of life writes: "Democritus in his book 'On the End' (teaches) euthumian....and many times he finishes (the chapters of his writing?) by saying:" (fr. 4(188) follows).[2]

It seems improbable that a learned man like Clement could write this, unless he had seen and read the book referred to.

3. During the last decades of the third century A.D. Diog. Laertius was so well informed about D.'s Chief Good (euthumia) that he knew that others had misunderstood it and he regarded it as his duty to overthrow the misapprehensions and give the correct meaning of D.'s term. He writes:[3] "The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure,

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1. Seneca, de tranquill. an. 9,5-6.
   Cf. also: Seneca's letters (edition with comments by W. Summers, Macmillan), letter 77th § 3: Seneca's uncle had been viceroy (praefectus) of Egypt for 16 years; he himself must have had an estate or business there.
2. Clem. Stromata, II.130 (DK 68B4): ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Ἀβδηρῖται τέλος ὑπάρχειν διδάσκουσιν· Δημόκριτος μὲν ἐν τῷ περὶ τέλους τὴν εὐθυμίαν ..... καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιλέγει· τέρψις γάρ καὶ ἀτερπίη οὖρος τῶν .....
3. Diog. Laertius IX 45 (DK 68A1.45).

as some[1] by false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion."

I cannot find any reason to suppose that Diogenes could attack previous scholars (philosophers?) and correct them in such a categorical way, unless he had strong evidence at hand (perhaps a genuine copy of D.'s work). He also gives a list of D.'s ethical writings and adds:[2] "The other works which some attribute to Democritus are either compilations from his writings or admittedly not genuine." This is a further piece of evidence that he used other sources.

The following conclusions seem to be sufficiently justified:

1. D. had written at least one book[3] on ethics ("on euthumia" according to Seneca, "on the End" according to Clement of Alexandria).

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1. Who were they? Perhaps the Cynics as Stewart (op.cit. p.187) supposes. But why not some hedonists? Such an implication is more probable. In any case, Diogenes had another source, more reliable, giving him the right to correct misinterpretations.

2. Diog. Laertius, IX.49: τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅσα τινὲς ἀναφέρουσιν εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ διεσκεύασται, τὰ δ' ὁμολογουμένως ἐστὶν ἀλλότρια.

3. Even the length of some frr. (e.g. 191, 277-9) and the structure of some others (175, 191, 238, 257, 259, 262) indicate that they belonged to a longer context, from which they have been extracted.

2. A copy of such a book was used by Seneca, Clement, and Diogenes; the same book could have been available later to Stobaeus (our main source for Democritus' frr.)

3. The question formulated by Stewart and accepted by Guthrie has been answered. We have found a way (to explain the survival of D.'s ethical writings) which covers the period from D. to Stobaeus.

4. A probable haven (reservation store) for D.'s ethical writings was the Ptolemaic Library in Alexandria[1], the doors of which were open for Clement and which Seneca also could have visited. That library was easily available to all citizens of the Roman Empire during the third and fourth centuries A.D.

Perhaps D.'s books found in the shelves of a tolerant and unprejudiced institution the place which was denied them in Athens.

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1. The librarians of that institution would be reasonably interested in collecting the books of the philosopher of Abdera.

3. Some considerations on the problem of the authenticity of D.'s fragments

This question has a long history; it first appeared in Diog. Laertius' age. Immediately after he had given a list of D.'s genuine books, he remarked[1] that other writings attributed to him are either compilations or fabrications ("admittedly not genuine").

For modern scholarship[2] the dispute begun a century ago, when Lortzing pointed out the problem which briefly is as follows:

The frr. of D. now included in Diels-Kranz, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker (fifth and subsequent editions), can be divided into three groups according to the degree of the authenticity admitted by modern scholars:

1. frr. 1-34 and 116-168 extracted from various sources (ancient authors, commentators, lexicographers) are the only undisputed attributions.[3]

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1. DL, IX.49.

2. Main literature: RE Suppl. 12 (1970) col. 208 ff. [Steckel]
   Z. Stewart, "D. and the Cynics", HSCP 63 (1958) 179-191.
   Guthrie, Hist. of Gr. Philos., II 489 footn. 3. He gives a brief summary of earlier literature.
   Schmid-Stählin, Gesch. d. Gr. Liter., I.5. (1948) 276 ff. for further literature.
   M.L. West, "The sayings of D.", Clas. Rev., 19 (1969), p. 162.

3. Of these 15 only can be regarded as having importance for a reconstruction of D.'s ethical theory, namely: 2,3,4, 30, 31, 33, 118, 119, 145, 146, 149, 153, 154, 159, 160.

2. frr. 35-115 coming from the so-called Democrates' collection[1] are strongly suspected to lack authenticity. Many of them are also included in the third group.

3. frr. 169-297 survived in Stobaeus' Florilegium. The shadow of suspicion is also cast on this group, on the ground that up to this point no bridge has been found to cover the period from D.'s death to Stobaeus' floruit (over 700 years).

Orelli had published (1819) a collection of over 200 frr. including the last two groups.

Lortzing investigated the question of identification of the two names Democrates and Democritus under whose names the two groups had survived.[2] Two other scholars[3] of the last century assumed that most of the surviving frr. should be accepted as authentically Democritean and tried to reconstruct D.'s ethical work (theory). Their attempt produced two other problems: the consistency of an ethical theory to be reconstructed from the surviving frr. and the compatibility of such a theory with the rest of D.'s system.[4]

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1. Δημοκράτους Γνῶμαι Χρυσαῖ were published for the first time by L. Holstenius, Rome 1638, from a Barberini codex and by C.J. Orelli, Leipzig 1819, from a Palatine MS.
2. Lortzing, "Über die ethischen Fr. Demokrits," Sophien-Gymnasium (Berlin, 1873) pp. 1 ff.
3. R. Hirzel, "Demokrits Schrift περὶ Εὐθυμίης ", Hermes 15 (1879) 354-407.

   P. Natorp, Die Ethika des Demokritos, Marburg (1893).
4. A. Dyroff, Demokritstudien, München (1899). As it concerns our inquiry these two questions will find an answer during the research which follows.

Important contributions to the question of authenticity were made by two scholars during the 1920's; one attacking the authenticity, the other defending it;[1] both in somewhat polemical tone. H. Diels had included both these collections in his second edition of "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" and found a conciliatory but "vague compromise" by saying that: "Investigation of the content forbids us either to accept them all uncritically or to reject them wholesale"[2] (transl. by Guthrie, Hist. II, 490).

The controversy continues; all later scholars who study D.'s moral frr. must first give their opinion on the problem of authenticity and the nature of the material itself, before saying anything else about it. Separate investigations into the problem of authenticity have made their appearance too.[3]

Stewart[4] casts doubt upon the "foolish men's series" of frr.

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1. H. Lalle, "De Democriti fragmentis ethicis," (diss.) Jahrbuch der Philosophischen Fakültät in Göttingen, 1922.
   R. Philippson, "Demokrits Sittensprüche", Hermes 59 (1924), pp. 369-419.
2. DK Fragmente II, 154: Die inhaltliche Prüfung der Democrates-sammlung gestattet weder alles kritiklos für echt noch alles für unecht zu halten.
3. Z. Stewart, "Democritus and the Cynics", HSCP, 63 (1958), 179-191.
   M.L. West, "The sayings of Democritus", Clas. Rev. 19 (1969), 142.
   C.C.W. Taylor, "Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in Democritus", Phronesis 12 (1967) pp. 6-27.
4. op. cit. p. 191 footn.39. RE 12 col.9 [Helm].

(197-206), for which Friedländer[1] had shown that they may have been lifted in their present state from the original work. Stewart argues that this group "is much more easily explained as part of the well known Cynic division of the world into wise men and fools or madmen". His reference to Diog. Laertius VI.71 does not help his interpretation.

On the contrary, the following remarks support the attribution made by Stobaeus:

a. fr. 197 is authenticated in its content and terminology by its similarity to other frr. attributed to D. beyond doubt.[2]

b. the content of fr. 202 is included in that of 191 (dovetails with that of 191).

c. the word τερπόμενος (frr. 200, 201) is confirmed by many other frr., two of which are beyond doubt (this term is unknown in Democrates' collection).[3]

d. the tradition about the laughing philosopher[4] — and there are abundant stories about him — would encourage us to attribute these frr.

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1. P. Friedländer, "Aufsatz zum Ὑποθῆκαι Problem", Hermes 48 (1913) 603-616, (particularly pp. 610-611).

2. fr. 119, fr. 33 (cf. ῥυσμοῦνται - μεταρυσμοῖ) fr. 7 (ἐπιρυσμίη). Cf. Simpl. Phys., 28.15 (DK 68 A 38) where ῥυσμός.

3. frr. 4, 146, 232, 211, 191, 194, 235, 188. More about it in the paragr. "on Criterion".

4. [Hippocr.] Epist. 10 (IX p. 320 Littré):... ὁ δὲ (sc. Δημόκριτος) γελᾷ πάντα .... ὁρῶν.

Epist. 17 (IX p. 360 Littré):... τίς ἡ κενὴ σπουδὴ καὶ ἀλόγιστος, μηδὲν μανίης διαφέρουσα.....

More examples in DK 68 A 21 and S. Luria, Democritea, pp. 21-22.

Cf. C.E. Lutz, D. and Heraclitus (Class. Journal, 49 (1953-4) 309-14).

to D. even if we lacked the attribution by Stobaeus. At least the question arises: why deny the attribution? because of the style?

e. Friedländer[1] correctly made a comparison to the well known Beatitudes (from the Sermon on the Mount) with their repetitive stylistic device.

One might also recall Kipling's poem "If" with its numerous ifs.[2]

Finally in defending their authenticity we don't insist that these frr. were a continuous part of a text; possibly they belonged to a series of chapters; after each of them a longer text explaining and justifying each aphorism might have been attached. The collector may then have abstracted for his purpose the aphorisms as they are known to us.[3]

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1. op.cit. p. 610-611.
   See Matthew, ch. E 3.
2. R. Kipling's Verse, Inclusive edition (2nd impression, London, 1934) p. 560.
   One more example from Nietzche, given by Friedländer (op. cit. p. 611): "Ich liebe die, welche, ... Ich liebe den, welcher ...."usw.
3. Stewart in his final page (191, footn. 44) accepts that "not all fragments in Stobaeus and the other gnomologies were preserved, and therefore subjected to sifting and alteration, in the same way. Some of the political ones (e.g. B 266), and some of the longer ones (e.g. B 191), seem pretty surely to have come to Stobaeus through another and better protected excerpting tradition...."

Guthrie[1] casts a general suspicion on the authenticity of both groups arguing (summarising previous literature) that:

"The grounds for suspicion are strong:

1. Many (of the frr.) are, even for their time, extremely commonplace and banal (36, 50, 53a, 54, 66, 81, 101, 268 and so forth).

2. Some are unoriginal (64, 65, 171, 236) echoing Heraclitus (40, 119, 85).

3. Some are astonishingly Socratic or Platonic: 45 (cf. Gorgias 479 E), 40, 77, 171 (cf. Apol. 30b), 173 (Meno 88A).....

The existence of these examples must cast considerable doubt

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1. History, II, 489-91. Cf. Stewart op. cit. p. 188 and footn. 42

on the selector's trustworthiness."[1]

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1. (a) I shall explain later (in the paragr. on Happiness) that the similarity (between D.'s fr. 171 and Heracl. fr. 119) is only apparent and deceptive; the meaning is different.

   (b) fr. 268 is not commonplace wisdom more than Lord Acton's aphorism: "All power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Both belong to that kind of wisdom which men know only after bitter experience.

   (c) fr. 236 (and Heraclitus' 85) might have a common origin in everyday parlance (cf. Chilon's 15: Θυμοῦ κράτει). Their similarity is only apparent and misleading; their meaning is quite different. According to Heraclitus fighting desire is very difficult; nearly impossible Democritus says it is difficult but it is the proper achievement of a reasonable man (εὐλόγιστος). He uses a term of importance in his system of virtues (cf. λογισμός in frr. 187, 290). It is reasonable that both these thinkers make a comment on a common problem, beginning with the same formula but expressing different aspects (on it).

He also seems to accept Stewart's conclusion that D,'s frr. survived through a Cynic "sieve" and to adopt the following statement "if the sayings are genuine, the problem is to account for their survival over 700 years, when neither Plato nor Aristotle shows any knowledge of them."[1]

An account of the survival of D.'s ethical writings is given in the previous paragr. Here the grounds for suspicion presented by Guthrie will be briefly discussed.

1. The fact that some frr. seem to contain commonplace wisdom is no reason to suspect their authenticity. They becqme banal because they were true and simple apophthegms.[2]

2. Similarities or even excessive imitation between thinkers of the same or different ages is not an argument that the work of either of them is not authentic, particularly when the points of similarity represent less than 3 % of the surviving work under discussion.[3] D. at least, for his part, confessed that he had visited Athens for the purpose of listening to Socrates and perhaps he did hear him teaching.[4] Since

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1. Guthrie, History, II 489 footn. 3. He repeats his opinion in the third vol. of his History of Gr. Philos., p, 470 footn. 1.
2. Philippson (Hermes, 59 (1924) p. 418) in reply to Lane argues: "Die Alltäglichkeit vieler Sprüche beweist also nichts gegen ihre Echtheit....Weil es wahr war, wurde es banal.
3. 5 frr. of Democrates' collection (64, 65, 45, 40, 77), 3 frr. of Stobaeus' collection (236, 171, 173).
4. DL 36. Cf. DK 68 B 116.

they are contemporary, either of the two might be a lender; D. is the likelier borrower. It would not be strange if he was influenced by that acquaintance with a famous and original thinker.

Less surprise is justified if we remember that ancient sources pointed out the parallel between D. and Plato in their common doctrines, without suspecting the originality of D.'s work.[1] Guthrie's grounds for suspicion fall mainly on frr. of Democrates' collection.[2]

It is more perplexing (and I am afraid almost impossible) to free Democrates' collection from the suspicion of non-authenticity. So a separate discussion on it might be justified.

Facts and evidence have priority:

1. All these frr. (DK 68 B 35-115) are short aphorisms very likely to be instructions for memorising; many are hardly longer than one line.

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1. Cic., de orat. II 46, 194. De divin. I. 38. 80 (DK 68 B 17).
   Horat., de art. poet. 295 (DK 68 B 17).
   Clement, Strom. VI 168 (DK 68 B 18).
   Cf. RE. Suppl. 12 (1970) col. 208 [Steckel].

2. To Guthrie's list of common ideas between D. and Socrates should at first sight be added fr. 83 which sounds very Socratic. Cf. Guthrie, History, III 450 ff. or Socrates, 130 ff. The idea of close connection between knowledge and virtue — is remembered — was a widespread doctrine during that period.

2. Compilations from D.'s books or selections of aphorisms attributed to him were in circulation in Diog. Laertius' days, which were perhaps fabrications.[1]

3. The only thinkers who were interested in some of D.'s moral sayings during that period were Cynics (according to a recent and valuable publication on the subject).[2] But is it not possible that D.'s followers would abstract a collection of aphorisms from the writings of their teacher?[3] It could equally have been a hedonist, if we draw the logical implications from D. Laertius' elucidation of D.'s euthumia.[4]

But there are some more important difficulties connected with these frr.

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1. DL, IX. 49 (DK 68 A 33 end).

2. Stewart, 184.

3. We have evidence about the existence of a School of Abdera during the fourth century B.C.

   Cf. Burnet, 157.

   See: DK, Fragmente, II·230-251.

4. DL, IX 45 (DK 68 AI, 45): τέλος δ' εἶναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν τῇ ἡδονῇ, ὡς ἔνιοι παρακούσαντες ἐξεδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἣν γαληνῶς ἡ ψυχὴ διάγει ....

4. A large proportion of them are included also in Stobaeus' Florilegium[1] whose source is obviously different and certainly larger (not only because he preserves many more frr. but also (principally) because most of his abstracts cannot be characterised as aphorisms to be memorised; their structure[2] or their length[3] show that they are parts of a larger context, abstracted from it by the collector for his purpose).

5. Some of them are in some way similar to frr. known also from Stobaeus' collection (either they are shortened forms of them or can accompany them).[4]

6. Democrates' frr., it is remarked by Laue,[5] are centred round the meaning of καλόν ἀγαθόν; but this is not accurate, since these notions are (more) equally frequent in the frr. of Stobaeus' collection.[6]

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1. 31 altogether (namely): 36, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46-49, 51-2, 53a, 55, 57-64, 73, 75-7, 81, 85-6, 88, 108, 111.
   fr. 39 is in Stob. III.37.22 (not in 25 which DK refer to).
2. 175, 191, 238, 257, 259, 262.
3. 191, 228, 235, 252, 253, 266, 277-9.
4. 84 (244, 264), 44 (225), 107a (293), 43 (174 end), 37 (189), 51 (181), 40 (170-171), 102 (191), 104 (294).
5. Laue, De Democriti fragmentis ethicis, p. 15.
6. καλόν : 38, 56, 63, 73, 102, 112 // 182, 194, 207, 274.
   ἀγαθόν : 35, 37, 39, 48, 62, 69, 79, 93, 108 // 172, 173, 175, 177, 229, 242, 247, 255, 261, 266, 294, 295.
   Underlined frr. are included in the two collections.

By contrast (Lałłe remarked) Stobaeus' frr. are centred round the concept of euthumia (and egoism); but this is not an acceptable generalisation. Euthumia is an important concept[1]; but justice is also strongly emphasised as an obligation toward others, indispensable for individual happiness and the life of the community.[2]

7. There remain less than half[3] of the frr. of Democrates' collection which: (a) are not included in the Florilegium of Stobaeus, (b) do not have evident similarity with frr. in it, (c) are not implied from frr. in it, but (d) which also don't contain ideas which should be excluded from D.'s teaching on the ground of incompatibility, if the rest of the Corpus Democriteum is accepted as genuine.

8. Democrates' collection has a different style,[4] structure of statements, vocabulary. Namely:

a. The conclusive word οὖν (therefore) is never used in Democrates' frr. although it is met several times, in Stobaeus.[5]

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1. frr. 3, 189, 191, 279, 286, 258, 174.
2. 261, 174, 215, 265, 256, 268, 263, 266.
   More about this problem in the Meaning of Good(s).
3. These are: 38, 45, 50, 53, 54, 56, 65-70, 72, 74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 87, 89-97, 99, 101, 103, 105-7, 109-110, 112-115.
4. Lałłe, De Dem. fragm. ethicis, pp. 13-14.
   Cf. Diels-Kranz, II 154: Ob der von Lałłe statuierte Stilunterschied....muss eine genauere Untersuchung lehren.
5. frr. 172, 182, 191, 295 173.

b. Democrates' aphorisms are categorical instructions; no case of demonstration and conclusion can be traced.[1]

c. Nowhere in Democrates is there an if-then construction leading from a condition to be fulfilled to a result to be attained (aimed at).[2]

d. Words like κόσμος, τύχη, ῥυσμός, ἀνάγκη showing a very probable connection to D.'s genuine vocabulary (used in his physics) are frequent in Stobaeus but non-existent in Democrates.[3]

e. The concepts of εὐθυμίη, τέρψις, ἀτερπίη can frequently be traced in Stobaeus' frr. (and frr. attributed to Democritus by other sources beyond doubt) but not in Democrates.[4]

f. αὐτάρκεια (selfreliance), δίκη, σωφροσύνη are found only in Stobaeus' collection.[5]

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1. Cf. (on the contrary): 173, 191, 179, 181, 187, 228, 235, 252, 253, 264-266, 275-9.
2. Except the introductory fr. 35. But compare: frr. 189, 233, 245, 253, 264.
3. κόσμος in frr. 5C, 21, 34, 180, 195, 247, 258, 259, 274.
   τύχη in frr. 3(2), 119(2), 176, 197, 210, 269, 293.
   ῥυσμός in frr. 197 (ῥυσμοῦνται), 7(ἐπιρυσμίη), 33 (μεταρυσμοῖ).
   ἀνάγκη in frr. 181, 239, 253, 262, 277, 289.
4. τέρψις : 4, 146, 188, 194, 235 (cf. also: 211, 200, 201, 232).
   ἀτερπίη : 4, 174, 188 (cf. also fr. 233).
   εὐθυμίη : 2C, 191, 258 (cf. also: 174, 3, 189, 279, 286)
5. αὐτάρκεια : 4, 209, 246 (cf. 176, 210: αὐτάρκης).
   δίκη : 159, 174, 215, 256, 258, 263.
   σωφροσύνη : 208, 210, 211, 294.

g. Some forms characteristic of the Ionic dialect are found only in Stobaeus' collection.[1]

h. On the other hand some terms describing human character are found in Democrates' collection, but nowhere in Stobaeus.[2]

9. Additionally, it should be remarked here that, all testimony about D.'s style, particularly his clarity and figurative way of expression (in frr. like 30, 119, 125, 159, all coming from other sources than the two collections) permit the assumption that his writings were a rich fountain for collectors of epigrams.[3]

From these facts and remarks (above 1-8) the following conclusions might well be justified:

1. Democrates' collection has an obviously different style from that of Stobaeus (remark 8). It seems also to have a different purpose (remark 1).

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1. κως (266), ξκοίων (235), ξκόταν (235),
ὅκως 191, 266, 285, 259, 288,
ὁκόσα 175, 191, 198, 223, 235, 251, 254.

2. δόκιμος 67, 68, ἀδόκιμος 68,
κίβδηλος 63, 82, 93.

3. Cic. de orat. I.2.49. Orat. 20.67. de divin. II.64. 133: valde Heraclitus obscurus, minime D.
Dionys. de compositione verborum, 24: φιλοσόφων δὲ κἀτ' ἐμὴν δόξαν Δημόκριτός τε καὶ Πλάτων καὶ 'Αριστοτέλης· τούτων γὰρ ἑτέρους εὑρεῖν ἀμήχανον ἄμεινον κεράσαντας τοὺς λόγους.
(DK 68 A 34).

2. Either Democrates' source is considerably poorer than that of Stobaeus (1, 4) or the intentions of the collector were different. It is possibly (but not necessarily) the work of a Cynic (3).

3. Characteristic terminology of D. is non-existent in Democrates, abundant in Stobaeus (remarks 8 d-e).

4. Stobaeus' collection in its style and structure shows that it might consist of genuine frr. abstracted from a book rich in ideas and distinguished in style (4, 9, 8 a-c).

5. Though the two collections are dissimilar for the reasons noted above, they are not unalike in content (remarks 4-7).[1]

6. Finally, from all the above evidence, there are strong grounds for recognising Stobaeus' collection as the genuine work of D. in style and content.[2] And there are strong grounds for the suspicion that Democrates' collection, at least in the form we know, is not genuine work of D., although mirroring D.'s ideas; we cannot overlook the facts (of remarks 4,5,7).

Aalders's opinion seems to be justifiable: "So long as a fr. has not been clearly proved to be spurious, we have to accept it as a part of D.'s writings and may not neglect it."[3] In the final analysis "the onus probandi falls on the shoulders of those who deny authenticity.[4]

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1. Cf. DK II 154: Die inhaltliche Prüfung der Demokrates Sammlung...
2. For some remarks on its survival see in the previous paragraph.
3. G.J.D. Aalders, "The political faith of Democritus". In: Mnemosyne 4/3 (1950) p. 302.
4. S. Luria, Zur Frage der materialisischen Begründung der Ethik bei Demokrit, Berlin (1964) p.1.

As far as it concerns our research these rules will be followed:

1. frr. 1-34, 116-168, 169-297 are taken as authentic. Our inquiries will begin with them.

2. From Democrates' collection those frr. will be used without hesitation which are included also in Stobaeus (e.g. 41, 42, 44, and so forth).

3. From the same group those frr. will be used which show obvious similarity to those in Stobaeus e.g. 84 (244, 264) or might have similar implications 107a (293).

4. Some of the remaining fragments of Democrates' collection (nearly 40) will be used if and only if they are not contrary to D.'s ideas.

5. Fr. 299 (spurious in DK edition) will be defended as genuine. Occasionally also some remarks will be made on the authenticity of other frr. (e.g. 69, 83).

CHAPTER ONE

Democritus' attitude towards Religion.

The evidence we possess (D.'s own fragments or testimony coming from other sources) about his belief or disbelief in gods may be discussed under the following heads:

1. Exclusion of gods from his Macrocosmos.
2. Cautious criticism of traditional religious ideas.
3. Explanation of an epistemological problem: a rationalistic solution in the Democritean Microcosmos.
4. The problem of Fortune. Theory of Eidola.
5. Implications for his ethical theory and political views.

1. Exclusion of gods.

In the Atomists' Universe necessity is omnipotent and displaces gods; according to Leukippus' formula: "nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity."[1] The testimony of authors from antiquity leaves no doubt that D. held the same view. Necessity, we are informed, is the only cause for everything that has happened, is happening or will happen.[2]

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1. VS 67 B 2 (Aët. I. 25. 4 Dox. 321): οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.

2. 68 A 39 ([Plutarch] Strom. 7 Dox. 581): προκατέχεσθαι τῇ ἀνάγκῃ πάντ' ἁπλῶς τὰ γεγονότα καὶ ἐόντα καὶ ἐσόμενα.

Similar information is provided by D. Laertius[1] and Aristotle.[2]

D.'s description of nature leaves no room for deities. "On the whole he was inclined to regard the course of the universe as unaffected by the gods."[3]

2. Cautious criticism of traditional religious ideas.

Let us see whether his Microcosmos is created, or governed, or in any way affected by gods. He rejects any divine intervention in human affairs; but he does not attack popular views in such a way as to provoke reaction and possibly persecution; at least no such attack is to be traced.

D. seems to have attempted to make man responsible for his decisions and actions. Of course such an aim cannot be attained without denial of popular superstitions and prejudices. In that direction a wide road had been opened by other thinkers. Xenophanes e.g. was quite definite in his criticism of the traditional conception of the gods who mirrored human vices. He attacked outspokenly very respected poets, Homer and Hesiod, on the ground that they had "attributed to the gods all qualities that are shameful and a reproach among mankind: theft, adultery, and mutual deception."[4]

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1. VS 68 A 1, 45 (DL IX 45): πάντα τε κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀνάγκην καλεῖ.
2. VS 68 A 66 (De gener. animal. 789 b 2): Δ. ... πάντα ἀνάγει εἰς ἀνάγκην οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις.
3. Th. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, I. 355.
4. VS 21 B 11: πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδός τε, ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

During the fifth century BC scientists, rationalists, realists, and politicians united their voices or actions in their effort to give a rationalistic explanation of human affairs[1] and to deprive traditional religion of its customary respect. Atheism or scepticism about the existence of gods and their function or suspicion of having such irreligious ideas was quite common. Anaxagoras was

1. F.M. Cornford, Greek Religious Thought, London (1950) [1923], pp. 131-157 (Chs. XII-XIII).

"The fifth century had an almost limitless faith in the powers of the mind" (W. Jaeger, Paideia, 1.287). The causes and consequences of the age of rationalism cannot be analysed here. Only some repercussions of this movement in the field of ethics will be briefly outlined.

Scientific ideas about the Universe displaced or at least removed gods and the connected fear of the gods.

In education nature was accepted as the ground on which teaching, learning, practice will come to build a human personality; the aristocratic view of inherited character and morality is attacked.

This is perhaps the result of some political events and the cause of others; every citizen in a city-state is entitled to the right to get into power by vote and/or "lot", to express opinion about state affairs, to propose laws. Perhaps it was one (possible) interpretation of Protagoras' "Homo-mensura" aphorism (VS 80 B 1).

A sense of arrogance was unavoidable; the Greek victory over the Persians (490-449 BC) was another source of national

arrogance; the construction of a naval empire (of Athens) and the wealth, in which the new generation grew, led to more arrogance and misuse of power.

In a period of commercial and political competition the ethical qualities were gradually pushed to the background and strong emphasis was laid on intellectual qualities. Absence or displacement of deities was deeply felt in private, social, political life (Cf. Sophocles' Antigone, 134f ff.).

See: Jaeger, op. cit. 1. 287 ff. (Sophists)

1. 382 ff. (Thucydides).

prosecuted for impiety perhaps during the last years of Pericles' office.[1] Alcibiades was accused on suspicion that he and his friends mutilated the "Hermae" before the expedition to Sicily (415 BC). Protagoras had

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1. The date of this prosecution is controversial. According to Burnet (Greek Philosophy, p. 61) the trial could have taken place at the beginning of the Periclean Age (before 450 BC). This dating is shared by Copleston (History of Philosophy, I. 1.83).

   It is not intended here to discuss this problem in detail; a brief review only will be presented. D. Laertius (II.12) does not give any hint for dating the trial. Testimony from Plutarch (Pericles 32.3) allows Victor Ehrenberg (From Solon to Socrates, London, 1969, p. 244) to conclude that "the decree of Diopeithes concerning atheism has to be dated in 433-2 or 432-1". He goes on: "Diopeithes, one of the charlatan soothsayers who were trusted by the people, acted on the instigation of Cleon... The decree was most likely directed in particular against Anaxagoras." Such a late dating of the trial was adopted much earlier by J.B. Bury (History of Greece, 3rd. ed., 5 (1956) [1951] p. 409) who connects it with two other prosecutions (of Pheidias and Aspasia) and writes: "In his last years Pericles had been afflicted by the indirect attacks of his enemies."

declared his scepticism,[1] Kritias, the famous oligarchic politician, presented on the stage the view that gods are a human invention[2] and Euripides portrayed the debate on the stage.[3] "The time, it seemed, had come for the tragic conflict between man and god to be resumed."[4]

The reasons for the whole movement cannot be discussed here, but the results are of importance, if we are to understand D.'s attempt to reconstruct human morality on an earthly basis. In doing so, he was in accordance with his scientific system and in agreement with his age.

First of all: he played his part in the criticism of traditional beliefs. A kind of Theodicy can be seen in fr. 175: "But the gods are the givers of all good things, both in the past and now. They are not, however, the givers of things which are bad, harmful, or not beneficial, either in the past or now, but men themselves fall into these through blindness of mind and lack of prudence (sense)".[5]

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1. VS 80 B 4: περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι...
2. VS 88 B 25 (vers. 12-16): ...πυκνός τις καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνήρ...τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο.
3. fr. 292, vers. 7: εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρόν, οὐκ εἰσιν θεοί· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν ὑφηγοῦνται θεοί.
   Two different views of the world are mirrored above; ethical absolutism and religious absolutism.
4. W. Jaeger, Paideia, I. 342.
5. fr. 175: οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι διδοῦσι τἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. πλὴν ὁκόσα κακὰ καὶ βλαβερὰ καὶ ἀνωφελέα, τάδε δὲ οὔ<τε> πάλαι οὔτε νῦν θεοὶ ἀνθρώποισι δωροῦνται, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τοῖσδεσιν ἐμπελάζουσι διὰ νοῦ τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην.

Two implications are clear and distinct:

a. the gods are acquitted,

b. human responsibility is founded on human capacity.

We have not yet a rejection of the gods, but an optimistic vision of human capacity is asserted. Man is not predestined to live in pain and torture, but he must be persuaded that he alone is able to make his decisions, be responsible for his actions, and guilty for his misfortunes. This is a form of rationalism.

A question should be raised: Did D. accept the existence of gods by writing what is for us fr. 175? Did he infer that gods are responsible only for good from a previous affirmation of their divinity and perfection of their nature? Human responsibility emerges so strongly (from the passage under discussion) and any intervention of divine powers is so categorically rejected in other passages (to be discussed, fr. 119 e.g.) that there remains no probability for an affirmative answer to the question above. Expressions like that (in fr. 175; cf. also 217, 234) constitute concessions only to popular beliefs.[1] Natura non vincitur nisi parendo and human nature is not persuaded except by way of concession.

That using the word "gods" is only a mode of expression for D. seems clearer in this passage: "Men ask in their prayers for health from the gods, but do not know that the power to attain this lies in

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1. I. Lana, L'etica di Democrito, in Rivista di Filosofid 42 (1951) pp. 20-21.
Cf. H. Eisenberger, Demokrits Vorstellung vom Sein und Wirkung der Götter (in Rhein. Mus. 113 (1970) pp. 148-9).

in themselves; and by doing the opposite through lack of self-control, they themselves become the betrayers of their own health to their desires."[1] Here again gods are not rejected but it is denied that they give help to men; if men believe so, it is due to human ignorance, lack of self-control, stupidity (cf. fr. 197).

In both passages presented above the last proposition gives the important point which D. aimed to emphasise: human capacity and therefore responsibility. "Nous" in the first case (175), strong will or self-control (egkrateia) in the second (234) are described and demanded as human qualities leading to what is good and to health. And both passages seem to be addressed to people obviously failing to use their "nous" and "egkrateia".

In some other passages D. uses expressions from which it might be inferred, at first sight, that his attitude towards religious ideas of his age was friendly rather than hostile (negative). We read: "it is the mark of divine intellect to be calculating always something noble"[2] or "they think divine thoughts with their mind"[3] or "Homer, having been gifted with a divine nature..."[4]. It seems that he found

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1. fr. 234: ὑγιείην εὐχῇσι παρὰ θεῶν αἰτέονται ἄνθρωποι, τὴν δὲ ταύτης δύναμιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντες οὐκ ἴσασιν· ἀκρασίῃ δὲ τἀναντία πρήσσοντες αὐτοὶ προδόται τῆς ὑγιείης τῇσιν ἐπιθυμίῃσιν γίνονται.
2. fr. 112: θείου νοῦ τὸ ἀεί τι διαλογίζεσθαι καλόν.
3. fr. 129: φρενὶ θεῖα νοῦνται.
4. fr. 21: Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θειαζούσης...

Cf. also: frr. 37, 189 (last sentence).

more convenience in using such expressions for his ideas and hoped at the same time by expressing them in current terms to win a wider audience. In the final analysis he was not a dogmatic (opponent) persecutor of religious ideas but a tolerant thinker; according to tradition he used to laugh at and not get angry with human absurdities. Expressions like these in the passages above are used in everyday parlance to emphasise nobility and greatness. With the same meaning and in accordance with the same tendency Epicurus writes: "So you will live like a god amongst men."[1]

D.'s rationalism is obvious when he allegorises Athenas' epithet "Tritogeneia"; "he identifies the goddess with the three excellences (by saying that): Prudence...(is) good counsel, unerring speech and right action."[2] Such allegorising was popular in the fifth century; but it is difficult to accept that this phenomenon does not express a disbelief or a shaken belief.[3] D.'s fr. 2 must be discussed and understood in connection with his effort to explain how people came to believe in gods; behind their names he saw powers of nature and moral conceptions as will be argued in the following paragraph.

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1. Third Letter: To Menoiceus (paragraph 135) (Usener, Epicurea, p.66, Arrighetti, Epicuro, p. 117): ...ζήσῃ δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

2. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 196.
Fr. 2: Τριτογένεια ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ....ἐκ τοῦ φρονεῖν τρία ταῦτα βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς, λέγειν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. Cf. 68A76.

3. Per contra see McGibbon, The Religious Thought of Democritus (in Hermes, 93 (1965) p. 397, footn. 1.

On the other hand, to characterise the Abderite thinker as "ein kämpferischer Atheist....unversöhnlichste Gegner des Theologismus"[1] is - in view of his own fragments and of what is recorded of him - a onesided and biassed explanation. He was a thinker independent enough to be an agnostic on religious problems and tolerant to other people's beliefs, while he faced another difficulty with the very existence of religious beliefs.

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1. Grosju Grosew, Der Materialismus des D., pp. 217-8.

3. Explanation of an epistemological problem: a rationalistic solution in the Democritean Microcosmos.

D. was first of all a physicist, i.e. a scientist seeking an explanation for everything; his teacher, Leukippus, was the first to formulate what we call the principle of sufficient reason: "everything happens out of reason..."[1] D. tried to find a cause for every phenomenon in nature and event in human life; the enthusiastic[2] spirit of investigation inherent in his vast scientific programme is beautifully expressed in fr. 118; he used to say that "he would rather discover one cause than gain the kingdom of Persia."[3] All his life was a restless attempt to find truth in the Macrocosmos and Microcosmos. He tried to form an epistemology consistent with his scientific system and a corresponding theory of sensation, according to which perceptions must correspond to external realities. Now he was confronted with an epistemological problem.[4] In the Macrocosmos gods had no function, either in the creation or in the government of the universe; but expelled through the door gods returned through the window of the Democritean Microcosmos. Belief in gods is an

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1. VS 67 B 2: οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.
2. Kurt v. Fritz, Νοῦς, νοεῖν and their derivatives, p. 26 n. 161.
3. fr. 118: Δ. ...ἔλεγε βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι.
4. W. Jaeger, The Theology of early Greek philosophers, p. 180.

undeniable fact. D. had to meet this problem not only because of his scientific inclination but also in order to (protect) defend his whole system. If the existence of gods was asserted explicitly or silently in the Microcosmos, why should they not have a place in the Macrocosmos? An adequate solution should be accomplished in two stages:

a. a persuasive explanation of the fact that many people believe in gods and perform a variety of religious actions,

b. an explanation of some other phenomena, which, without belonging to religious concepts strictly speaking, are nonetheless in many cases closely connected with religion (prophetic dreams, belief in Chance).

According to Sextus Empiricus[1] D. shared with other t inkers the view that men came to form conceptions of divine beings because of the fear which they felt when confronted with powerful, astonishing and sometimes dangerous natural phenomena (e.g. lightning, thunder, etc.); i.e. men believed that such phenomena were caused by divine beings or gods. There is noreason for doubting that D. adopted this opinion. But in some fragments of his more elaborate views are expressed. In a beautiful passage (fr. 30), which probably

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1. IX. 24 (VS 68 A 75): .... ὁρῶντες .... τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα .... ἐδεισματοῦντο θεοὺς οἰόμενοι τούτων αἰτίους εἶναι.

belonged to a book on the History of Civilisation.[1] D. says: "of the

1. See Diels-Kranz comments on both B 30 and B 5.
Cf. G. Pfligersdorffer, Λόγιος und die Λόγιοι ἄνθρωποι bei Demokrits Fr. 30, p. 6: "Das Fr. als Bruchstück einer Religionsgeschichtlichen Darstellung."

For reasons to be explained in the discussion which follows it seems purposeful (interesting) to quote here the two versions of this fragment which survived in Clement Alexandrinus' writings, from which DK's 68 B 30 (combination of terms and syntax):

a. Protr. 68: ὅθεν οὐκ ἀπεικότως ὁ Δημόκριτος "τῶν λογίων ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγους φησίν ἀνατείναντας τὰς χεῖρας ἐνταῦθα, ὃν νῦν ἠέρα καλέομεν οἱ Ἕλληνες, [πάντα] Δία μυθεῖσθαι....

b. Stromata V. 102: Ἤδη δὲ ὡς εἰπεῖν ὑπ' αὐγὰς ὁ Δημόκριτος εἶναί τινας ὀλίγους γράφει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὴ ἀνατείναντες τὰς χεῖρας ἐνταῦθα, ὃν νῦν ἠέρα καλέομεν οἱ Ἕλληνες, <φασί> πάντα Ζεὺς μυθέεται....

learned men, a few, lifting their hands thither to what we Greeks call the Air nowadays, said: 'Zeus thinks of all things and he knows all and gives and takes away all and is king of all'."[1]

Some questions of exegesis arise:

a. Who are meant by the term "Logioi"? G. Pfligersdorffer[2] discusses a variety of interpretations: religious leaders, learned men, inventors, great personalities in human civilisation; it seems that only the first interpretation is well fitted to the context.

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1. fr. 30 (Clem. Protr. 68. Strom. V. 102): τῶν λογίων ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγοι ἀνατείναντες τὰς χεῖρας ἐνταῦθα, ὃν νῦν ἠέρα καλέομεν οἱ Ἕλληνες· "πάντα, <εἶπαν>, Ζεὺς μυθέται (?) καὶ πάνθ' οὗτος οἶδε καὶ διδοῖ καὶ ἀφαιρέεται καὶ βασιλεὺς οὗτος τῶν πάντων".

E. Norden (Agnostos Theos, Leipzig-Berlin, 1913, p. 163 footn. 2) divided it in 3 semicola as shown above; he showed that the first is similiter desinens ~~cadens~~ (homoiteleuton) with the second and that the whole passage is a rounded sentence (πάντα - πάντων).

2. Λόγιος und die Λόγιοι ἄνθρωποι bei Demokrit, in Wiener Studien, 61 (1943) pp. 5 ff.

The same term "logioi", with a second meaning (learned men) is repeated in fr. 299 where D. is recorded as saying: "...I have heard very many logioi..."[1]

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1. fr. 299 (Clement I. 15.69): Καὶ λογίων ἀνδρῶν πλείστων ἐπήκουσα....

Authenticity of the passage is denied by DK who include it in the list of "Unechte" (VS II.208); its content is not in accord with D.'s expected modesty. Nevertheless his expressions (seen from a psychological point of view) could be uttered by a man who:

a. was not accepted by Anaxagoras (DL IX.41; VS 68 B 5) and consequently travelled to foreign countries for his education and became an outstanding scientist,

b. visited Athens some time before 399 BC and to his surprise was not known there by anyone (DL IX.36; VS 68 B 116) although he was then one of the most important scientists of his day. (Cf. F.M. Cleve, The Giants of Presocratic Philosophy, pp. 399-400. Also: F. Enriques - M. Mazziotti, Le Dottrine di Democrito, Bologna (1948) p. 3). See also Th. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 1.318: "The emphasis that was laid here on the mere scope of his culture and achievements is in full accord with our conception of the man in whom we recognise less of the initiative faculty of invention than of the erudition which continues and expands it. Nor w ould we be repelled by the boastful tone that is taken...."

Two more reasons to accept the authenticity of the passage are:

a. the content of it is confirmed by other sources (DL IX 35. See also: Luria, Democritea, pp. 15-16),

b. in it is found the term logioi (which led us to this reference); and this term is unique in the Presocratics.

cf. also p. 317 of this study.

Reinhardt[1] thinks and Diels-Kranz accept (VS 68 B 30, commentary) that "mit den Logioi, die Zeus als Gott des Himmels verehren, meint er die Weisen der vorhellenischen Urzeit."

Luria (Democritea, Leningrad, 1970, p. 576, No.580[1]) asks himself whether logioi belonged to the original text of D. or was added by Clement (who preserved both B 30 and B 299); but in B 299 this term is found in the middle of the passage; therefore we have no reason to doubt that he copied this term with the passages mentioned. Luria rejects any relation between fr. 30 and Lucr. V.1105 (op. cit. p. 577).

On the other hand, the use of the national name Hellenes gives us the impression that D. opposes them to non-Hellenes; it is reasonable to accept that he makes an allusion to the oriental origin of religious beliefs.[2]

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1. Hermes 47 (1912) 511. Cf. Lucr. V. 1105; particularly interesting for the origins of religious belief and tradition is Lucretius V. 1155 ff.

2. Herodot (II.52 ff.) shares such a view.

   It is not irrelevant that Zeus' name is of oriental origin (Sanskrit. dyau = sky). See: E. Boisacq, Dictionaire Etymologique de la Langue Grecque, p. 308. H. Frisk, Griech. Etym. Wörterbuch, 1.610.

b. What is the meaning of fr. 30? Clement uses the extract in order to support his view: that ancient philosophy was but a preparation for Christian doctrines.[1] O. Gilbert (Griechische Religionsphilosophie, p. 478) accepted such an interpretation and presented D. as a theist and dualist. McGibbon (op. cit. p. 397, footn. i) saw the fragment as an expression of respectfulness. Bailey (op. cit. p. 175), on the contrary, saw in it an ironical tone and noted: "D.....says with an obvious note of contempt....logiōn".

c. It seems that by examining the fragment itself one might discover a clearer answer to D.'s purpose (and the meaning of his allusion).

1. "What we call the Air nowadays"...: a reasonable implication is that: now we have recognised that it is the Air; therefore Zeus is displaced and whatever the "logioi" have said about Zeus is unacceptable.[2]

2. "Logioi...said"...: it is more than evident that D. comments on how religious ideas were originated; it does not mean that he accepts them. [On the meaning of the passage there can be no doubt: it is certainly a reference to the origin of religion.] Lifting the hands implies an expression of thanksgiving

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1. P. Böhner - E. Gilson, Christliche Philosophie, zweite Auflage, Paderborn (1954) pp. 33 ff.

2. Cf. Euripides fr. 941: τοῦτον (sc. τὸν αἰθέρα) νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἡγοῦ θεόν.

fr. 877: αἰθήρ....Ζεὺς ὃς ἀνθρώποις νομίζεται.

Aristophanes, Clouds, 828: Δῖνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δία ἐξεληλακώς.

Cf. also: VS 64 (Diog. of Apollonia) B 4, B 5.

or supplication; therefore thankful feelings and/or supplicatory disposition are regarded as sources of religious beliefs.

D.'s intention seems to have been rather to criticise the very existence of belief in divine beings and to find a solution to the question: how this belief came into existence; it was an epistemological problem for him. Despite the fact that Clement used the extract under dispute for his own purpose,[1] the very wording of it remains witness of the original purpose intended by its author; and it is very reasonable that the meaning of the passage should agree with the whole system and the general plan not of the excerptor but of the original author, whose views are known from other passages of his own (explicitly or by implication).

Sharp criticism e.g. is directed by D. against persons who create fables about retribution in the hereafter, because of their own bad conscience: "Some men, not knowing about the dissolution of mortal nature, but acting on knowledge of their sins, afflict the period of life with anxieties and fears, inventing false tales about the period

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1. For the way in which Clement uses D.'s text (fr. 3a) a comparison would be useful with another passage (fr. 33 in Stromata VI.151; Patr. Gr. VIII. 1357) where Clement commenting on D.'s text explains: καὶ διήνεγκεν οὐδὲν ἢ φύσει πλασθῆναι τοιόνδε ἢ χρόνῳ καὶ μαθήσει μετατυπωθῆναι· ἄμφω γὰρ ὁ Κύριος παρέσχηται τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὴν δημιουργίαν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Διαθήκης ἀνάκτησίν τε καὶ ἀνανέωσιν.

after the end of life."[1]

A number of important problems are touched on in this passage; and they have equally important implications in Democritean Ethics:

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1. fr. 297: ἔνιοι θνητῆς φύσεως διάλυσιν οὐκ εἰδότες ἄνθρωποι, συνειδήσει δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ βίῳ κακοπραγμοσύνης τὸν τῆς βιοτῆς χρόνον ἐν ταραχ(αῖς) καὶ φόβοις ταλαιπωρέουσι, ψεύδεα περὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν μυθοπλαστέοντες χρόνου.

Nilsson (Greek Piety, transl. by H.J. Rose, Oxford, 1948 p. 83) characterises it as a "protest" against beliefs in the underworld and the punishments expected there; he also recalls (in connection with this passage) Plato's Introduction to the Republic where the old Kephalos is represented as saying "that when death draws near, a man who formerly gave no thought to such matters is seized with fear about the myths of the punishment of evil-doers in the underworld." It is obvious that Nilsson refers to Rep. 330 D-E. Cf. his Greek Popular Religion, New York, 1940, pp. 118-119.

Cf. also: Aeschylus' Persae, 497-99 (the Persian messenger is speaking): ... θεοὺς δέ τις
τὸ πρὶν νομίζων οὐδαμοῦ τότ' ηὔχετο
λιταῖσι, γαῖαν οὐρανόν τε προσκυνῶν.

a. Soul is mortal; this declaration is in complete agreement with the atomic theory.[1]

b. Bad conscience is the origin of a retribution in the hereafter.

c. Therefore, religious conceptions are the unreal offspring of a bad conscience.[2]

d. Fables about retribution hereafter disturb life; such disturbances abolish what is for D. the "summum bonum", i.e. euthumia.[3]

e. Retribution, according to D., comes in man's own inner life, which constitutes his own Hell.[4] The road is left open for freedom and responsibility.

Remarks c and d above perhaps explain the angry and polemical tone — unusual in D.'s manner — of fr. 297.

It should be remembered that this fragment has been declared unauthentic on the ground that the word syneidesis was not used up to D.'s days in the meaning which it must bear in this case.[5] This is partly true; but the corresponding verb "synoida" can be found with

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1. 68 A 109 (Aët. IV.7.4 ; Dox. 393): Δ. .... φθαρτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην.
   See the paragraph: "Mind-body problem".
2. W. Jaeger, The Theology, p. 181.
3. See the paragraphs: "Euthumia", "Presuppositions of Eu."
4. Jaeger, op. cit. 181. Cf. fr. 174 (ad fin.)
5. P.W. Schönlein, Zur Entstehung eines Gewissensbegriffes bei Griechen und Römern (in Rhein. Mus. 112 (1969) 289-305).

with the same meaning in Euripides' Orestes (vers. 395-6 apud Stob. III. 24. 5)[1], where Menelaus asks: "Miserable Orestes what illness destroys you? and Orestes answers: "Remorse, that I am conscious (synoida) that I have committed horrible actions".

Since the term syneidesis is perhaps not a new[2] one in the case of fr. 297, but is only used with a modified meaning, our interest must reasonably be limited to the question: what is here the sense of the word?

On the other hand syneidesis in D.'s ethical theory is accompanied by other terms, e.g. metameleia (remorse, fr. 43), aidōs (self-respect, fr. 179), aideisthai (to be ashamed, frr. 84, 244, 264), and law of the soul (fr. 264), which together constitute fundamental conceptions in his system.

Finally, a new term or a new meaning of an old one cannot be regarded as anything unusual or improbable, especially in the case of a thinker whose tendency was to use unusual or old, as well as sometimes new, terms[3] and whose aim was to *create* an ethical theory not dependent on the will of the gods or their caprices, but a theory based on individual human responsibility.

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1. τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ'ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος;
ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος.

2. Stob. III. 24. 11-12: Βίας ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἂν εἴη τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄφοβον, εἶπεν· ὀρθὴ συνείδησις. Περίανδρος ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστιν ἐλευθερία, εἶπεν· ἀγαθὴ συνείδησις.

3. Cf. frr. 129 ff.

So D.'s attempt to explain actual religious belief can be summarised in two points:

a. mistaken inference from terrifying natural phenomena.

b. psychological projection (expression of thanksgiving or supplicatory feeling or fear of retribution in the hereafter).

A third (parapsychological) explanation will be discussed in the following pages (on Eidola).

4. The problem of Fortune. Theory of Eidola.

If D. was finally to have cleared his Microcosmos of gods and any substitute for them, he had to provide an explanation for some further phenomena and superstitions, e.g. dreams, prophetic dreams, influence of Chance, precognition.[1]

There is a beautiful attack on the deification of Fortune in fr. 119: "men have fashioned an image of fortune as an excuse for their own stupidity. For fortune rarely conflicts with intelligence,

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1. On these problems important contributions have been published in recent years by P. J. Bicknell: D.'s theory of precognition, REG, 82 (1969) pp. 319-26 and Democritus: Parapsychology again, REG, 83 (1970), pp. 301-304.

and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharpsightedness."[1]

The rationalist character of D.'s thought is evident here; fortune, according to him, is an "idol" (of the market ?) which men created as an excuse for their laziness of mind and consequently for their failure. But, as a matter of fact, in human affairs an intelligent and active mind can exercise foresight, with success.[2] Chance is only the measure and offspring of our ignorance

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1. fr. 119: ἄνθρωποι τύχης εἴδωλον ἐπλάσαντο πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀβουλίης. βαιὰ γὰρ φρονήσει τύχη μάχεται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ἐν βίῳ εὐξύνετος ὀξυδερκείη κατιθύνει.
Meineke's writing (βαιῇ see VS II 167, commentary) raises a difficulty of interpretation: if phronesis is weak (βαιῇ as dative of the adjective refers to φρονήσει), it must be defeated by fortune, which contradicts the following sentence of the passage. If βαιῇ is an adverb, then βαιῇ equals βαιά .
Cf. Epicurus' sent. 16 (Usener, p. 17, Arrighetti, p. 127): βραχέα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκησε...

2. It is strange that Langerbeck (Δόξις Ἐπιρυσμίη , p. 53) found a contradiction in this fragment: "Auf Grund ihrer eigenen Ratlosigkeit haben die Menschen das Bild der Tychē gebildet. Und unmittelbar darauf....sie kämpft mit der Phronesis". But in the second proposition fortune is not a reality — as Langerbeck wrongly supposed — it is in D.'s view the personification (conceptualisation) of what is incalculable in human affairs (as they concern the future or the intentions of other people).

(of causes, of future conditions, of changing situations, of intentions of other people). Fortune had no room in D.'s Physics;[1] now it is expelled from the field of ethics; necessity rules there; phronesis will be recognised as the ruler here.

Another famous thinker of the late fifth century BC, the historian Thucydides, fought no less persistently to dethrone the idol of fortune. His thoroughgoing observations aimed at explaining how that image is exalted by men, although it represents nothing at all in reality. He says: we commonly lay upon fortune the blame for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations.[2] Elsewhere he emphasises human capacities as opposed to fortune and hope, which is strong in perplexity only, where there are incalculable conditions.[3]

D.'s aphorism seems to be the first appearance of a conscious attack against this popular idol.[4] Neither in the Presocratics[5]

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1. See Arist. Physics 195 b 36 (VS 68 A 68)
   and de generat. animal. 789 b 2 (VS 68 A 66).
   Cf. VS 67 B 2.
2. Thucyd. I. 140.i: ...τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι.
3. Thuc. II. 62.5. Cf. IV.62.4, II. 87. 2-3, III.45.6.
4. We cannot say with certainty that it is prior to Thucydides' writing; but D.'s view of fortune is connected with his (and Leukippus') Physics, which in all probability is a theory prior to the work of Thuc.
5. Two cases can "accompany" D.'s radical attack against any conception of fatalism:
   a. VS 88 B 21 (Kritias): ... τοῖσιν εὖ φρονοῦσι συμμαχεῖ τύχη.
   b. VS 85 B 1 (Thrasymachus): τὰ μέγιστα μὴ θεῶν ἔργα εἶναι μηδὲ τύχης ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπιμεληθέντων (VS II. 322. 9-11).

nor in classical tragedy[1] can such an outspoken opposition to the phantom of fortune be found.[2]

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1. A kind of fatalism is sometimes apparent in Greek Tragedy. See e.g. Aeschylus' Persae 345 ff., 495 ff., Sophocles' OT, 977-9, Antig. 1158 ff. Of course these and numerous other examples should not be pushed to logical consequences, which would transform the characters of the Tragedy into simple puppets (See D. Page, Introduction to the Agamemnon, Oxford, 1960, particularly pp. XXIII-XXVIII. I express my thanks to Prof. A. J. Beattie, who drew my attention to D. Page's pages). In many cases fortune is only another personification of Justice (for wrongdoings committed by men). "The Gods only predict; they do not compel". (H.D.F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy, 3rd. ed.[2](1966), p. 147) The only case of direct divine intervention is that of Athena in the Ajax where she makes Ajax mad. Otherwise the characters are acting according to their decisions. (See Kitto's remarks on OT and Heracles on p. 148 of his book). But straight and clear denial of Fortune's existence and intervention is nowhere traceable before D.'s fr. 119. Sophocles touches in some way this problem sub personae Iocastae (OT 915-6).
2. Aristotle shared similar views; he observes (Metaph. 1065 a 30-35): chance is....a cause only accidentally, but in the strictest sense is a cause of nothing.

It seems that D.'s aim was to dethrone fortune in order to give a place to human virtues and responsibility. He remarks elsewhere: "fools are shaped by the gifts of fortune; but those who understand these things, by the gifts of wisdom."[1] Wisdom (197) and phronesis (119) are opposed to fortune; i.e. human capacity is opposed to the caprices of a phantom.

Having freed his Universe of the presence and intervention of gods and his Microcosmos of the caprices of fortune D. was finally confronted with a class of phenomena which in modern terms are called parapsychological. He tried to find a cause, but he was not successful in finding a persuasive solution to the problem. His theory of Eidola (images, phantoms) - fragmentary as we know it - seems to be a heroic effort on the part of a strongly scientific character to find the answer to a problem of causation. It cannot be said that he himself was satisfied with his solution. It seems probable that he tried at some time to modify his own theory; at any rate, he did not avoid criticism and misapprehension. But let us first consider the sources.

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1. fr. 197: ἀνοήμονες ὑρυσμοῦνται τοῖς τῆς τύχης κέρδεσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε δαήμονες τοῖς τῆς σοφίης.

A very characteristic term of atomic Physics seems clearly to be behind the verb of this passage. Cf. 68 A 38 (ὑρυσμός), B [illegible] (ἐπιρυσμίη) , B 33 (μεταρυσμοῖ) , A 132 (μεταρρυθμίζεσθαι).

According to Sextus Empiricus[1] "D. says that certain eidola come into contact with human beings. Some of these eidola benefit men and others do them harm, and for this reason D. used to pray that he might meet with well-disposed eidola. The eidola in question are large and of extraordinary appearance (gigantic); they are not easily destroyed, but they are (also) not indestructible; they foretell future events; when they do this they are visually perceived and they communicate by speaking. Perception of such entities led the men of earlier times to surmise that a god existed. In fact there is no such thing as a being with an immortal nature, which is what we normally understand by a god; the notion arises purely from misinterpretation of impressions of the eidola.[2]"

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1. Adv. Math. IX 19 (VS 68 B 166): Δ. δὲ εἴδωλά τινά φησιν ἐμπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ τὰ δὲ κακοποιά· ἔνθεν καὶ εὔχετο εὐλόγχων τυχεῖν εἰδώλων... The translation above is taken from B. J. Bicknell, D.'s theory of precognition, REG 82 (1969) pp. 318-319.

2. Cf. 68 A 78: μεστόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἀέρα τούτων (sc. εἰδώλων).

According to D.'s epistemology knowledge of objects can be obtained either through the senses(by perception) or through the mind by thought. In both cases the process of apprehension is exactly the same; minute, spherical atoms within the perceiver or thinker are disturbed and rearranged through actual physical contact with objects. So, atomistic epistemology must preclude acquisition of knowledge of the future.[1]

But the theory of eidola continues as follows: " D. says that simulacra penetrate through its pores into the human body and having got there they are responsible for the things seen in sleep. These simulacra come to us from everything, from furniture, from clothes, from plants and especially from animals because of their motion and warmth. The simulacra are so constructed as to be replicas of the emitting object or creature and, according to D., in the latter case, they incorporate and carry along with them copies of the motions of his soul. The motions include those that are responsible for the intentions, the attitudes and dispositions of whoever emits the simulacrum reach their recipient and, just as if they themselves were living creatures, they acquaint him with the views, the calculations and the impulses of the individual who is their source. All this is likely to happen, it should be pointed out, if the simulacra are

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1. See Bicknell, op. cit., p. 321.

On D.'s theory of sensation see: Aristotle, de sens. 442a 29 (VS 68 A 119), Theophr. de sens. 63 (VS 68 A 135, 63). Cf.Bailey, Greek Atomists, 178. Guthrie, History, II. 438-41. cf. frr. 11, 125.

preserved complete and undamaged when they are received."[1]

There can be no doubt that we are confronted here with a theory of telepathy or prophetic dreams. Aristotle makes an allusion to it (only to reject it);[2] by doing so, he confirms the attribution of the theory to Democritus.

Combiningthe evidence given above one might remark:

a. These beings(eidola), surpassing human standard in size, were designed to move through the air (see 68 A 78) and enter our bodies and reach our most diverse organs and by direct impressions on our senses — by appearing to us in dreams and speaking to us — they were to exercise beneficial or malignant influences. They were not easily destroyed, but nor were they immortal.

b. According to Favorinus (in Plutarch's narration, 68 A 77) eidola are emitted from objects, while according to Sextus (B 166) eidola are described as independently existent beings themselves. An incompatibility between the two sources, as it concerns the nature and origin of eidola, is obvious.

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1. Plutarch, Quaestiones conv. VIII.10.2 p. 734 F (VS 68 A 77): ... ὅ φησι Δ., ἐγκαταβυσσοῦσθαι τὰ εἴδωλα διὰ τῶν πόρων εἰς τὰ σώματα... The translation quoted above is that of Bicknell, op. cit., pp. 323-4.

2. On prophecy in sleep, 464a 5-6: τοιόνδ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ἢ ὥσπερ λέγει Δ. εἴδωλα καὶ ἀπορροίας αἰτιώμενος.

c. At first sight all information we have about these mysterious phantoms seems to be irreconcilable with D.'s scientific system; he had denied fortune strongly, but now he seems to be introducing another external factor, on which human life is dependent.

When problems of incompatibility or inconsistency arise, questions of authenticity or interpretation are raised. S. Luria denied the authenticity of fr. 166[1] and all related testimonies;[2] H. Eisenberger unhesitatingly regards it as authentic.[3]

On the other hand, fr. 166 presents problems of interpretation; the verb ἐύχετο (he prayed or wished) may be understood in either of two different meanings with unacceptable implications. The first (he prayed) is irreconcilable with fr. 234; prayer for D. is meaningless. The second still makes human life and human happiness dependent on external powers, which is incompatible with Democritean Ethics of individual responsibility (see frr. 119, 197, 264). How little D. makes inward happiness dependent on fortune, we have already seen; and his insistence on human responsibility is to be discussed in detail later (when frr. 170, 171 and 264 will be analysed).

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1. S. Luria, Zur Frage der materialistischen Begründung der Ethik bei Demokrit, Berlin (1964), 4-5.
2. S. Luria, Democritea, pp. 571-75.
3. H. Eisenberger, Demokrits Vorstellung vom Sein und Wirken der Götter, in Rhein, Mus. 113 (1970) p. 142.

In accordance with the meaning attributed to fr. 166 different conclusions are inferred: (a) on the one view a kind of prophetic communication by the gods to men is to be seen in this crucial passage,[1] (b) on the other, "D. did not deny the gods altogether, but relegated them to a twilight realm of 'materialised psychical phenomena', where even though divested of their own peculiar power and significance, they could still bring about good fortune or bad."[2]

Despite the difficulties and the uncertainty of interpretation it seems very likely that the theory of eidola belongs to D.[3] and originally constituted an explanation of a real problem, i.e. the origin of dreams, especially of these dreams, which were believed to foretell the future. A part of what is recorded for D. verbally (in A 77 and B 166) amounts to the following: the eidola visit men, enter our bodies and so produce direct impressions; this part is compatible with D.'s theory of sensation. But the other item of information that D. himself wished (or prayed) to meet with fortunate eidola cannot be accepted, unless its meaning is modified to a wish for good dreams or good weather. For an entire surrender of life to accidental occurrences would be irreconcilable with the rest of D.'s ethical theory (see e.g. fr. 119).

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1. McGibbon, D.'s religious thought, p. 394.
2. Jaeger, The Theology, p. 181.
3. Aristotle, On prophecy in sleep. 464a 5-6.

In ancient times Cicero had already criticised D. for wavering on the problem of divinity.[1] "At one moment he (D.) holds the view (a) that the universe includes images endowed with divinity,... at another he says (b) that there exist in this same universe the elements from which the mind is compounded,[2] and that these are gods, ...at another (c) that they are animate images, and again (d) that they are certain vast images."

In the actual teaching of D. these scattered doctrines probably formed a consistent whole: the basis of the world is particles in space; groups of them form vast beings of long life but not everlasting; some of the particles floating off from their place enter the soul, itself composed of similar particles.... So the Abderite scientist-philosopher tried to solve a parapsychological problem; his solution is neither complete nor convincing; but it is consistent with his whole system.[3] He was looking for a cause. His theory of eidola was no doubt mistaken, but not necessarily irrational or unscientific.

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1. Cicero, De natura deorum, I. 43. 120.
2. Perhaps only in connection with the second point of Cicero's criticism is it possible to understand a mysterious statement of Aëtius (I. 7. 16; Dox. 302; VS 68 A 74): νοῦν τὸν θεὸν ἐν πυρὶ σφαιροειδεῖ.
3. For these reasons Langerbeck's view (which substantially repeats Cicero's) cannot be accepted (Δόξις Ἐπιρυσμίη, p. 52): Die Götterlehre Demokrits ist in sich widerspruchsvoll und unklar.

D.'s theses (formulated in fragments discussed above) may be summarised as follows:

1. No kind of predetermination or teleology can be traced.
2. The existence of the gods is not admitted, therefore no divine intervention in human affairs is accepted.
3. It is reasonably concluded that no retribution in the hereafter is possible.
4. No caprices of chance influence human actions.
5. Some forms of precognition and telepathy are explained in terms of causation and should rather be incorporated in D.'s epistemology.
6. No justification of human actions from external factors is affirmed.
7. Bad conscience, not sanctions in the hereafter, is man's Hell.
8. Nous or lack of nous (blindness) is the main factor for what is good or bad in human life (fr. 175).
9. Phronesis is emphatically opposed to what is called fortune; phronesis, as a rule, prevails (fr. 119).
10. Human nature is reliable and self sufficient (frr. 234, 176).

5. Implications for D.'s ethical theory.

Human autonomy will be the only ground for the foundation of an ethical theory; and it will be anthropocentric. The corner-stones to be used are remorse, self-respect, self-control, justice. D. will not have men's conduct based on false authorities, even if they are derived from the laws of State; he has faith in the paramount efficacy of some such moral force as human self-respect (264) and corresponding responsibility.[1]

Is his optimism (theory) reconcilable with actual human capacities or does it exceed them? This is a question to be answered later.

If freewill is a presupposition of responsibility and presupposes freedom from prejudices, fear, ignorance, superstition, then D. has prepared a good foundation.

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1. Jaeger, The Theology, 181.

CHAPTER TWO

ON HAPPINESS

OR

ON EUTHUMIA

It is a truism to say that the pursuit of happiness (eudaimonia) is a general characteristic in Greek Ethics; and D.'s ethical theory is no exception; different schools however had different notions of eudaimonia and of the means by which eudaimonia was to be pursued.

D., for reasons which will be discussed, did not pervade the term eudaimonia; instead he chose another, a rather unusual one: euthumia; "On Euthumia" (cheerfulness) was the title of one of his works on ethics, as is recorded by ancient sources.[1]

I intend to discuss the problem of happiness (or euthumia) in Democritean Ethics under the following particular heads:

1. Nature of euthumia. Meaning of alternative terms: athambia (freedom of alarm) and euestō (well-being) in D.'s thought.
2. Presuppositions of euthumia (eudaimonia).
3. Measure (moderation) as a principle in Dem. Ethics.
4. Body-Mind (Soul) relations.
5. Meaning of Good(s).
6. Meaning of pleasure.
7. Hedonism or Eudaimonism?
8. Work and Labour.

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1. Seneca, de tranquill. animi, II.3: Hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci euthumian vocant, de qua Democriti volumen egregrium est; ego tranquillitatem voco.

   Diog. Laertius, IX.46, ii 3 (DK, VS 68B2C)

9. On Duty.

10. On Virtue. Virtue is action.

11. What is the meaning of fragment 83?

12. Tree of virtues.

13. Freewill problem.

14. What is the "Criterion"?

15. Moral autonomy, individual responsibility, the foundations of character.

1. The nature of Εὐθυμία

"On Euthumia" is recorded asthe title of one of D.'s writings on ethics;[1] perhaps it was his main book in this field, because:

a. This term and the related words εὔθυμος, εὐθυμεῖσθαι, εὐθυμότερον are the more frequent in Democritus' fragments concerned with the subject of happiness[2] and

b. Seneca's characterisation: 'egregium volumen' cannot be overlooked.

The first problem to be met is a terminological one; athambia is ascribed to D. as an alternative for euthumia by Cicero;[3] according to other sources[4] D. also used the term euestō (well-being) to describe the same conception.

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1. Seneca, de tranquill. animi, II.3: hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci euthumian vocant, de qua Democriti volumen egregium est; ego tranquillitatem voco.
   Cf. Diog. Laertius, IX. 46 (DK 68 B 2C).
2. fragments: 2c, 191, 258 // 174, 191 // 3, 189, 191, 279, 286 // 191.
3. Cic., de fin., V. 29, 87 (DK, 68 A 169).
   See also:
   Clem., Strom., II 130 (DK 68 B 4). Cf. fr. 215.
4. Clem., Strom., II 130 (DK 68 B 4),
   D. Laertius IX 45 (DK 68 A 1, 45),
   Stob. II 7 (DK 68 A 167),
   Cf. frr. 140, 257.

Other terms also are recorded: ἁρμονία, συμμετρία, ἀθαυμαστία, ἀταραξία.[1]

Cicero translates euthumia by the terms securitas (freedom from care) and tranquillitas, and explains that "ista animi tranquillitas ea est ipsa beata vita".[2] In another passage he affirms that euthumia or athambia (freedom from fear) constitute, according to D., the summum bonum of life.

Epiphanius[3] accepts that, in D.'s view, there is an end of all things and euthumia is the highest.

Stobaeus[4], recording all the variety of terms mentioned above and additionally eudaimonia, explains that euthumia consists in "the ability (of the soul) to distinguish and discriminate between pleasures".

That the term "euthumia" was misunderstood by friends or most likely by opponents of the Democritean system we are informed from an explicit passage from D. Laertius;[5] he writes: "the end of action is (euthumia) tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by false

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1. Stob. II. 7. 31 (VS 68 A 167).
   Strabo I. p. 61 (VS 68 A 168).
2. Cic., de fin., V. 8. 23)
) VS 68 A 169.
   V. 29. 87)
3. Epiphan. III. 2. 9. (VS 68 A 166), Dox. 590).
   So also DL. IX. 45.
4. Stob. II. 7. 3 i(VS 68 A 167).
5. D. Laertius, IX. 45 (VS 68 A 1. 45).

interpretation have understood it, but a state in which the soul continues, calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion (passion). This he calls well-being and many other names."

To sum up:

1. "On Euthumia"is the title of a book (of D.'s),
   Euthumia is identified with beata vita (Cic.),
   Euthumia is the highest end (Epiphan.),
   Euthumia consists in the ability to distinguish pleasures (Stob.),
   Euthumia is the end of action...is a state of calmness, strength, stability (DL),
   Euthumia or athambia is the summum bonum (Cic.).
2. Athambia means "animum terrore liberum"(Cic. A 169).
3. Eudaimonia is to be sought in the soul (Stob. A 167).
4. Harmony, ataraxia, symmetry are alternative terms for euthumia (Stob., perhaps DL by implication, A 1. 45).
5. Athaumastia (absence of wonder or fear?); perhaps this term was used (by Strabo) as an alternative of athambia by mistake or confusion.

On the grounds of this evidence two remarks might be justified:

1. D. himself did not use one term only to connote happiness, but euthumia seemed to be the most frequent term in his texts. [Philosophical terminology was then, it should be remembered here, not yet standardised.]

2. Euthumia seemed to be for D. the chief Good of life.

Hirzel[1] using the surviving frr. of D. and tracing influences

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1. "Demokrits Schrift "περὶ Εὐθυμίης ", Hermes, 14 (1879) pp. 354-407.

to two later writers[1] (both of them refer to D. as a forerunner on the subject) tried to reconstruct the whole idea (content) of D.'s book on Euthumia.

Further terminological elucidation seems to be unavoidable:

1. Ἀθαμβία(η)(B4, B215, A169, ἀθαμβος B216).[2]

Although appearing as an alternative concept for euthumia, it is explained by a scholar as a stronger one, "where stability of the soul appears not as a passive state but as a dynamic quality, able to withstand external shock without losing its inner balance."[3]

2. Εὐεστώ (well-being) (A1,45, A167, B 2c, B140, B257) derived from εὖ (well) and ἐστώ[4] (real situation) for an atomist could refer to the only accepted reality: atoms and their combinations; therefore it might be recognised as a physical condition for euthumia. Such a connection is nowhere expressed in the surviving frr. and testimonies, but it is not an unreasonable hypothesis, if we keep in mind the atomic structure of the soul.[5] D. "could adopt euestō as a

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1. Plutarch, περὶ Εὐθυμίας,
   Seneca, de Tranquillitate animi.
2. Cf. θάμβος (amazement) δ' ἔχεν ἐσορόοντας
   (Ilias, 4,79).
3. G. Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in D.," Philol. Rev. 54 (1945) p. 583.
4. Vlastos, op. cit., footnotes 29-30.
5. Aristotle, de anima, 403b 31f.

general cognate of "cheerfulness" only if it meant the soul's "well-being" in an ontological, i.e. physical, sense."[1]

3. Ἁρμονία (nowhere in D.'s frr. with ethical connotation) appears to be of Pythagorean or Heraclitean origin, but also it was used in a medical sense.[2]

4. Συμμετρία (symmetry, commensurability) is to be found in fr. 191 in close connection with the meaning of metriotēs (moderation); it is rather a condition of cheerfulness.[3]

5. Ἀθαυμαστία [4] refers to a condition of freedom from fear or surprise; it does not mean lack of θαυμάζειν (admiration); if it were so, it would be a strikingly unphilosophical attitude.[5]

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1. Vlastos, op. cit., p. 583 and footn. 30.

2. J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, London, [4](1968) p.39.
   For D.'s acquaintance with medicine cf. frr. 31, 32, 234
   Cf. also DL. IX. 33. XII.

3. fr. 191: εὐθυμίη γίνεται μετριότητι τέρψιος καὶ βίου συμμετρίῃ..... /ηι...

4. Strabo, I. p. 61 (partly in VS 68 A 168): προστιθέασι δὲ ἀθαυμαστίαν....παράκειται γὰρ τῷ ἀθαμβεῖ καὶ ἀνεκπλήκτῳ.
   It is very probable that this term belongs to Strabo who used it as an alternative to athambia.

5. Plato, Theatetus, 155D: μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν.

6. Ἀταραξία (calmness) belongs rather to Epicurus' philosophy.[1]

7. Εὐδαιμονία, finally, a term derived from εὖ (well) and δαίμων (daimon) could imply that human happiness was dependent on some kind of divine being (gods or fortune). D. had left no room for gods in his Macrocosmos and had explicitly rejected the existence of fortune in his Microcosmos. Therefore, he could not be justified with a term, the implications of which were unacceptable to him; so, it is reasonable to suppose that he deliberately avoided this concept in most of his writings and gave a new content to euthumia.[2]

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1. Epicurus, Epist. III. 128 (Usener, p. 62, Arrighetti, p. 111). Bailey (Greek Atomists and Epicurus, p. 441) remarks that ataraxia "is at once the aim and the condition of moral life" and (p. 499) "a permanent condition of peaceful happiness". Cf. also what he notes on pp. 369, 513.

2. "On Euthumia" is a title of book attributed to Pythagorean Hipparchus (VS 68 C, vol. II, 228.21 Stob. IV. 44. 81). The word is traced nowhere else in the Presocratics. It is found in Pindar, Hippocrates, Xenophon (Cyrop. VI. 4. 13) and later writers. See, e.g. Pind. Is. 1.63: καὶ τὸ σεσωπασμένον εὐθυμίαν μείζω φέρει. Cf. Hippocr. Visits, 6. 55: ἡ δ' εὐθυμίη ἀφίει καρδίην. On a physiological connotation of the term see Vlastos (Ethics and Physics in D., part 1, notes 32, 38).
The adjective euthumos is found in Odys. 14. 63 and the adverb euthumōs in Aesch. Agam. 159 2.

Let us consider some frr. connected with the problem of happiness which afford the material for constructing a definition or at least a description of the conception of happiness in D.'s view.

In fr. 170 he says: "happiness or unhappiness is a property, an achievement of the soul"[1] (the genitive ψυχῆς can refer to the soul as originator or creator). Obviously D. wanted to emphasise that happiness is not an external coincidence, but something internal and personal. The same emphasis can be seen in the next fr. 171: "happiness does not dwell in flocks of cattle or in gold. The soul is the dwelling-place of daimon."[2]

From these frr. two implications are justified and a new question should be raised:

1. Happiness is independent of external possessions; individuals are responsible for their own happiness.

2. Happiness, whatever might be this thing which is to be happy, is in the soul.

3. But what is the daimon? and why does D. use this word and its compound (eudaimonia) despite his tendency to avoid them elsewhere?

If the soul is (not) the dwelling-place of the daimon, and if the daimon in current language denoted gods or fortune, then these frr. are incompatible with D.'s system. As it seems, D. is using popular expressions intended to emphasise his view on happiness and at the same time to preclude the existence and interference of gods and fortune,

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1. fr. 170: Εὐδαιμονίη ψυχῆς καὶ κακοδαιμονίη.
2. fr. 171: Εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδὲ ἐν χρυσῷ· ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος.

since, in his text, the daimon, whatever it might be, lives in the soul. The last proposition (assertion) of fr. 171 obviously was added in order to preclude implications unacceptable to D.; indirectly the concepts of daimon and eudaimonia are disapproved.

Ἀθαμβίη is closely connected with an intellectual virtue (in fr. 216): "imperturbable wisdom is worth everything".[1] Combining this fr. and fr. 118: ("D. used to say (he would) rather discover a cause than gain the kingdom of Persia")[2] one might reach the conclusion that D. found great (much of) happiness in contemplation; but he did not include the first concept in the second, as later Aristotle did.[3]

The portrait of the euthumos (cheerful man) is given by D. himself in fr. 174: "the cheerful man, who is impelled towards works that are just and lawful, rejoices by day and by night and is strong and free from care."[4] From the passage it is unclear whether being cheerful is a condition of being just and lawful or vice versa. The first interpretation seems more likely; but, whatever answer might be given, the fact remains that D.'s cheerful man is just and lawful.

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1. fr. 216: σοφίη ἄθαμβος ἀξίη πάντων [τιμιωτάτη οὖσα].
2. fr. 118: Δ. ...ἔλεγε βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι.
3. E.N. 1178 b 32: ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις....
4. fr. 174: ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ ἀνακηδὴς ἐστιν.....

Such a close connection between virtue (or virtues) and happiness can be found in Plato.[1] And there is nothing at all strange in the fact that Stobaeus[2] notes the parallel in D. and Plato with reference to placing eudaimonia in the soul.

Modern scholars[3] have tried to give a platonizing interpretation of Democritean Ethics.

By pointing out these similarities and tendencies I am not intending to maintain either that they constitute the main tenets of Dem. ethics or that Plato imitated D.'s doctrines (Socrates' personality was much more rich in this field). The following view can be defended: D., living in the same age as Socrates, facing the same problems in the

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1. Banquet 180B: εἰς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐδαιμονίας κτῆσιν.....
   Rep. 576C: ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ...
   Crito 47E. Gorgias 472E-473A.
2. Stob. II 73 i p.52 (DK 68A 167): Δ. καὶ Πλ. κοινῶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τίθενται.... (from Areios Didymos).
3. P. Natorp, Die Ethika des D., Marburg (1893) pp. 88 ff., particularly on p. 106: Wie platonisch das alles lauten mag..... J. Ferber, "Über die Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der Ethik Demokrits," Zeitschr. f. Philos. 132/3 (1908) pp. 82 ff., particularly on p. 93: So bereitet sich bei D. der grossartiger Idealismus der platonischen Philosophie vor.....

life of their time during and after the Pelop. War and during the sophistical movement (and after it in the case of D.), tried to help in reconstruction [in two concrete fields, namely epistemology and ethics] and conceived happiness as consisting in:

calmness, strength, stability of the soul, freedom from fear and passions, autonomy and self-reliance, accompanied by wisdom, righteousness (justice) and lawabidingness.

2. Presuppositions for Euthumia

a. That euthumia (happiness) is the Chief Good in human life is explicitly asserted in fr. 189: "The best thing for a man is to lead his life having been cheerful on as many occasions and pained on as few occasions as possible. This could happen if one did not find one's pleasures in mortal things." [1]

It is actually a surprise to find in the writings of a "materialist" this ideal of life, and in such terminology. There is no doubt about the meaning of the precept (in fr. 189). The Chief Good to be pursued is expressed in the first proposition; in the second are shown the means by which the Chief Good is to be attained. Yet the expression remains too abstract until we define what is meant by "non-mortal pleasures". First of all, we may suppose, as it was correctly remarked, that D. in his ethical theory (precepts) sometimes "chose to speak at the level of the ordinary man, without adhering too scrupulously to the requirements of his atomic theory according to which nothing, not even a god, was immortal." [2] On the other hand, by reference to frr. like 194 or 207[3], it can be pointed out that D. by the term non-mortal

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1. fr. 189: ἄριστον ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν βίον διάγειν ὡς πλεῖστα εὐθυμηθέντι καὶ ἐλάχιστα ἀνιηθέντι. τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς θνητοῖσι τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιοῖτο.
2. Guthrie, History, II, 491, n.1.
3. fr. 194: αἱ μεγάλαι τέρψεις ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων γίνονται.
   fr. 207: ἡδονὴν οὐ πᾶσαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ αἱρεῖσθαι χρεών.

(pleasures) means what we call mental joys.

Before examining them, I think it useful to notice the variety of meanings which in classical Greek are attributed to the term hedonē (used by D. also in the fr. in question). Hedonē is usually translated by the term pleasure; its meaning is context-dependent. In many cases this term alone leads to misunderstanding and misclassifications, by opening the door to fallacious inferences (quatternio verborum).

Plato enumerates four different meanings of hēdesthai (the corresponding verb) at the very beginning of his "Philebus",[1] scaled from crude bodily pleasures to the more highly valued mental activity. Much misinterpretation and confusion is the result of identifying a polymorphous concept with only one of its meanings. The term hedonē acquires a specific meaning according to its attributions. I insist on this elucidation because this kind of fallacy constitutes the origin of a serious mistake with reference to D. (and his continuator in ancient times, I mean Epicurus).

Aristotle was aware of the problem when writing: "the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul....and a thing gives a man

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1. Philebus, 3D: ἥδεσθαι μέν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον,
ἥδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν,
ἥδεσθαι δ' αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ
ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν,
ἥδεσθαι δ' αὖ καὶ τὸν φρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν.

Also in Plato's Prot. 337B-C. (Prodicus is introduced speaking on the meaning of hēdesthai; he made a restriction (of the meaning), which was warmly approved by his audience but ignored by Plato in his later Philebus).

pleasure in regard to which he is described as 'fond of' it."[1] Here pleasure is not an experience of the body even in the case of "bodily pleasures". This remark brings pleasure within the Aristotelean definition of happiness as an "activity of the soul".

The Chief Good of life (is said in fr. 189) is pleasure provided that the content of pleasure is not mortal; obviously the non-mortal pleasure is intellectual satisfaction.[2]

b. What follows (b-h) is an attempt to define what are (according to the evidence we possess) the necessary and sufficient conditions of cheerfulness (euthumia).

"The portrait of the 'cheerful'man (described in fr. 174) is on the whole a pleasant one".[3] It is not characterised by self-centredness of motive, as Bailey believed.[3] The "cheerful" man is an

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1. EN 1099a 11-12: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ προς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος....

2. D. does not suggest by this expression that the soul is immortal (per contra cf. fr. 297); he merely wants to value more highly the pleasures of the mind using the popular idiom to say so. Cf. frr. 118, 194, 112.

3. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 205.

fr. 174: ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται.....

cf. p. 338 of this study.

active personality who enjoys his life by doing what is legal and just; he is the protector of wronged fellow men (fr. 262); as a result of his actions he is openhearted and carefree and naturally free of any kind of remorse.

The content of justice and law (identified or differentiated) will be examined in another place; what is of interest here is that the setting of the cheerful man is a civilised society, of which he is described as an active member, living in harmony with it. Moreover D. speaks often of the relation of the cheerful man both to domestic and public life.

c. A question should be raised here: does the cheerful man act in such and such a way (manner) because of his cheerfulness or is his cheerfulness the result of such and such conduct? At first sight fr. 174 suggests the former explanation, but the latter cannot be rejected and this is also implied in the immediately following description of the opposite character.[1]

He is the person who disregards what justice is and forgets his duties (he is the truly self-centred man); the consequence of his negligence is immediate; he is self-punished; he suffers by remorse for his omission and in anticipation of his punishment; he then accuses himself. A kind of civil war breaks out in his heart. Remorse for the past, fear for the future make his present an actual Hell. This man

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1. Actually in our text a character opposite to the cheerful man is described but not by a specific concept named. Plato (Laws 792B) examines the way of education of a cheerful character as opposed to the "dyskolos" (discontented).

is a prosecutor of himself. In the light of this analysis fr. 43[1] is intelligible. Behind this aphorism is the notion of conscience (syneidesis, a word used for the first time by D. with this meaning in fr. 297). The sinner's (unjust man's, lawbreaker's) Hell is not remote from him, it is in him, it is his own conscience (syneidesis); a voice accusing him; a kind of court in which his actions are to be judged. No god is necessary here to act as a prosecutor; D. did not need gods to guarantee justice.[2] The self-prosecuted person will not have peace of mind until he is punished.[3]

The portrait of the cheerful man (and the opposite) leave no doubt that in D.'s mind they were free to decide and act in accordance with their decisions and therefore be responsible for their actions, and praiseworthy or guilty of negligence accordingly.

d. The results of wrongdoing and rightdoing are contrasted in another remarkable fr. (215): "The glory of justice is a courageous and undismayed judgement, but the end of injustice is the fear of

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1. Fr. 43: μεταμέλεια ἐπ' αἰσχροῖσιν ἔργμασιν βίου σωτηρίη.
2. Schmid-Stahlin, Geschichte der Griechische Literature, 1. 5. p. 315.
3. Cf. Plato's Gorgias, 472 E where Socrates says:

   ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

disaster."[1] The striking impression from this judgement of moral value demands, by the way, a short comment. It does not seem to have been an isolated precept or an aphorism; it introduces a thesis to be analysed and defended or a conclusion drawn after a systematic inquiry; it should be considered as a part of a longer structure.

Justice as a practice is crowned by forthright candour, which leads to athambia, i.e. to euthumia. Thus euthumia presupposes am activity in accordance with justice (fr. 174) and is rewarded by interior serenity.[2] Epicurus also connected justice with his ideal of ataraxia in a beautiful aphorism: "the greatest fruit of justice is ataraxia (freedom from trouble)".

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1. fr. 215: δίκης κῦδος γνώμης θάρσος καὶ ἀθαμβίη,
   ἀδικίης δὲ δεῖμα ξυμφορῆς τέρμα.
   P. Natorp (Die Ethika des Demokritos, p. 98) explained this fr. by giving emphasis to athambia alone and connecting it with the ideal of knowledge with reference "to vitam beatam... (quam) in rerum cognitione ponebat;" it is a part only of a complete explanation.
2. For a different explanation see Bailey (Greek Atomists, p. 192): "it is clear that the idea of cheerfulness is one of undisturbed serenity rather than of an active and sensational pleasure."
3. Epicurus, sent. 519 (Usener, 317): Δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.

By introducing obligation (frr. 41, 181, 256, 261)[1] as a motive for avoiding crimes and in connection with his effort to define justice, D. showed the direction of activity of his cheerful man; at the same time he overcomes the traditional (customary) Greek view of ethics (what am I to do if I am to fare well?). Justice is not only to be actualised by someone's actions, but also to be protected when someone else is wronged. Protecting justice is not, of course, an action of self-centredness; it is a social conception.

According to a corrupted passage — the meaning of which is clear enough, nontheless — cheerfulness should be a kind of reward for persons defending the community from those creatures who do hurt (harm) contrary to justice. There it is said: "The man who does this has the greater share of cheerfulness."[2]

e. "Do not be very busy" is a second maxim leading to cheerfulness. If someone is to be cheerful he must place some limits on his activities, we are informed by fr. 3. It runs:" The man who wishes to be cheerful should not engage in many activities either private or public, nor choose activities beyond his powers and natural capacity. He must guard against this, so that when good fortune strikes him and leads him on to excess by means of (false) seeming, he must rate it low, and not attempt

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1. δέον or χρή make a sense of oughtness.
2. fr. 258: Καὶ ταῦτα ὁ ποιῶν εὐθυμίης ... μέζω μοῖραν μετέξει.

things beyond his powers. A reasonable fulness is better than over-fulness."[1] Perhaps this fr. was in the beginning of D.'s book On Euthumia.[2] It is regarded as one of the best attested frr. of D.: "It receives some confirmation from other sources; it is in Stobaeus' anthology but is also twice attributed to D. by Seneca." [3]

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1. fr. 3. τὸν εὐθυμεῖσθαι μέλλοντα χρὴ μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν μήτε ἰδίῃ μήτε ξυνῇ, μηδὲ ἄσσα ἂν πράσσῃ, ὑπέρ τε δύναμιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν ἑωυτοῦ καὶ φύσιμ· ἀλλὰ τοσαύτην ἔχειν φυλακήν, ὥστε καὶ τῆς τύχης ἐπιβαλλούσης καὶ ἐς τὸ πλέον ὑπηγεομένης τῷ δοκεῖν, κατατίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τελέω προσάπτεσθαι τῶν δυνατῶν. ἡ γὰρ εὐογκίη ἀσφαλέστερον τῆς μεγαλογκίης.

Cf. M. Aurelius, The Communings with himself, IV.24.

2. Zeller-Nestle, Die Philosophie der Griechen, I.2. 1143 footn. 1.

3. Natorp, Die Ethika, p. 116.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, II, 491.
Seneca, De tranquillitate animae 13.1: hoc secutum puto D. ita coepisse: "qui tranquille volet vivere nec privatim agat multa, nec publice."

De ira 3.6.3: proderit nobis illud D. salutare praeceptum quo monstratur tranquillitas, si neque privatim neque publice multa aut majora viribus nostris egerimus.

An important presupposition of euthumia (which will be repeated and analysed in fr. 181) is not to exceed the limit of one's capacity. Ambition compatible with one's capacity is the ideal measure. This capacity is determined by two factors: one's strength (dynamis) and his nature (physis). This precept is backed, I think, by the belief that what is necessary to human life nature gives in abundance (with a free hand), an idea explicitly expressed by fr. 223[1] and later by Epicurus.[2] Even if chance opens a wide road in front of you, beware of this phantom, be a good guard of your own euthumia against this deceiver (chance); it can trick you and lead to unhappiness.

The criterion, nonetheless, of "doing so much" and "no more" is not obvious from the text. It seems that it is to be found in the concepts of 'dynamis" and "physis". What exactly is the meaning of dynamis in D.'s terminology is difficult to define, because of lack of evidence. Anyway, this term conjoined here (fr. 3) with physis should not be understood as identical. Comparing this concept (of dynamis) with its use in fr. 234 one might incline to believe that it refers to

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1. fr. 223: ὧν τὸ σκῆνος χρῄζει, πᾶσι πάρεστιν ἄτερ μόχθου καὶ ταλαιπωρίης....
2. Epicurus, Sententiae Sel. XV (Usener, 14. Arrighetti, 127): ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος εὐπόριστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.
3. fr. 3: ....ὑπὲρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν καὶ φύσιν ..[ ]

strength of will.[1] Whatever the interpretation of the two terms might be, the fact is that they (dynamis and physis) describe the limits within which one must restrict his activity.

D.'s precept must not be considered similar to the Epicurean λάθε βιώσας (Usener, fr. 541). It is not a doctrine of quietism.[2] D. himself devoted his whole life to scientific investigations, journeys, work. Philodemus characterised him as the most busy man (πολυπράγμων)[3] In fact he recommends political activity (fr. 157). D. disapproved of πολυπραγμοσύνη in the sense of interference with other people's affairs (fr. 80). Curiosity is evidently a vice; busying oneself in

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1. Clearer distinction between the two terms but not clearer differentiation can be seen in a strikingly similar passage of an Epicurean (Diogenes of Oinoanda, 56, p. 54 William, 1907.) Chilton, p. 71 VS II. 132): οὐδὲν οὕτως εὐθυμίας ποιητικὸν ὡς τὸ μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν μηδὲ δυσκόλοις ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασιν, ... μηδὲ παρὰ δύναμιν βιάζεσθαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ταραχὰς ἐμποιεῖ τῇ φύσει....

2. Langerbeck, Δόξις Ἐπιρυσμίη, pp. 60-61.

3. fr. 144.

the affairs of others means that one has neglected his own.[1]

f. Finally, fr. 3 seems to suggest the notion of the mean; it is in accordance with many other aphorisms (233, 102, 70, to be reviewed later) and particularly with fr. 191 which follows: "Cheerfulness is created for men through moderation of enjoyment and harmoniousness of life. Things that are in excess or lacking are apt to change and cause great disturbances in the soul. Souls that are stirred by great divergences are neither stable nor cheerful. Therefore one must keep one's mind on what is attainable, and.... If you keep this way of thinking, you will live more serenely, and will expell those not-negligible curses in life, envy, jealousy and spite."[2]

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1. This idea was approved by Plato in the Gorgias (526 B-C.) where it is said about Radamanthys that:"when he discerns a philosopher who has minded his own business and not being a busy body in his lifetime — he is struck with admiration and sends him off to the Isles of the Blest.

2. Fr. 191: ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ εὐθυμίη γίνεται μετριότητι τέρψιος καὶ βίου συμμετρίῃι· τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντα μεταπίπτειν τε φιλεῖ καὶ μεγάλας κινήσιας ἐμποιεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ. αἱ δ' ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινούμεναι τῶν ψυχέων οὔτε εὐσταθέες εἰσὶν οὔτε εὔθυμοι.....ταύτης γὰρ ἐχόμενος τῆς γνώμης εὐθυμότερόν τε διάξεις καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγας ἥρας ἐν τῷ βίῳ διώσεαι, φθόνον καὶ ζῆλον καὶ δυσμενίην.

Some remarks on it are unavoidable:

1. D. by referring to the concept of mean actually continues the Greek tradition of gnomological "measure" and in some extent anticipates Aristotle's theory of "the mean".[1] The meaning of this concept and (what is of importance for our inquiry) its moral implications in D.'s system are to be explained in the next paragraph (on measure).

2. Interesting is the way in which D. connected measure with euthumia (happiness). In the second and third propositions of the fr. in question his language can hardly be metaphorical.[2] His term μεταπίπτειν is used also in his theory of sensation[3] and theory of knowledge.[4] When reading propositions 2-3 in the fr. quoted above one has the impression of a physiological conditioning of euthumia: "Souls...are neither stable[5]

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1. EN 1106[b]36-1107ai ff.: where (1) μεσότης is included in the definition of virtue (2) μεσότης is defined.
   Also: Magna Moralia, 1186b 34-36: ὥστε δεῖ ἀεὶ .... τὴν μεσότητα διατηρεῖν.
   Cf. D.'s frr. 233, 102, 70.

2. Kurt v. Fritz, Philosophie u. sprachliche Ausdruck, pp. 33 ff.
   G. Vlastos, Philos. Rev. 54 (1945) 582-4.
   Guthrie, History, II, 497.

3. Theophr., de sens. 63 (DK 68 A 135, 63): μεταπίπτον.

4. Sextus, adv. mathem. 136 (DK 68 B 9): μεταπίπτον.

5. Εὐσταθέες is recognisable, no doubt, as the original concept from which D. Laertius borrowed his term εὐσταθῶς (stably) in his description of Democritus' conception of euthumia. See D.L. IX 45 (DK 68 A 1, 45).

nor cheerful"; which means when stability (of soul atoms?) is abolished, then cheerfulness also is destroyed. Possibly we might see here evidence of a connection between ethics and the rest of D.'s system. Other points of such a connection are to be pointed out in other pages and finally summarised (in conclusion) because: a) such liaisons make **sure** the authenticity of the fragments involved and through them of other frr. in which D.'s technicalities are repeated, b) an ethical theory is based (partly) on a physical one.

3. In the fr. under discussion, which, no doubt, belonged to D.'s book on Cheerfulness (Euthumia), we see a chain of statements, which can hardly be regarded as normative ethics (judgements of moral value or moral obligation) alone. There is an inquiry into a problem of metaethics; a thesis is formulated and defended, some norms (instructions) are derived from it. We can discern a chain of reasoning, with coherence and completeness. From the beginning to the end the concept of euthumia to be (attained) aimed at is the leading notion (the key concept, mentioned 4 times altogether). The demonstrative character of the reasoning can easily be traced throughout. I don't see any reason to characterise all these statements as aphorisms, precepts; the whole fragment, I think, should be accepted as a part of a larger structure.[1]

g. Lawabiding is emphatically mentioned in the middle of fr. 191;[2] it is regarded as a self-evident obligation; which means that lawabidingness

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1. See: Seneca, de Tranquillitate, II, 3.

2. fr. 191: .... πρήσσειν τι ἀνήκεστον, ὧν νόμοι κωλύουσι....
cf. fr. 174: ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος ... νόμιμα ... χαίρει ....

is a condition again for cheerfulness, a condition to be fulfilled by a cheerful man.

What D. recommends is not a life of "apraxia" but a life in harmony with natural vitality and some social conventions (to be described later), necessary for a civilised society.

h. Although the egocentric (and perhaps atomistic) character of euthumia is conspicuous at first sight, there is evidence that D. included in the conditions of euthumia these elements, which (if) generally applied constitute an objective basis for happiness within the framework of the ancient city-state. His emphasis on defending justice and being lawabiding (frr. 174, 261[1]) in connection with his strong preference for democracy (fr. 251) ← which was not representative but a general assembly of the citizens, where law-giving meant complete participation) give the measure of his conception of euthumia; it is not an expression of selfishness; it is described in terms of the individual because he (or she) is the unit of action; but it is planned to be euthumia for a whole society; individual activity contributes toward this end.

l. Finally, to attain euthumia a man needed to think little of worldly goods (frr. 170-171) which are at the mercy of fortune, i.e. unforseen conditions.

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1. fr. 261: ἀδικουμένοισι τιμωρεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν χρὴ καὶ μὴ παριέναι.....

To conclude: if someone is to live in euthumia, he must take thought to limit his aspirations to his abilities, think little of worldly goods, be lawabiding and just; it is precisely this last (condition) quality of his conduct which puts him on good terms with his fellowmen.

3. Measure

Two main points can be noted (distinguished) in D.'s views on "measure in human life".

1. Measure is justified by medicine and according to D. (previous paragraph 2.f.2) it becomes a condition necessary for happiness (euthumia).

2. Measure is extended to cover the whole field of human conduct and so becomes a factor in morality.

1. "If you step over the due measure (metrion) the most agreable things will become most disagreable."[1] D. expresses here a personal belief which was endorsed by early Greek wisdom and understood by common sense people. "Measure in everything is the best way"[2] was a well known precept; "Nothing too much" was another one.[3] Only "fools cannot understand how much greater is the half than the whole" Hesiod had written.[4]

The concept used in the original text for the most agreable things (epiterpestata) gives us the key for understanding the connotation of fr. 233 for Democritus. At first sight it is not clear what kind of

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1. fr. 233: εἴ τις ὑπερβάλλοι τὸ μέτριον, τὰ ἐπιτερπέστατα ἀτερπέστατα ἂν γίγνοιτο.
2. Πᾶν μέτρον ἄριστον.
3. Μηδὲν ἄγαν.
4. Works and Days, 40.

agreableness or disagreableness is meant. But both here and in fr. 191[1] the concept of measure is conjoined with pleasure or joy.

For D. the measure of agreableness is a factor in euthumia. He explains it in terms reminding us of medicine: "Things that are in excess or lacking are apt to change and cause disturbances in the soul (191);[2] and disturbances destroy euthumia, as is said in the continuation.

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1. fr. 191: ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ εὐθυμίη γίνεται μετριότητι τέρψιος καὶ βίου συμμετρίῃ....

   Τέρψις in D.'s frr. is clearly identified with mental joys (cf. fr. 194). A detailed discussion on the connotation of this concept is given in paragr. on Criterion where frr. 4, 74, 188 are compared and explained.

2. fr. 191: ...τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντα μεταπίπτειν τε φιλεῖ καὶ μεγάλως κινήσιας ἐμποεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ....

   Cf. the terminology used in Hippocratean school:

   a) On ancient medicine, 9: δεῖ γὰρ μέτρου τινὸς στοχάσασθαι....

   b) On sacred Disease, 8: ἢν μὲν καλῶς καθαρθῇ καὶ μήτε πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἀπορρυῇ οὕτως ὑγιηροτάτην τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔχει.

   c) On Breaths, 1 (definition of medical art): ἀφαίρεσις τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων, πρόσθεσις τῶν ἐλλειπόντων....

   See: Fr. Wehrli, Ethik und Medizin (Helveticum Mus. 8 (1951), pp. 36 ff.).

Excess of food (fr. 235) gives a short and transient pleasure but many (long and permanent, by implication) pains; and bodily pleasures the more they are satisfied the more they demand satisfaction.

The consequences of such excesses make medicine necessary; illness (bodily disorder) is a kind of revenge. Natural conditions (living with measure) give health. This is what many people do not know or overlook and the consequence is that "Men ask in their prayers for health from the gods; but they do not realise that the power to attain this (protect their health or restore it?) lies in themselves; and, by doing the opposite because of lack of self-control, they themselves become the betrayers of their own health to their desires." (234)[1]

This formulation is questionable: does it mean:

1) that natural conditions protect health by themselves, therefore a moderate fulfilment of desires is enough to maintain health, therefore nature itself gives the measure (through desires)? or

2) that men have the possibility (by knowing what are the healthy conditions, by strong will and self-control) to protect their own health as a good?

Frr. 4, 74, 188 in which we will try to discover the criterion of Democritean Ethics could answer positively either of these questions; but incontinence (lack of control, ακρασία) and betrayers (prodotai), terms used in fr. 234, indicate a positive answer to the second question;

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1. fr. 234: ὑγιείην εὐχῇσι παρὰ θεῶν αἰτέοντα ἄνθρωποι, τὴν δὲ ταύτης δύναμιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντες οὐκ ἴσασιν· ἀκρασίῃ δὲ τἀναντία πρήσσοντες αὐτοὶ προδόται τῆς ὑγείης τῇσιν ἐπιθυμίῃσιν γίνονται.

which implies, in D.'s thought, free will and responsibility. Moreover, the insistence on the supremacy of the soul over body, that soul is the pilot of the vessel, is explicitly asserted in other cases (frr. 159, 187).[1]

Both explanations seemed to be intended by the original writing and can reasonably be justified in the frame of D.'s ethical theory. A strong confidence in human nature and individual responsibility is defended by fr. 234, which in free translation could be so: Men do not realise that they are endowed by nature with a certain (reliable) criterion of what is good for their health (i.e. measured fulfilment of their desires); but because of lack of will they become slaves of their desires and so they lose (destroy) their health by their incontinence; they are responsible for the undesirable result; they are to be blamed; as regards gods (if any, according to individual attitude toward the problem), they have nothing to do with us, with our affairs, with our incontinence. Therefore, prayers are both: in vain and an indication of foolishness.

What we call Democritean ethics is denied the title by F. M. Cleve on the ground that it is only a hygienic. "It would almost be preferable to speak here rather of mere biotics, or art of living, than of ethics."[2] Cleve's main interest is admittedly Democritean physics, but what he ignored or failed to understand is that in D.'s fragments three steps (grades) can be traced, as

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1. They will be discussed in the paragr. on body-soul problem.
2. The Giants of Presocratics, p. 403.

Krokiewicz[1] rightly argued:

1) A self-preservation (191, 88, 3, 224, 285, 286, 231).

2) A self-perfection (3, 60, 80, 191, 196, 220, 221, 254, 192, 224-5, 122, 43, 44, 53, 53a, 114, 63, 115).

3) An integral (free and responsible) personality with "verecundiam quam Democritus aidōs appellat" (84, 244, 264), and a strong feeling towards justice, which implies good relations of the individual personality with other members of a civilised society (fr. 261).

For D. happiness is a personal affair; morality begins with one's way of life (his conduct to himself), the fulfilment of his desires, in what degree it is necessary to proceed later to the formulation of rules of behaviour for his fellowmen; a good man socially should first of all be a good individual. Some views on the aim of life and the meaning of happiness and values of life are the personal beliefs which lead to interpersonal relations and make a man a good or bad companion to others.

In the surviving frr. it cannot be traced (it would not be possible even in terms of medicine for the age when D. lived) what actually is the measure of needs (what is necessary for the human body); an idea only of D.'s thought on this problem can be seen in fr. 233, which runs: "The things needed by the body are available to all without toil and trouble. But the things which require toil and trouble and which make life disagreable are not desired by the body but by the ill-

1. A. Krokiewicz, Quaestiones Democriteae, in Eos, 47 (1954-55), pp. 44-46.

constitution of the mind."[1]

Here speaks the physicist and perhaps the physician or the man who was well acquainted with the medical teaching of his days, in the first part; the philosopher of life, the moralist, is speaking in the second.

An optimistic view about the possibility of the soul becoming good pilot for bodily needs and a factor of self-perfection is to be found in fr. 187. The responsibility of the soul is quite explicitly emphasised in fr. 159.

In any case, exceeding the measure brings bodily disorders and then medicine as an art is necessary to cure them. Medicine's work on behalf of the body is to establish harmony again.

D.'s intention was not to explain measure as a means for the health of the body, but to emphasise the soul's responsibility to keep measure, and proceed to a higher level: measure is a means to improve the conduct of individuals in their pursuits and therefore their relations. The basic idea is that exceeding measure and doing misdeeds means a misrepresentation of what is necessary for the present and the future. In both cases soul is responsible; in the first case for lack of control over the body (which in consequence reacts by diseases); in

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1. fr. 223: ὃν τὸ σκῆνος χρῄζει πᾶσιν πάρεστιν εὐμαρέως ὁκόσα δὲ μόχθου καὶ ταλαιπωρίης ἄτερ μόχθου καὶ ταλαιπωρίης χρῄζει καὶ βίον ἀλγύνει, τούτων οὐκ ἱμείρεται τὸ σκῆνος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῆς γνώμης κακοθιγίη (?).

the second for miscalculations about the future (frr. 233, 227, 281). Results in both cases are undesirable; then, cure is necessary for the body by medicine, for the soul by wisdom (fr. 31).

Here is expressed an optimistic belief in the power of knowledge to give wings to human soul, when it is said: "Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions."[1] Obviously an echo of fr. 83 can be seen: "The cause of error is ignorance of the better."[2]

2. What is more interesting is that by this way keeping the measure, controlling desires, is promoted to the level of morality. If someone is able (by wisdom) to put limits on his insatiable appetite for money, property, he will win more euthumia (fr. 286), less disappointments (224), and, obviously will have no reasons for fighting against his fellow-men (companions) or wronging them in any way. He will be more rational in his pursuits, since it is unreasonableness not to recognise the necessary conditions of life"[3] and confine one's activity within right limits.

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1. fr. 31: ἰητρικὴ μὲν γὰρ σώματος νόσους ἀκέεται, σοφίη δὲ ψυχὴν παθῶν ἀφαιρεῖται.
2. fr. 83: ἁμαρτίης αἰτίη ἡ ἀμαθίη τοῦ κρέσσονος. Cf. section 11 of this chapter (: meaning of fr. 83).
3. fr. 289: ἀλογιστίη μὴ ξυγχωρέειν τοῖσι κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναγκαίοις.

All these aphorisms find their justification in fr. 285: "one should realise that human life is brief and mixed with many cares and difficulties, in order that one may care only for moderate possessions, and that hardship may be measured by the standard of one's needs."[1] At first sight a shadow of pessimism might be seen in it. Nevertheless an optimistic disposition lies behind the surface, since:

a. a belief is expressed again that difficulties of life can be conquered by measuring real needs and therefore by avoiding purposeless conflicts,

b. what is of more importance: what could be called a seeming sadness does not expend itself in vain complaints; it becomes a source of philosophical meditation,[2] and

c. a comparison of this fr. (285) with 223 (quoted above) leads reasonably to the conclusion that this phrase: "with many cares and difficulties" does not refer to the actual conditions of life, according to D., but represents fanciful miscalculations because of lack of wisdom.

If these thoughts are correct, it means that fr. 285 is only a precept addressed to those people who make their lives full of misfortunes on the purpose they to help themselves by a better understanding of the actual problems of life by replacing cares for more property with care for more wisdom. The vocabulary used in the passage and the structure itself is but a concession to those unwise men.

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1. fr. 285: γιγνώσκειν χρεὼν ἀνθρωπίνην βιοτὴν ἀφαυρήν τε ἐοῦσαν καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιον πολλῇσιν τε κηρσὶ συμπεφυρμένην καὶ ἀμηχανίῃσιν, ὅκως ἄν τις μετρίης τε κτήσιος ἐπιμέληται καὶ μετρῆται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις ἡ ταλαιπωρίη.

2. L. Stella, La posizione storica di D. (Sophia, 10 (1942) p.218.
T.A. Sinclair, Hist. of Gr. political Thought, p.66.
H. Langerbeck, Δόξις Ἐπιρυσμίη, p.71.

In this aphorism D. seemed to be aware of the fact that in many cases men feel a sense of deprivation not because they are actually deprived but because they fear possible impoverishment in the future. So they are led to a restless attempt for more and more possession making the life difficult for themselves and other people.

D. is the first, to my knowledge, in the ancient world who deepened[1] the meaning of measure and, elevating it to a higher level, introduced it into the moral life[2] as a means:

to protect health,

to promote euthumia,

to improve conduct and human relations.

A self-limitation, it should be noted, far from being slavery, leads to actual freedom; lack of measure not only undermines

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1. F. Mesiano, La etica materialistica di D., p. 71.

2. cf. Fr. Wehrli, Ethik und Medizin: Zur Vorgeschichte der aristotelischen Mesonlehre (Museum Helveticum, 8(1951) pp. 33-62).

someone's health but also leads to conflicts with others[1] and finally to legal procedures which are actually a limitation of freedom (cf. fr.245). True wisdom is to keep the measure, "to understand what is possible within the limits of what is necessary (fr. 289).[2]

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1. Such thoughts on human nature could be opposed to Thucydides' pessimistic views on ἀνθρωπεία φύσις (human nature) according to which:
   a. men are insatiable for power, therefore (are) led to conflicts;
   b. they are sinners by nature;
   c. justice is a concept understandable only in relations between equally-powered individuals or states.

   The arrogance of power is described by Thucydides as a natural offspring and misuse of power (See: E. Topitsch, ἀνθρωπεία φύσις und Ethik bei Thukydides. In: Wiener Studien, 61 (1943) 50-67).

   There is no evidence that Thucydides and D. met each other; that they agreed or disagreed. But Thucydides lived in Thrace (ἐν Σκαπτῇ ὑλῃ) during a long period of the Pelop. war as an exile; in Thrace is Abdera, D.'s birth place, where he lived most of his life (in all probability the period of the Pelop. war). Some more references (for reasons of comparison) to Thucydides' work are to be mentioned in other pages (on Virtue, on Political life).

2. Vlastos, op. cit., part II, p.61.

4. Body-Mind (Soul) relations.

Every discussion of this problem has to include what one believes about the life of the soul after death. D.'s answer to this question can reasonably be inferred from fr. 297[1] and confirmed by the evidence we have from Aëtius;[2] according to the latter D. believed that "the soul is perishable; it perishes with the body". With a kind of indignation hardly repressed beneath the calm certainty of his reasoning D. says in the fr. mentioned above: "Some men ignoring (not knowing or disregarding the fact of) the dissolution of mortal nature, but acting on knowledge of their own sins,[3] afflict the period of life with anxieties and fears, inventing false tales about the period after the end of life."

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1. fr. 297: "Ενιοι θνητῆς φύσεως διάλυσιν οὐκ εἰδότες ἄνθρωποι, συνεφδήσει δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ βίῳ κακοπραγμοσύνης, τὸν τῆς βιοτῆς χρόνον ἐν ταραχαῖς ταλαιπωρέουσι, ψεύδεα περὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν μυθοπλαστέοντες χρόνου.

2. ΑΕΤ. IV 7.4 (DK 68 A 109; DOX. 393): Δ. .... φθαρτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην.

3. K. Freeman's translation of this passage (....on knowledge of the suffering in life...) is quite mistaken and destroys the meaning of the fr.

Soul's absolute superiority (to the body) and unique capacity in guiding human life is explicitly asserted in one of the most beautiful frr. of D.; he says: "If the body brought a suit against the soul, for all the pains it had endured throughout life, and the illtreatment, and I were to be judge of the suit, I would gladly condemn the soul, in that it had partly ruined the body by its neglect and dissolved it with bouts of drunkenness, and partly destroyed it and had torn it in pieces with its passion for pleasure — as if, when a tool[1] or a vessel were in a bad condition, I blamed the man who was using it unsparingly.[2]

1. fr. 159: Δ. ...φησίν· εἰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῇ δίκην λαχόντος, παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον ὧν ὠδύνηται <καὶ> κακῶς πέπονθεν, αὐτὸς γένοιτο τοῦ ἐγκλήματος δι<καστής>, ἡδέως ἂν καταψηφίσασθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐφ' οἷς τὰ μὲν ἀπώλεσε τοῦ σώματος ταῖς ἀμελείαις καὶ ἐξέλυσε ταῖς μέθαις, τὰ δὲ κατέφθειρε καὶ διέσπασε ταῖς φιληδονίαις, ὥσπερ ὀργάνου τινὸς ἢ σκεύους κακῶς ἔχοντος τὸν χρώμενον ἀφειδῶς αἰτιάσασθαι.

2. It is not without interest to recall here that a similar view was shared by Antiphon the Sophist (VS 87 B2), Socrates, Plato (see: Guthrie History III, 473 or Socrates 153 where the page title is: the body as instrument of the Psyche), Aristotle (on part~~icle~~s of animals, 642 a 11: since the body is the instrument...).
Cf. Epicurus, fr. 445 (Us. p.29): μηδὲ αἰτιώμεθα τὴν σάρκα ὡς τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίαν μηδὲ εἰς τὰ πράγματα τρέπωμεν τὰς δυσφορίας, ἐν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τὰς τούτων αἰτίας μᾶλλον ζητῶμεν.

In this quotation it is obviously implied that, in D.'s view, soul is absolutely responsible for the conditions of the body in good health and bad. Responsibility presupposes freewill about which D. did not say, as far as we know from surviving evidence, any word. Nonetheless, his ethical theory cannot be understood, unless we accept freewill as a postulate.

A more optimistic aspect of the capacity of the soul to improve the body (to lead human beings to a self-perfection) is affirmed elsewhere:[1] "It is right that men should value the soul rather than the body; for perfection of soul corrects the inferiority of the body, but physical strength without intelligence does nothing to improve the mind." The ideal of καλὸς κἀγαθός (fair of form and virtuous of soul) seems modified[2] with a strong emphasis on the second member of the pair; which acquires a clearly ethical connotation; it is not something given by birth; it is achieved in life by the soul which is evidently superior to the body. Soul being the guiding power, is of higher value[3] and worth higher care. If one is to be justly proud it is of the perfection of his soul rather

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1. fr. 187: ἀνθρώποις ἁρμόδιον ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος λόγον ποιεῖσθαι.....
2. Cf. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 353 n.14: Kalokagathia is undeniably a term with the strongest of social implications. Cf. his pages 339ff., 351 n.7. Cf. pp. 31-33.
3. Cf. fr. 57:.... ἀνθρώπων (εὐγένεια) ἢ τοῦ ἤθεος εὐτροπίη.

rather than the beauty of his body. What C.C.W. Taylor[1] proposes as a translation of fr. 187 can be accepted as an implication; it is a very Socratic and attractive interpretation, but it is a paraphrase of the original text.

However, neither the last-quoted fr. (187) nor the previous one (159) make any sense of ascriptions of dualism.[2] Unlike Aristotelian active nous[3] and Platonic soul[4] the Democritean soul-cluster would dissolve if deprived of the body (if separated from the body).[5]

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1. C.C.W. Taylor, "Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in D.", Phronesis, 12 (1967), 14: It is fitting for men to pay more attention to the soul than to the body....

   Sinclair's explanation (History of Greek Political Thought, p. 65) that D. "was thinking....of the Importance of the reasoning faculty rather than the Socratic" ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ψυχῆς " emphasises one point and misrepresents the whole passage.

2. Per contra see: Langerbeck, 75.

3. De anima, 430 a 22-3: χωριστὸς δ' (ὁ νοῦς) ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. Cf. Guthrie, History, II. 430 ff.

4. Phaedo 67 D, Phaedrus 250 C ff., Gorgias 493A, Rep. 611 B-C, Phaedo 66 D-E.

5. fr. 297. Aët. IV 7.4. (DK 68 A 109 Dox. 393). See also: G. Vlastos Philos. Rev. 54 (1945) p. 579.

Mind and body constitute a unity; neither of them is the form of the other; body is the vessel, soul is the pilot during life. Happiness is pursued and achieved by the soul, if some conditions are fuldilled; one of these is the body's health; from this point of view the soul is interested in the body's health and (because of its superiority) also responsible for protecting it.

To characterise D.'s view (on the problem of body-soul relations) as a materialism with modern connotations (that soul is an epiphenomenon* of the material body) is beyond the evidence we possess. For D. body and soul coexist and perish together; both of them consist of atoms which are the only reality for atomists.[1] But:

(1) Soul atoms are spherical,[2]

(2) they are the most mobile[3] and therefore

(3) the soul is more mobile than any other atomic structure.[4]

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1. Sext. adv. math. VII 135 (DK 68 B 9).
   Galenus, de medic. empir. fr. ed. H. Schöne 1259, 8 (DK 68 B 125).
2. Arist. de anima 404 a 2-3: ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει,....
3. op. cit. 404 a 6 ff. τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν, διὰ τὸ διὰ παντὸς δύνασθαι διαδύνειν τοὺς τοιούτους ῥυσμούς, καὶ κινεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ κινούμενα καὶ αὐτά,....

   Cf. 406 b 16-22 and 409 b 1.
4. op. cit. 404 b 7: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλεψαν, οὗτοι τὸ κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν.

   in connection with 404 a 1-10, partly quoted beneath. Cf. also, de anima, 405 a 7-13.

* Cf. P. J. Bicknell, The Seat of Mind in Democritus (Eranos, 66 (1968), p. 11, n. 6.).

It is not strange if D. reached the conclusion that soul moves the body[1] and governs it; and that soul is responsible for the body (frr. 159, 187). "It is an elegant deduction from the first principles of atomic physics."[2]

On the other hand — unlike other materialists — nowhere in D.'s frr. can evidence be traced that wealth, bodily satisfactions, sensuous pleasures,[3] or the like, are either the only or the greatest values man can seek or attain, as will be explained in the following pages.

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1. op. cit. 404a 1-10: Δημόκριτος...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ....ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ παρέχον τοῖς ζώοις τὴν κίνησιν.
2. Vlastos, op. cit. p. 579.
3. W. Schumacher, Die Seele: der Sitz des Schicksals, Berlin (1938) p. 26.

5. Meaning of good(s)

To know the good is a reasonable demand before we decide to pursue and attain it. We have already seen that euthumia is the Chief Good according to D. The inquiry here will be directed to the following points:

1. What are the good things and activities in the life of individuals.
2. What are good activities approved in the relationship of individuals.
3. Towards a definition of good (or a description of it).

1. A general and vague dichotomy with a sense of hierarchy of goods is described in fr. 37: "He who chooses the goods of the soul chooses the more divine; he who chooses those of its dwelling-place chooses human goods."[1]

The seeming religious flavour of this aphorism has been explained elsewhere.[2] Apart from this aspect, another problem arises, because of its vagueness: what are the objects of choice about which a hint is given in the fr. above? or what activities of the soul are to be deliberately aimed at?

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1. fr. 37: ὁ τὰ ψυχῆς ἀγαθὰ αἱρεόμενος τὰ θειότερα αἱρέεται· ὁ δὲ τὰ ἐκήνεος τὰ ἀνθρωπήια.
2. In Ch. 1. This fr. would not be discussed if a distinction between body and soul with superiority of the soul was not testified by other frr. attributed to D. (e.g. 159, 187, 11, 125).

(a) is this possibly cosmological speculation and successful scientific inquiry? or

(b) expression of admiration for moral deeds? or artistic speculation? or

(c) clear conscience and the joys of friendship?

There is evidence to affirm all these questions. D. seems to have included all mental activities in the meaning of "goods" for the soul. He declared that he would prefer to acquire "cognitionem rerum" than gain the Kingdom of Persia (fr. 118), that the great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works (fr. 184),[1] that a man who neglects justice is unhappy (fr. 174), that a man is not worthy to live, if he has not one, at least, good friend (fr. 99).[2]

However, these are not the only goods in life; there is the partner of the soul — the body; it is a condicio sine qua non for the soul, since disembodied existence of the soul is unacceptable in D.'s system. If soul is to enjoy euthumia (fr. 189), its dwelling place should be looked after; attention should be paid to it.

What is good for the body is at first a matter of acquaintance and later of experience. Here, as elsewhere, a physicist's way of thinking will be seen in the frr. concerned with the problem. Nature is our teacher, things in nature are neither useful nor hurtful; a positive or negative value is given to them according to our relation to them. Man is able to adapt to new conditions and accustom

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1. fr. 194: αἱ μεγάλαι τέρψεις ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων.
2. fr. 99: ζῆν οὐκ ἄξιος, ὅτῳ μηδὲ εἷς ἐστι χρηστὸς φίλος.

Cf. frr. 100, 101, 103, 186.

himself to them after having some acquaintance with them. A clear example of this kind of thought is given by fr. 172: Those same things from which we get good can also be for us a source of hurt, or else we can avoid the hurt. For instance...(deep water - swimming).[1] External nature teaches man, human nature naturalises this kind of learning[2] and so man becomes stronger for reasons of adaptation and self-protection. This practical learning is the first good for the survival of man. In this stage a simple definition of the good and the bad might be derived (from fr. 172):

good is what is useful for surviving,

bad is what is contrary to our survival

(or good is what has survival-value, bad what has not).

At a higher level men's intentions are to be considered if good and bad are to find a better (really ethical) definition; good and bad interchange according to men's ability and their intention to make good use of their experience and knowledge, i.e. good and bad are dependent on human skillfulness and volition. Fr. 173 is

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1. fr. 172: ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ'ἄν, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκτὸς εἴημεν. αὐτίκα ὕδωρ βαθὺ εἰς πολλὰ χρήσιμον καὶ δαῦτε κακόν· κίνδυνος γὰρ ἀποπνιγῆναι. μηχανὴ οὖν εὑρέθη, νήχεσθαι διδάσκειν.

2. Cf. fr. 33:... ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυθμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυθμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ.

fairly clear on this.[1]

1. fr. 173: (a) ἀνθρώποισι κακὰ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν φύεται, ἐπήν τις τἀγαθὰ μὴ 'πιστῆται ποδηγετεῖν μηδὲ ὀχεῖν εὐπόρως. (b) οὐ δίκαιον ἐν κακοῖσι τὰ τοιάδε κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀγαθοῖσιν ὤν· (c) τοῖς τε ἀγαθοῖσιν οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ κακά, εἴ τινι βουλομένῳ, ἀλκῇ.

Some comments of this are necessary:

a. There is a kind of correspondence in the meaning of the two extreme propositions; both emphasise that good things (or situations) can be changed into bad ones, because of bad management (in the first case), because of ill will (in the other).

b. The middle proposition is an explanatory comment on the others. In many cases people blame the conditions for their failure or for undesirable results and consequently (men) misclassify the things. Here it is demanded that objective judgement on such things should be directed not to the results but to men's ability or will. Things are by themselves (potentially, if we might use terminology of Aristotelian flavour) good (or neutral), but the results are actually bad.

This statement makes sense as an ethical problem: conditions of objectivity of moral judgement. What should be the criterion: the result or the management and intention?

One might recall here a parallel point from Socrates' conversation with his friend Crito in prison: Socrates says: "I wish to investigate, Crito, in common with you and see whether our former argument seems different to me under our present conditions..... For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying tomorrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your

For the foundation of an ethical theory fr. 173 is of interest. What is good or bad is not to be found in the things themselves but in the user's treatment and intention.[1]

Note 1 ctd. from p. 113.

judgement astray." (Plato's Crito, 48 D-E).

c. Luria (Democritea, Leningrad (1970) p. 422, no. 34) is right to say that ὀχεῖν, ποδηγετεῖν, εὐπόρως make a metaphor from navigation.

d. Langerbeck (Δόξις Ἐπιρυσμίη, p. 74) pointed out "die starke Hervorhebung des βουλομένῳ durch die sehr wirkungsvolle Stellung in Satz: wenn einer es nur zielsicher angreift."

So the lastproposition takes its place as a part of an obvious attempt in D.'s frr. to found an ethical theory based on knowledge and will (df. frr. 62 - Stob. III.9.29. - 68, 89, 248, 69, 181, 264).

1. See: L. Stella, Valore e posizione storica dell' etica di Democrito, Sophia, 10 (1942) pp. 220, 227.

Cf. Meno 88A. See Guthrie, History, II, 490.

H. Langerbeck (Δόξις Ἐπιρυσμίη, p. 74) noted correctly:

"frr. 172-3 are the best comment on fr. 119."

Nature gives men the opportunity to find what is good or bad; to obtain it they have to deliberate and decide. The necessity to expand effort for good results is underlined in fr. 108: "Good things are obtained with difficulty if one seeks; bad things come without even seeking."[1] Whatever is taken at random will very probably be undesirable. This fr. is a remarkable consideration about the necessity of wisdom in leading a happy life (cf. frr. 119, 197).

Finally (in fr. 294) 3 qualities are named as goods (of youth and old age respectively) characterising periods of human life: "The good things of youth are strength and beauty, but the flower of

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1. fr. 108 (Stob. IV 34.58): διζημένοισι τἀγαθὰ μόλις παραγίνεται· τὰ δὲ κακὰ καὶ μὴ διζημένοισιν.

A rounded sentence with a term of Heraclitean flavour (Heraclitus, B 22, B 101). Cf. fr. 182.

old age is sophrosyne."[1]

From the four aphorisms quoted above it becomes evident that D. included in the meaning of good:

(a) good things (e.g. health, protection of life),

(b) good qualities (sophrosyne, ability to manage things, good intentions),

(c) good activities (virtuous actions), since, in his opinion, virtue is deeds not words (cf. fr. 145).

2. What is the agathos' personality? Agathos was a current concept in D.'s days; but to define it is a difficult task. A description would be easier, of course. In D.'s frr., at least, only descriptions of the agathos can be traced, ascribing good qualities to him.

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1. fr. 294: ἰσχὺς καὶ εὐμορφίη νεότητος ἀγαθά, γήραος δὲ σωφροσύνη ἄνδρος.

Optimism for the aged is emphatically affirmed (flower-sophrosyne); old men are of value, if their experience is crowned by sophrosyne. If so, life is congenial even for old men. Such approval of old age seems to mirror a feeling of pride in D. himself. With some other frr. this seems to have been written when D. was rather old and proud of his own sophrosyne. Cf. frr. 295, 299, 183.

2. cf. pp. 135 ff..

It is a "must" in moral life for someone to "be agathos or try to become by imitation."[1] This sounds like a judgement of moral obligation; but it is general and vague. A similar idea in a reverse way is expressed by fr. 79: "It is a bad thing to imitate the bad, and not even to wish to imitate the good."[2] Vagueness is no less present here. A glimpse of practical life can be found in fr. 229: "Only an agathos has the capacity to discern when to save money and when to lead a more expensive life."[3]

It is evident that the inquiry is turned not to the concept of agathon[4] but only to a description of the qualities of agathos.

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1. fr. 39: ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἶναι χρεὼν ἢ μιμεῖσθαι.
   See: Natorp, Ethika 119 44.
2. fr. 79: χαλεπὸν μιμεῖσθαι μὲν τοὺς κακοὺς μηδὲ ἐθέλειν δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθούς.
3. fr. 229: φειδώ τοι καὶ λιμὸς χρηστή· ἐν καιρῷ δὲ καὶ δαπάνη· γινώσκειν δὲ ἀγαθοῦ.
4. H. Langerbeck, op. cit. p. 66: Zusammenfassend kann man feststellen, das auch hier der Blick auf den Agathos, nicht auf das Agathon gerichtet ist.
   But E. Kapp, reviewing Langerbeck's book (Gnomon, 12 (1936) pp. 65-77) and referring to Aristotle (Eud. Ethics 1216b), argued that in human life it is important not to find definitions of virtues but to lead a virtuous life. Socrates, to be sure, would reply that nobody can be agathos without knowing what is agathon. We face certainly an unsolved problem of circularity, unless we accept that the concept of agathon is acquired by intuition.

A characteristic of the agathos is his magnanimity; he does not blame bad men, even if accused by them.[1]

All these remarks touch the agathos' personality from outside; there is no effort to penetrate his soul and explore that terram incognitam. They would be characterised as banal by some scholars. The following two, on the contrary, cannot be deprived of some importance; they touch crucial and debatable problems and present a thinker who took part in the interesting questions of his age. "More men become good through practice than by nature."[2] There are three points to be considered:

a. The long dispute of physis-nomos antithesis reaches its culmination and a reasonable solution: synthesis. D. is not the first to propose this solution; the importance of his proposal is found in the fact that it comes from a believer in a mechanical universe, an outstanding physicist, a man well-acquainted with the medical teaching of his days,[3] a thinker who survived after the great Sophists.

b. By his aphorism D. takes his position against the aristocratic view of hereditary virtues (gifts, talents); he declares that "a man's nature is not irrevocably fixed at birth, a man is indeed a creature

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1. fr. 48: μωμεωμένων φλαύρων ὁ ἀγαθὸς οὐ ποιεῖται λόγον (Stob. III. 38.46).
2. fr. 242: πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος.
   The educational aspect of this aphorism will find place elsewhere (Ch. "On Education").
3. See frr. 26 c-d, 31. See also: Schmid-Stählin, Gesch. d. griech. Liter. I.5. p. 294 n.5.

who makes himself by a process of constant change."[1]

c. By this formula the door is opened for the concept of freedom of will. Askesis (exercise) is a voluntary action, it is, at least, not non-voluntary.

On the grounds of its content fr. 247 ("to a wise man the whole earth is open; for the whole earth is tha native land of a good soul")[2] constitutes an anticipation of ideas of the 4th century B.C. Only the concept of the good soul is of interest here. The good soul is equated with wisdom; it is the product of wisdom. At first sight it is near the doctrine "virtue is knowledge". It seems to mean: more knowledge implies better understanding, it entails better behaviour, more forgiveness and subsequently easier relationship (better relations). According to this explanation, in any specific situation (state of affairs), conduct (i.e. orientation of will, decision and action) can be influenced by knowledge. Knowledge is a condition necessary but not sufficient for action.[3]

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1. Guthrie, Sophists, p. 256 (footn. 2).
2. fr. 247: ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀγαθῆς πατρὶς ὁ σύμπας κόσμος
   Strangely enough this fr. echoes similarly an aphorism of Thucydides sub persona Pericles (2.43.3):... ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος.
3. In the light of this interpretation fr. 83 might be more intelligible. Cf. fr. 181 (end).

3. An attempt to define "good" is put at the end of this paragraph, because:

(a) after centuries of philosophical inquiry this concept is still undefined and discussions of good things and good qualities are made necessarily without a final definition of "goodness".[1]

(b) D. tried to give a definition of it (it is evident from frr. like 62, 261); but he gave only an indirect description through the concept of justice.

It is a duty not only to be just but also actively to protect justice on behalf of others; "We must avenge those who are wronged to the best of our powers and not let it be; for this is just and good, and the contrary is unjust and evil" (fr. 261).[2] This maxim presupposes of course good will, since to avenge wronged people is a voluntary and free decision.

To avoid injustice is one step to goodness; perhaps it is a necessary condition of living in a state; but it is not enough. To want justice and not to tolerate injustice is a higher conception of goodness; it puts good will as the foundation, as is explicitly

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1. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge 1968 [1903], p.6 (§ 6) ff., p. 118 (§70).
W.K. Frankena, Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1963) pp.81-85 (refutation of definist theories).

2. fr. 261: ἀδικουμένοισι τιμωρεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν χρὴ καὶ μὴ παριέναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἄδικον καὶ κακόν.

For a further discussion see: E.A. Havelock, The liberal temper in Greek Politics, London (1957) pp. 133-134.

declared in fr. 62: "Virtue consists not in avoiding wrongdoing but in having no wish thereto" (fr.62)[1]. D. values the intention which has not yet become action.[2] But there is one more step to be reached if someone's good will is to be proved; he must willingly and actively protect justice (fr. 261).

Some of these frr. are actually a remarkable anticipation of later thought; they "are conceived on a high plane and some of them have an almost Christian ring about them."[3] These frr. tend to introduce the idea of "Willens Ethik", in which only one concept can be good without any qualification: good will.

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1. fr. 62 (Stob. III 9.29): ἀγαθὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθέλειν.

2. The same emphasis on the importance of intention can be seen in fr. 68: "Worthy and unworthy men (are to be known) not only by their action but also by their wishes."

3. Bailey, Greek Atomists....p.203.

Fr. 69.

If there is no clear and final definition of what is good, one would be hesitant on whether and how good is to be realised. D. did'nt follow the way of scepticism or subjectivism; he proceeded to overcome the difficulty deliberately and decisively. In a surprisingly daring – for his age – and optimistic statement he expressed a positive view embracing knowledge and morality at the same time. He says: "For all men the good and true are the same; but the pleasant differs for different men."[1]

This can – and must because of its importance – be studied from different viewpoints:

a. Why are good and true both opposed to pleasant?

b. Is there any similarity or antithesis or progress in comparison to Socrates' views on these problems?

c. What – if any – is the connection with Protagoras' doctrines?

d. Is there any compatibility and connection between D.'s Ethics and epistemology with reference to fr. 69?

e. On the authenticity of fr. 69.

a. This aphorism unexpectedly combines two main fields of human capacity and separates them at the same time. There is truth and it is objective (this is implied, since truth is the same for all men). This is

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1. fr. 69: ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τωὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀληθές· ἡδὺ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἄλλο. This fr. we know only from Democrates' collection. There are nevertheless internal reasons suggesting attribution to Democritus; these are explained below. Cf. p. 227.

an epistemological credo for Democritus.[1] The existence of an objective good is also asserted here, without any comment; it is a fundamental belief, an ethical credo, which is logically necessary for the foundation of an objective ethical theory. All men, it is said, have the ability to discern what is good or bad;[2] of course it presupposes a degree of knowledge; it explains why the concept of truth is here combined with that of goodness, which seems unexpected at first sight, but justifiable for D.'s cultural environment. Knowledge of good is

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1. Cf. frr. 117, 11, 125.

2. This belief was later shared by Aristotle who says (Metaph. 1008 b 26ff.):

..... ὥστε, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν ἁπλῶς, εἰ μὴ περὶ ἅπαντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντες, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιμελητέον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀληθείας.

See: P. Natorp, Die Ethika des D., 91: .....
das Wahre, das Allen gleichartig, und das Erscheinende, Sinnliche, das jeden auf seine eigenthümliche Art sich darstellt.
Arist. Met. 1009 b 2 ff.
Theophr. de sens. 63 (Dox. p. 517, 13). Vgl. 69, 70. (Dox. p. 519, 19, 24).
See also Natorp, Vorschungen.... 186 ff., particularly 188.

asserted as a condition necessary but not sufficient for doing it; the differentiating point — the other condition, which is crucial and important — is individual preference and decision. Virtue is not identified with knowledge,[1] but only accompanied by it.

A central problem of ethics remains unanswered and should be raised here: What is the basis of objectivity of good?

"D. can take 'man is the measure' in an entirely different sense. His physical concept of the soul defines a unitary human nature, which affords a basis for universally valid judgements."[2] Believing that all men can discern what is good is not, of course, a definition; but it is a necessary affirmation, if one is to construct an ethical theory and escape scepticism or subjectivism; it is, to be sure, the starting point of an intuitionist, not of a "definist". In the final analysis no later philosopher succeeded in providing a complete

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1. Cf. C.C.W. Taylor, op. cit. pp.14,25.

2. G. Vlastos, op. cit. I. 591 (Philos. Rev. (1945) p. 591).

From some other statements (e.g. fr. 278, first proposition: "for human beings it is a necessity of life to have children, arising from nature and primeval law...", fr. 253, last proposition: "to err is human but to forgive is difficult for men") it might reasonably be inferred that D. recognised a common nucleus in human nature; perhaps something like a priori conditions of existence, perhaps race memories accumulated in common experience. Cf. frr. 165, 172 and Diodorus I. 8. 7 (in DK II 136, 8-15).

Vlastos (op. cit. footn. 67) makes a reference to D.'s baffling fr. 124: One (man) will be (many) men and all (men) one man, which DK give up as unintelligible.

definition; and such a definition is not of importance for the practice of virtue.[1]

b. From this point starts the differentiation between D.'s and Socrates' views on the subject. Knowledge of good is necessary and sufficient condition for doing it is implied from S.'s teaching.;[2] it is only a necessary condition, D. says in fr. 69, because another factor intervenes between knowing and doing what is good, viz. individual preference, will, decision.[3] In a free paraphrase fr. 69 could be so: "In so far as knowledge of good is necessary for practical reasons all men are able to know; the point of difficulty and differentiation is what they like to do, what they will decide to do." This conception of the problem escapes the implications[4] of the doctrine "virtue is knowledge" and actually leaves more room for freedom of will and personal responsibility.

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1. A. McIntyre, A short history of Ethics, Oxford, 1971 [1967], 21-22, referring to Aristotle, Eud. Ethics, 1216 b.
2. Arist. EN 1144 b 28: Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι· ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας.
   1144 b 19: φρονήσεως ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς.
   See: Guthrie, History, III, 450 ff. or Socrates, p. 131.
3. frr. 62 (Stob. III 9. 29), 68, 69 concerned with the problem of will (volition) are to be discussed elsewhere. 89 ?
4. A paradoxical perplexity (determinism) is discussed by Guthrie in his History, III, 459, or his Socrates, pp. 139 ff.

"The good and the true are the same for all men" (fr. 69) sounds like an explicit denial of Protagoras thesis: "I call some things better than others, but none truer"[1] and "man is the measure for everything"[2]. Protagorean subjectivism is attacked by objectivism on both sides: moral and epistemological.[3]

Fr. 69 seems to be a two-sided aphorism, something like a two-sided axiom in the Democritean system; perhaps it was a transitional one from epistemology to moral philosophy.

Conjunction of these two fields of mental activity was a general belief (in D.'s age and after him), which found its culmination in Socrates' doctrine:[4] "virtue is knowledge". D., therefore, had

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1. Plato's Theaet. 167 b: ἐγὼ δὲ (καλῶ) βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀμεινέστερα δ' οὔ. See: Vlastos 591.

2. VS 80 B 1 { Sext. adv. Math. VII 60 . Theaet. 151E - 152A, 161C.

3. See: Kullmann, Zur Nachwirkung des Homo-Mensura Satzes des Protagoras bei D. und Epikur, Archiv für die Philosophie, 51 (1969) 128-44, where earlier literature is referred to.
   Cf. also: VK 68 B 156 (Plutarch, adv. Colotes 4 p. 1108 F)
   Arist. Met. 1009 b 7 ff. (DK 68 A 112),
   Philoponus, de anim. p. 71, 19 (DK 68 A 113),
   Sext. VII 389 (DK 68 A 114),
   Arist. Metaph. 1062 b 12,
   See also: RE 23 (1957) cols. 913-916.

4. Guthrie, History, III, 257 ff., 450 ff. or
   Sophists, 257, Socrates, 130 ff.

to assert the possibility of knowledge, if he wanted to construct an ethical theory.[1] Scholars are right to make the parallel between the two fields: epistemology and ethics.

I. "Fr. 69 as a whole gives an obvious parallel with the famous fr. 125...pleasantness is ranked with the secondary qualities as it obviously varies from person to person, while the good is independent of all the changes in the perceiver of the environment."[2]

II. Pleasant (fr. 69) corresponds to sweet and bitter (frr. 9, 125) and sight and hearing (fr. 11).

IIIThe good and the true (fr. 69) correspond to truly being (frr. 9, 125).[3]

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1. For this reason - among others - I think that D.'s epistemology is prior to his ethical theory; the former came as a supplement of Physics, the latter as a supplement of the whole system. And both of them (being a reply to subjectivism, scepticism of the Sophists - see Burnet, Greek Philosophy [14](1968), pp. 157 ff.) fall in a period after 420 BC, when the teaching of the Sophists was well-known and they had retired from the stage.
2. Taylor, op. cit. p. 14. Taylor's article (Phronesis 12, 1967, pp. 6-27) is the best discussion of the problem of compatibility between D.'s Ethics and Epistemology.
3. See Vlastos op. cit., I. 589-91 (Philos. Rev. 54, 1945, pp. 589-91).

e. Ferber[1] thought (following in this Heinze's opinion) that fr. 69 deviates from D.'s thought. Natorp[2], on the contrary, was the first to observe that a reason for its authenticity is that fr. 69 is in agreement with D.'s theory of knowledge. Taylor expounded (explained) in detail the similarity between these two parts of D.'s system (theory of knowledge – of ethics). In both of them there is a subjective element (convention – fr. 125, pleasantness – fr. 69) and an objective one[3] (truly being – fr. 69) leading from subjectivism to objectivism (to an exit from scepticism).

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1. Ferber, Über die Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der Ethik des Demokrits, Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 132/3 (1908) p. 95. (The whole article covers pp. 82-114).
2. Die Ethika des D. ch. 2 (pp. 88 ff.), particularly on p. 91: "für die Echtheit entscheidet, dass D. genau so in der Erkenntnisslehre gegenüberstellt: das Wahre, das Allen gleichartig, und das Ercheinende, Sinnliche, das jedem auf seine eigentümliche Art sich darstellt."
3. Taylor, op. cit. pp. 24-27.

After all the discussion given under a-d above, it seems that not only the grounds for suspicion of the authenticity of fr. 69 are unjustified, but also that it is completely compatible with what we know about D.'s thought and its authenticity should be postulated — as a supplement — even if we had other reasons (Democrates' name for example) to suspect it as spurious. For my part, I cannot imagine which thinker except D. (of the fifth or fourth century BC) could have written it.

6. Pleasure

(Hedonē - Terpsis)

It seems necessary at this point to investigate some features of D.'s terminology concerned with bodily pleasures and mental joys (intellectual pleasures) in order to avoid misapprehensions later on.[1]

Some concepts used by him interchangeably (at first sight) should be defined; a careful study may persuade us that these notions have a different connotation. These are:

a. ἡδύ, ἡδονή, [2]

b. σύμφορον, ἀσύμφορον, [3]

c. τέρψις, ἀτερπίη. [4]

Two preliminary remarks, at the risk of repetition, may be recalled here:

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1. A chain of undefined terms included in D.'s definition of criterion of pleasure (frr. 4 [188]) demand elucidation (illumination) before we attempt to discover its meaning.
2. frr. 69, 74, 232, 243//71, 178, 189, 235, 207, 211, 214, 262, 293.
3. frr. 4, 188. Cf. also: 237, 253 συμφέρον, 74 συμφέρῃ.
4. frr. 4, 188, 146, 191, 194, 235, 174. Cf. also 232 τέρπει, 211 τερπνά 200, 201 τερπόμενοι, 233 ἐπιτερπέστατα, ἀτερπέστατα.

a. A standardised vocabulary was not available in D.'s days.[1]

b. Concepts like that of hedonē were in flux; they were under discussion from the days of the Sophists up to the Stoic period.[2]

We have seen in fr. 69 that "the pleasant differs for different men", although true and good are the same for all of them.[3] If no concrete restriction to the meaning of pleasantness is provided, it leaves open the way to subjectivism. But D.'s intention seemed to be different; his effort is obvious in many other frr. to overcome subjectivism and find an objective foundation for morality.

A first attempt to restrict the acceptability of what is pleasant can be seen in the following precept: "accept nothing of pleasant things, unless it is beneficial."[4] A new definition, nevertheless, will be necessary for "what is beneficial" (συμφέρη) if we are to have a clear connotation of pleasant.

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1. K. v. Fritz, Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck, pp. 9 ff.
   C.J. Classen, The study of language amongst Socrates' contemporaries, P.A.C.A. (1959) pp. 33-49.
2. VS 84 A 19 (Prodicus-Stoa).
   Plato's Prot. 337 A-C, Philebus 11B.
   Aristotle's EN 1099 a8, Topica 112 b 22.
3. fr. 69: ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τωὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀληθές· ἡδὺ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἄλλο.
4. fr. 74: ἡδὺ μηδὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ συμφέρῃ.

The next aphorism (fr. 232: of pleasant things, those that come most rarely give the greatest enjoyment)[1] has a psychological bias. In another case pleasantness is explicitly associated with success, when it is said that: "all kinds of toil are pleasanter than rest, when men attain that for which they labour, or know that they will attain it..."[2] This is again a psychological comment not helping us to understand any better what the connotation of pleasantness is in fr. 74 quoted above.[3] We have therefore to trace the meaning of derivative terms: σύμφορον (beneficial) and ἡδονή (pleasure).

In several frr. we can see D.'s intention to limit the general notion of hedonē and make a distinction between bodily pleasures and intellectual pleasures. In fr. 235 e.g. we read that bodily pleasures do not lead to any sense of true satisfaction. D.'s words are: "All who derive their pleasures from the stomach, overstepping due season in eating or drinking or sexual pleasure, have

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1. fr. 232: τῶν ἡδέων τὰ σπανιώτατα γινόμενα μάλιστα τέρπει.

2. fr. 243: τῆς ἡσυχίης πάντες οἱ πόνοι ἡδίονες, ὅταν ἂν εἵνεκεν πονέουσι τυγχάνωσιν ἢ εἰδέωσι κύρσοντες...

3. Cf. also ἡδέως in fr. 159, where it means willingly, gladly.

pleasures that are brief and short-lived...."[1]

For this reason it is recommended elsewhere that: "one should choose not every pleasure, but only what is concerned with the beautiful".[2] To distinguish between bodily and intellectual pleasure and to choose the latter is a condition of euthumia, since: "The best way for a man to lead his life is to have been as euthumos (cheerful) as possible.... This happen if one does'nt seek one's pleasures in mortal things."[3]

Pleasures controlled (in kind and time) are recommended (by implication), because "untimely pleasures produce unpleasantness".[4] What leads to uncontrolled pleasures is condemned, on the ground that

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1. fr. 235: ὅσοι ἀπὸ γαστρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιέονται ὑπερβεβληκότες τὸν καιρὸν ἐπὶ βρώσεσιν ἢ πόσεσιν ἢ ἀφροδισίοισιν, τοῖσι πᾶσιν αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ βραχεῖαι τε καὶ δι' ὀλίγου γίνονται.....

   By this fr. — which can hardly be a moral aphorism; it is rather a sample of metaethical reasoning — D. seems to turn his criticism against someone of his younger contemporaries (Aristippus? Antisthenis?). Cf. frr. 71, 232.

2. fr. 207: ἡδονὴν οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ αἱρεῖσθαι χρεών.

   Cf. Epicurus' Third letter (to Menoiceus), § 129. (Usener, p.63, Arrighetti [4] p. 113): οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα...

3. fr. 189: ἄριστον ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν βίον διάγειν ὡς πλεῖστα εὐθυμηθέντι καὶ ἐλάχιστα ἀνιηθέντι· τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς θνητοῖσι τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιοῖτο.

4. fr. 71: ἡδοναὶ ἄκαιροι τίκτουσιν ἀηδίας. Cf. fr. 235.

such pleasure is a source of wickedness.[1] Base sources of pleasure are rejected because they are not true causes of joy.[2] True courage is defined as the possibility for a man to control his own pleasures.[3]

It is fairly evident that all these aphorisms intend to restrict a general term (hedonē) to some favoured notion. Let us trace the way.

"Accept no pleasure, unless it is beneficial (unless it agrees with you)."[4] This could be an advice given by a doctor to a patient. Such a view was defended[5] on the ground that in the fr. above

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1. fr. 178: πάντων κάκιστον ἡ εὐπετεία παιδεῦσαι τὴν νεότητα· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίκτει τὰς ἡδονὰς ταύτας, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κακότης γίνεται.
2. fr. 293: οἷσιν ἡδονὴν ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν πέλας ξυμφοραί, οὐ ξυνιᾶσι μὲν ὡς τὰ τῆς τύχης κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ἀπορέουσι δὲ οἰκηίης χαρᾶς.
   Cf. fr. 107a.
3. fr. 214: ἀνδρεῖος.... ὃ τῶν ἡδονῶν κρέσσων.
   Cf. Antiphon (the Sophist) B 58 (DK II 364, 8-9), Plato, Laws, 626 E. Thucydides, II 40, 3.
4. fr. 74: ἡδὺ μηδὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ συμφέρῃ.
5. There is evidence that D. had acquaintance with the medicine of his days. See frr. 26 b-d, 31.

D. is using a term of medical origin[1] (an expression of medical flavour). Our inquiry into the meaning of συμφέρη leads to fr. 4 (188).[2] In this we will try to find (in one of the following paragraphs) D.'s criterion of good; but before doing so another term should be explained, i.e. τέρψις.

It is a higher kind of pleasure (frr. 4, 188, 146, 191, 194, 174); it is the only kind of joy recommended by D. without any trace of hesitation. Terpsis perhaps accompanies pleasures but neither all of them nor always; such an inference might be reasonable from fr. 235: "These men who derive their pleasures from the stomach....the pleasure passes quickly and they have nothing for themselves except a brief enjoyment.[3]

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1. Cf. Hippocrates, On ancient medic. 3. 35: συμφέρουσα τροφή = ἁρμόζουσα τῇ φύσει On breaths, 6: ἀσύμφορα i.e. τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει πολέμια.

   See: Vlastos, op. cit., part I, pp. 586 ff. (Philos. Rev. 54 (1945)).

   Cf. Diog. of Oinoanda (Usener, in Rhein. Mus. 47, p. 431): τὸ τῇ φύσει συμφέρον, ὅπερ ἐστιν ἀταραξία, καὶ ἑνὶ καὶ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.

2. fr. 188: ὅρος τῶν συμφόρων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπίη.

   Cf. Epicurus, Third Letter (to Menoiceus), § 130 (Usener 63, Arrigetti 113) τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων βλέψει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει.

3. fr. 235... διὰ ταχέος τε ἡ ἡδονὴ παροίχεται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτοῖσι χρηστόν (ἐστιν) ἀλλ' ἢ τέρψις βραχεῖα.

Terpsis is not only of different duration than bodily pleasure, but also of different quality; it is a pleasurable state of the soul; it can originate in certain pleasures under certain conditions:

(a) these pleasures must be acceptable by a certain criterion (which includes terpsis; cf. 188, 194) (fr. 207)[1]

(b) they must be limited in due measure (fr. 233: if one oversteps the due measure the most agreable things become most unpleasant; fr. 211: moderation multiplies pleasures and increases pleasure; fr. 191: euthumia is created for men through moderation of enjoyment....).[1]

(c) One more but higher-level condition can be inferred from fr. 174 (second half), where the opposite of terpsis (a state of unhappiness) makes its appearance for men, if they neglect their duty to be just. Justice is a necessary condition for terpsis.[2]

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1. fr. 207: ἡδονὴν οὐ πᾶσαν...αἱρεῖσθαι....

fr. 233: εἴ τις ὑπερβάλλοι τὸ μέτριον, τὰ ἐπιτερπέστατα ἀτερπέστατα ἂν γίγνοιτο.

fr. 211: σωφροσύνη τὰ τερπνὰ ἀέξει καὶ ἡδονὴν ἐπιμείζονα ποιεῖ.

fr. 191: ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ εὐθυμίη γίνεται μετριότητι τέρψιος....

2. fr. 174: ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος....ὃς δ' ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογῇ καὶ τὰ χρὴ ἐόντα μὴ ἔρδῃ, τούτῳ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη.....

The source of terpsis seems to be distinct from bodily pleasures: the great joys come from the contemplation of noble works (or deeds?)".[1]

A passage from Plutarch (fr. 146: the reason....which accustoms itself to derive its (intellectual) pleasure from itself) gives an Aristotelian connotation to terpsis.[2]

Therefore terpsis seems to be the highest kind of pleasant things; it is clearly intellectual pleasure and is connected with mental activities. It is not a specific term for the more general notion of pleasure (hedonē).[3]

Of course fools are excluded from this noble enjoyment (frr. 200, 201), since they live without being able to enjoy the true joys of life; they only yearn for long life without enjoying it.[4]

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1. fr. 194: αἱ μεγάλαι τέρψεις ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων. Cf. frr. 207, 118, 112.
2. fr. 146: ...τὸν λόγον...αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὰς τέρψιας ἐθιζόμενον λαμβάνειν. This fr. is one of the very few which Erwin Rohde (Psychē, London, 1925, p. 408, footn. 103) recognises as authentic.

   See defence of its authenticity in Philippson's "Demokrits Sittensprüche", Hermes 59 (1924), 393.
3. For a modified differentiation and classification of the term see: Kullmann, "Zur Nachwirkung des Homo-Mensura Satzes des Protagoras bei D. und Epikur," Archiv für die Philosophie, 51 (1969), 136: "Wenn Lust mit Terpsis verbunden ist...Hedonē ist der allgemeine, Terpsis der speziellere Ausdruck."
4. fr. 200: ἀνοήμονες βιοῦσιν οὐ τερπόμενοι βιοτῇ.
   fr. 201: ἀνοήμονες δηναιότητος ὀρέγονται οὐ τερπόμενοι δηναιότητι.

After these elucidations and under these conditions terpsis can be seen to signify the highest level of pleasant life introducing man into the realm of happiness (euthumia). One can actually trace close connections between these two concepts in the frr. we possess:

(a) one, by implication, in fr. 174 (second half)

(b) another, clear and direct, in fr. 191 (beginning): "euthumia is created by men through moderate terpsis..."

Now, I hope, frr. 4, 188 have become clearer; through these we will try to define what is the criterion in Democritean Ethics (in one of the following paragraphs).

But a short reference is necessary to another term (χαρά) met once in fr. 293: "These to whom their neighbours' misfortune give pleasure....lack cause for personal joy."[1] Elsewhere this concept is connected with the life of the εὐθυμος, who "rejoices by day and by night..."[2]

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1. Cf. frr. 107a.

2. fr. 174: ὁ μὲν εὐθυμος.....καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει....

7. Hedonism or Eudaemonism?

After the explanations given in the previous paragraphs (particularly On Euthumia, On Pleasure) not much comment is necessary to point out that:

1. If hedonism identifies good or welfare with happiness and happiness with pleasure, then D.'s ethical theory cannot be classified as any kind of hedonism, since D. disapproves of bodily pleasures (frr. 71, 235) and shows that they are a dangerous source of wickedness (178); he discourages men from mortal pleasures (fr. 189) and any other which is not well orientated (fr. 207); and he recommends only so much satisfaction of desire[1] as is beneficial (74) and finally he makes mental joy the criterion for that measured (moderate) satisfaction of desires (fr. 188). Nowhere in the surviving frr. of D. can evidence be traced that he recognised intrinsic value in bodily pleasures or in Wealth (frr. 40, 170, 171). He recognised such value only in what we call mental activities.

2. It is a kind of eudaemonism, which will be described in some detail below.

Highest Good in life is euthumia (eudaemonia) (fr. 189)

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1. Cf. a better formulation from Epicurus (Sent. XXIX, Usener p.77 Arrighetti p. 131.): τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι ..... (the only approved by Ep.).....

which originates from scientific activity (fr. 118)[1], from reasoning (fr. 146)[2] and is connected with justice — should be accompanied by justice (fr. 174), and is orientated to what is kalon in aesthetic or moral sense (fr. 194, 207).

For the last two aphorisms some explanation seems unavoidable because they are more interesting here and scholars have not accepted unanimously any single interpretation.

Fr. 207:" One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the noble (kalon)."[3] expresses a recommendation and

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1. Cf. two other views:

   a. Euripides fr. 910 (in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. IV 25, 157):

   "Ολβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας ἔσχε μάθησιν,
   μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνας
   μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὁρμῶν
   ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
   κόσμον ἀγήρω, τίς τε συνέστη / καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως.

   (influenced from Anaxagoras or the Atomists? or an accumulation of ideas of the late fifth century B.C.?)

   b. Empedocles (DK 31 B 132):

   "Ολβιος ὃς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον
   δειλὸς δ' ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.

2. fr. 146: τὸν λόγον....αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὰς τέρψιας ἐθιζόμενον λαμβάνειν. This is one of the very few fragments recognised as authentic by E. Rohde (PSYCHE, London, 1925, p. 408, footn. 3).

3. fr. 207: ἡδονὴν οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ αἱρεῖσθαι χρεών.

includes a purpose to be fulfilled (ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ). It is highly probable that D. recommends his disciples (or friends or readers) to perform what is morally good[1], because it is a highly valued enjoyment; it makes a man just; and justice is a condition of happiness.[2]

An aesthetic connotation is not unanimously recognised for fr. 194: αἱ μεγάλαι τέρψεις ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων [3]. The passage might be taken to refer to the pleasure of looking at works of art. "Great joys come from contemplating fine deeds (perhaps in the sense that one source of pleasure is the knowledge that one has acted well".[4]

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1. A. Dyroff (Demokritstudien, München, 1899, p. 149, note 2):
   Die Freude an schönen Taten stellt Sokrates gleichfalls hoch (Xenophon, Memorabilia II 6. 35).
   Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 195: Here the idea of "beautiful" is perhaps mainly moral....
2. Cf. frr. 261, 174
3. The wonderful works of nature, according to Natorp (Die Ethika des D. p. 99). This interpretation seems risky but not unreasonable (cf. fr. 118). It is, however, improbable.
4. C.C.W. Taylor, op. cit. p. 8. An improbable but not impossible interpretation, at first sight.
   Cf. Bailey, 195: "the completely aesthetic side is seen in fr. 194".

The ambiguity originates from the fact that in D.'s days Greeks believed (although it seems paradoxical to us) that beauty is moral goodness.[1]

The structure of the aphorism can be helpful: ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι describes the origin of joy and expresses not a moment of action but a calm situation, contemplation of what was done in the field of art or morality or both. Either of the two is equally a mental joy.[2]

I conclude that in D.'s frr. we find clear traces that sources of joy are all these activities which constitute what we call intellectual life. Therefore his eudaemonism rightly might be characterised as <u>intellectual eudaemonism.</u>

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1. Herbert Read, The meaning of art (Pelican) 1967, p. 19 § 88.

   The same ambiguity is present in fr. 112: Θείου νοῦ τὸ ἀεί τι διαλογίζεσθαι καλόν. Is this the attitude of an artist? or a moralist?

   Cf. Plato's Protagoras 351 B-C: τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθὸν εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς ζῴη ἡδόμενος.

   Cf. also: Plato's Hippias Major, 296 E (last line): τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα αἴτιόν ἐστιν τὸ καλόν.
   and 297 B 1: Εἰ ἄρα τὸ καλόν ἐστιν αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν.....

   Plato makes a thinker of that age (Socrates' contemporary) accept such a causal relation between beauty and goodness.

2. Bailey, Greek Atomists, 195. These two frr. (207, 194) "place one in the atmosphere of the Republic".

8. Work and Labour

No pains no gains

A basic idea in D.'s ethical teaching is "do not engage in many activities"[1] beyond your capacity and nature, neither in public life nor in private. His elaboration in the following lines of the same fr. is clear enough, so that neither misapprehension is justifiable nor confusion with doctrines of later centuries. This precept is far from being a form of "quietism"[2], as Langerbeck correctly remarked.[3]

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1. fr. 3:.... μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν....
Cf. Epicurus' (in Diog. of Oinoanda, 56, Arrighetti p. 508):
"... μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν...."
and M. Aurelius' (Meditations, IV, 24):" ὀλίγα πρᾶσσε".
The authenticity of fr. 3 is beyond doubt and dispute; it is attributed to D. by two ancient authors (see DK 68 B 3) and contains the central concept of D.'s Ethics; it describes conditions of euthumia (happiness). Natorp (Die Ethika, p. 116) was right to conclude "dass an seiner Echtheit zu zweifeln hätten wir ohnedies kein Recht."
2. H. Lahe (Die Ethik des D., in Sokrates (1923) p. 56) from fr. 3 concluded that: "die Euthymie....völlige Ruhe ist (tranquillitas ...nulla ne minima quidem aura fluctus commovente..." Cicero, Tusc. V.6.16) and after this misrepresentation of the concept in question he asked himself: "Wie ist nun aber eine völlige Seelenruhe praktisch erreichbar?".
3. H. Langerbeck, op. cit. 60: " μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν wird nicht im Sinne des Quietismus des λάθε βιώσας (Epicurus' fr. 551, Usener p. 326) gegeben." In the following page he added: it is enough to mention fr. 157 as a counter instance.

His ethical theory is strongly orientated to practical life. Hard work is compatible with Euthumia.

A first example is his attitude to prudence (phronesis): it has a similar orientation. If phronesis is a virtue, it finds its positive value in so far as it leads to right action. The crucial test for any theory, D. would say, is its practical application. Namely in fr. 2[1] we read that from prudence originate three highly appreciated qualities: "good counsel, unerring speech and right action." In D.'s list of virtues phronesis embodies a kind of practical wisdom orientated to practical problems.[2]

On the other hand, we cannot trace in D.'s frr. any hint that he rejected work as a source of inconvenience in human life or that he himself avoided labour in his personal life. On the contrary, we have evidence describing him — in a superlative degree — as very industrious in scientific inquiries in many fields of human knowledge.[3]

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1. fr. 2: ...ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως τρία ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὸ εὖ λογίζεσθαι, τὸ εὖ λέγειν καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. See: Natorp, op. cit. pp. 3, 98.
   Bailey, op. cit. p. 196.
2. Cf. frr. 119, 42, 58, 158.
   Cf. also F. Mesiano, La etica materialistica di D., p. 5.
   Thucydides (II.65.8) sub persona Pericles describes in a similar way the attributes of a good statesman. Cf. Schmid-Stählin, op. cit.,p.278.
3. fr. 144: Δ. ... τῶν ἱστορουμένων οὐδενὸς ἧττον πολυπράγμων.....

It is easy to gather from the ruins of his writings many reasons justifying hard work and recommending it to other people.

a. Work is a source of goods; absence of it opens the door to famine; it was a popular belief in Greek tradition.[1] No pains no gains. This way of thinking is naturally stronger in a man who denied fortune's gifts.[2] Good comes to men directly or indirectly through their efforts; e.g. learning, which is so important in protecting, organising and ameliorating life, is acquired by hard work.[3] Only in this way do men reach noble goals. On the contrary, neglecting their work men must face the results of laziness: everything that is undesirable, deteriorating their life. In D.'s words: "Good things are acquired by learning through hard work...."[3] Included in the connotation of "good" here is intellectual life, as we are obliged to recognise in fr. 180, where "education — i.e. accumulated learning — is a pride for men in prosperous days and refuge in unfortunate days."[4]

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1. Hesiod, Works and Days, 303: λιμὸς γάρ τοι πάμπαν ἀεργῷ σύμφορος ἀνδρί.
   Cf. Thuc. II. 40.1.
2. See frr. 197, 176, 210.
3. fr. 182: τὰ μὲν καλὰ χρήματα τοῖς πόνοις ἡ μάθησις ἐξεργάζεται, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἄνευ πόνων αὐτόματα καρποῦται....
4. fr. 180: Η παιδεία εὐτυχοῦσι μέν ἐστι κόσμος, ἀτυχοῦσι δὲ καταφύγιον.

b. As expected from D., his way of thinking on work is genetic; work is a necessity for surviving.[1] It becomes easier through the experience of the race.[2] Finally, it is the main factor (together with human ability)[3] for progress, since progress in every department is attained by making good use of the experience of the past.

With a realistic view of things, believing that what is necessary should be adopted as a reality, in which man lives and to which he must adapt himself,[4] D. accepts labour as a companion of life, compatible with man's pursuit of happiness.

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1. Diodor. I. 8. 7 (DK 68 B 5, in vol. II 136, 13).
2. ibid. lines 9-12. Also: Luria (Democritea, p. 137 no. 558, where Galenus, de medica exper., arabica interpretatio, ed. with English traduction, London, 1944): "D. says experience and vicissitudes have taught men this, and it is from their wealth of experience that men have learned to perform the things they do." Cf. fr. 247.
3. Diodor. I. 8. 7 (DK 68 B 5 in vol. II 136, lines 14-15.) Cf. fr. 154.
4. fr. 289: ἀλογιστίη μὴ ξυγχωρέειν ταῖσι κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναγκαίης.

c. If community is the frame, as a matter of fact, in which men have to realise their private life, they have to learn statesmanship and acquire through hard work that kind of skill by which they will succeed. D. recommends any toil necessary for attaining such a glorious result. From his own words quoted by Plutarch[1] it is not clear whether D. refers to a glorious personal career or a general success for the benefit of the community. In both cases, however, his recommendation of hard professional preparation is equally praiseworthy. This precept acquires much more force, if we remember the dangers to individual politicians inherent in political activity of which D. was well aware (perhaps he had had a bitter experience in political life of his native city-state or contemporary Greek city-states) when he formulated a dilemma: "To good men, it is not advantageous to neglect their own affairs for other things....But if a man neglects public affairs, he is ill-spoken of...Because, even if he is not negligent or wrong, he is liable not only to be ill-spoken of, but also to suffer something..."[2]

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1. fr. 157: Δ. μὲν παραινεῖ τήν τε πολιτικὴν τέχνην μεγίστην οὖσαν ἐνδιδάσκεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πόνους διώκειν, ἀφ' ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ γίνονται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

2. fr. 253: τοῖς χρηστοῖσιν οὐ συμφέρον ἀμελέοντας τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἄλλα πρήσσειν .... εἰ δὲ ἀμελέοι τις τῶν δημοσίων, κακῶς ἀκούειν γίγνεται.... ἐπεὶ καὶ <μὴ> ἀμελέοντι ἢ ἀδικέοντι κίνδυνος κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ δὴ καὶ παθεῖν τι.....

d. Hard work results in happiness when it is crowned by success.[1] Even the hope of success makes toil much pleasanter than rest. Although a final result can be affected by factors outside the agent's plans and intention — there is many a slip between cup and lip — D. does not hesitate to recommend hard work (fr. 243: "all kinds of toil are pleasanter than rest, when men attain that for which they labour, or foresee that they will attain it...).[1] When reading these lines one has the impression that D.'s personal feelings and emotions are revealed.

e. Fr. 241 is better explained psychologically: "Continuous hard work grows ever lighter through habituation."[2] Perhaps this aphorism is directed to friends or acquaintances, who find tiring work difficult, so as to encourage them in their labours and overcome their inertia. Whether this is true or not and whether or not it is addressed to actual people, this at least is certain, the advice originates in the personal experience of the adviser, who seems to have offered himself as a good example of his teaching (fr. 144). A hard worker is speaking here. Addressing all without exception: "do not avoid toil; it gets easier by repetition."[3]

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1. fr. 243: τῆς ἡσυχίης πάντες οἱ πόνοι ἡδίονες, ὅταν ἄν εἵνεκεν πονέουσι τυγχάνωσιν ἢ εἰδέωσι κύρσοντες....

2. fr. 241: πόνος συνεχὴς ἐλαφρότερος ἑαυτοῦ συνηθείῃ γίνεται.

3. Remarks d, e with a different argument and different purpose (compatibility of hard work and euthumia), accompanied with some others, are enumerated by Vlastos (op. cit. p. 58 Philos. Rev. 55 (1946) p. 58).

f. If fatigue accompanies hard work, it is more frequently the result of unwillingness to work. If one wishes to work, one will find pleasure in it. Voluntary work prepares men to endure even what is involuntary (fr. 240).[1]

Another aphorism might be explained as a precaution against disappointment: "Courage is the beginning of action, but fortune is the master of the result."[2] D. tried to exorcise this phantom by which men try to justify their failures, instead of blaming their own negligence or laziness (frr. 119, 197). However he felt himself obliged to allow, as a matter of fact of human life, that external conditions are liable to frustrate men's intentions and efforts.

g. The main reason which D. urges in defence of hard work is that it is the true fountain of virtues. If virtues are of any value for the happiness of individuals and the good relations among them, the origin is to be found in the educative power of hard work. This connection between happiness and hard work perhaps is an imitation of Prodicus' fable of "Hercules at the Crossroads."[3] But in D. it

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1. fr. 240: οἱ ἑκούσιοι πόνοι τὴν τῶν ἀκουσίων ὑπομονὴν ἐλαφροτέρην παρασκευάζουσι.
2. fr. 269: τόλμα πρήξιος ἀρχή, τύχη δὲ τέλεος κυρίη.
3. VS 84 B 1 (Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 361; Xenoph. Memor. II. 1. 21-34. See fr. 179 (quoted in next note).

found a deep and thoroughgoing illumination and justification, a kind of causal relation. He says: "If children are allowed not to work, they cannot learn letters or music or gymnastic, nor that which above all embraces virtues, i.e. a sense of respect. For it is precisely from these studies that the sense of respect usually grows."[1]

D. was a believer in the idea of education and produced an interesting theory of it. At least he formulated some remarks worthy of attention on the function and results of teaching. What is of interest here is simply the fact that he found a close connection between labour and aidōs (sense of respect), which supports all virtues and which from the formative point of view acquires that importance which is attributed to justice (the highest of classical virtues) from the objective point of view.

His doctrine is better understood, if we recall another aphorism according to which for a man to become virtuous is not only a matter of (nature) heredity, but also — and mainly — a result of the exercise of continuous effort and practice of virtue.[2]

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1. fr. 179: †ἐξωτικῶς† μὴ πονεῖν παῖδες ἀνιέντες οὔτε γράμματ' ἂν μάθοιεν οὔτε μουσικὴν οὔτε ἀγωνίην οὐδ' ὅπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν συνέχει, τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι. μάλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἡ αἰδώς.
   Cf. Philippson, op. cit., p. 388.
2. fr. 242: πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος.

In this way he made virtue and happiness dependent on labour from childhood (179) to old age. So he is in accordance with Greek tradition[1] and in agreement with another thinker of his age.[2]

I cannot find a better defence of hard work. In D.'s opinion work is not a punishment from an angry god or an inhospitable nature, but a gift that can produce happiness. Absolutely consistent with these remarks is his declaration (to be presented later on) that virtue is work, not words (fr. 55, Stob. II.15.36).

Possibly all this pleading on behalf of hard work comes from bitter experience that much of the disorder and misfortune in the social life of Greek cities of the late fifth century B.C. was due to the ambition and activities of that generation which grew up in wealth and luxury without the discipline of honouring common obligations and consequently (perhaps in D.'s view) with excessive ambitions and less obedience to moral rules. Superficiality on important and serious problems is another corollary of such miseducation. Socrates would endorse this from his experience and viewpoint. His obsession with definitions[3] was possibly another way to show up the superficiality of

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1. Hesiod, Works and Days, 311: ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.

2. Euripides, fr. 461: οὐκ ἂν δύναιο μὴ καμὼν εὐδαιμονεῖν, αἰσχρόν τε μοχθεῖν μὴ θέλειν νεανίαν.

   See Erffa: Αἰδώς und verwandte Begriffe von Homer bis Demokritos (Dissert., Leipzig, 1937) in Philologus, Suppl. 30/2 (1937) p. 168.

3. Richard Robinson, The what-is-x? question, in Socrates (a collection edited by G. Vlastos), London, 1972, p. 110 ff.

his interlocutors (especially the young and ambitious of his companions).

Whatever the fons of D.'s remarks might be, some of them are of permanent value and true originality.

A lively advocacy of work and labour for the profit coming from them directly or indirectly, does'nt mean that there are not some limits and reservations. One reason was mentioned at the very beginning of this paragraph (don't be over-busy is a condition of euthumia). Two more follow:

a. Interference in other people's business is strongly attacked without any explanation[1] (perhaps because of the character of Democrates' collection); it is self evident; it leads to negligence of one's own affairs and it is lack of respect for others.[2]

b. Political activity is justifiable and highly appreciated in so far as it is necessary for the advantage of the community (frr. 157, 253).[3]

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1. fr. 80: αἰσχρὸν τὰ ἀνεῖα πολυπραγμονέοντα ἀγνοεῖν τὰ οἰκήια.

2. Cf. Thuc. II.37.3.

3. It seems that the best compromise of D.'s doctrine ("don't be overbusy" etc.) with his recommendation of hard work is found in some verses of Goethe quoted by Philippson (op. cit. p. 388):

Wohl unglücklig ist der Mann,
der unterlässt das, was er kann,
Und unterfängt sich, was er nicht versteht;
kein Wunder, dass er zu Grunde geht.

9. ON DUTY

It is accepted by historians of Ethics that the concept of duty in the modern sense does not appear in classical Greek Philosophy[1] but only "in germ or marginally", that duty (as kathēkon) first appears in Stoicism.[2] It is true that Zeno (of Kitium) first used this term to denote what we call duty and his followers emphasised the importance of fulfilling duty for individuals.[3]

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1. A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, Oxford (1960), p.253: The Greek moral sense does'nt provide and never has provided even the raw material from which a categorical imperative could be fabricated. Cf. pp. 2 ff.

2. A. MacIntyre, A short history of Ethics, p. 84.
   Vernon J. Bourke, History of Ethics, I, 48.
   Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (edited by Paul Edwards) II, 444.

3. D. Laertius, VII. 107-110 (Zeno of Citium).
   ch. 107: καθῆκον φασὶν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει ἀπολογισμόν.
   Stobaeus II 7.8 (p. 85 line 18): τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεται.
   Sextus, VII 158: Ἀρκεσίλαος ... τὸ δὲ κατόρθωμα εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει ἀπολογισμόν (obviously Stoic idea).
   V. Bourke (op. cit. p. 251 n. 1) refers to Plato's Statesman (295 B) for the first appearance of the term kathēkon; there is actually (in the passage mentioned) a term of similar derivation (prosēkon) which has a different connotation (an action correct from the viewpoint of statesmanship).

Note 3. cont.

Kathēkon as a non-moral concept (in its Ionic form) appears first in Herodotus (VII.22): ὁ γὰρ Ἄθως ἐστὶ ὄρος μέγα τε καὶ ὀνομαστὸν ἐς θάλασσαν κατῆκον.

(reaching down to the sea).

Therefore it seems really premature to raise the problem of duty in D.'s age. There are, however, strong grounds on which to base this inquiry:

a. A number of statements are clearly normative ethical judgements, ascribing obligation (coming from one's own conscience, sense of duty);[1] some of them are included in frr. of reflective character;[2] all are imperative in their form.

b. Concepts associated with that of duty make their appearance in the frr. of D.[3]

This inquiry will be directed to the following topics:

a. A general view of the fragments and concepts involved.

b. Illumination of two basic terms.

c. How was the concept of duty reached?

d. Classification of duties and analyses of the corresponding frr.

e. Foundation of duty.

f. Two final questions.

a. Χρεών (χρή), δέον (δεῖ)

(Necesse est, oportet).

When reading the frr. which include the first of the above terms[4] one has the feeling of a transition from what is logically or

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1. frr. 41 (St.III.1.95), 39 (St. III 37.29), 181, 92, 191, 207, 225, 252, 259, 285, 3, 44 (St. III 12.13), 174, 256, 261.

2. frr. 181, 191, 252, 3, 261, 190.

3. Conscience (syneidesis): fr. 297,
Remorse: 43 (174 by implication),
Right: 261, 265, 266, 40,
Virtue: (on which see the next paragraph).

4. 39, 84, 92, 191, 207, 225, 259, 55, 285 //
3, 44, 174, 256, 261

naturally necessary to what is socially or morally fitting and binding, which some agent has to fulfil to create the necessary conditions for his own happiness[1] and good relations with his social environment.[2]

There is given some description of reality which is desirable and a conclusion approximately saying: if you wish that result you have to follow this instruction or do this action.[3] Or there are imperatives ascribing to individuals (without premises and apparent reasoning) "duties" to be fulfilled.[4]

Although the last group of imperatives is at first sight nearer to our conception of duty and more helpful for this inquiry, the former one is more interesting for the examination of the problem of duty in a genetic way.

If these instructions become a "credo", permanently accompanying an individual and consequently influencing his conduct, then they promote this individual from the level of necessity to that of personal decision (oughtness), i.e. from necessity to autonomy.[5] Then (as regards the frr. of D.) instead of χρή we find the other term δέον (oughtness).

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1. 191, 207, 285, 3, 174.
2. 92, 252, 44 (225), 261.
3. frr. 3, 191, 252, 174.
4. frr. 84 (cf. 244, 264), 92, 207, 225, 261.
5. frr. 44, 181.

A progress of moral obligation can be traced step by step from the level of instinct or biological necessity to that of commonly accepted and approved custom and conscience.[1] At the beginning of such a progressive process fr. 259 should find a place, on the top-level frr. 41, 55, 190, 264. Between these two extremes fr. 181 can be well intelligible, emphasising the power of persuasion as opposed to force and compulsion.

b. It should be noted that two impersonal verbs[2] or expressions including them, used by D. for ascribing moral obligations, had a long and distinguished history in Presocratic thought without moral connotation. Namely they were used to express:

1. logical necessity[3]

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1. This procedure (way of thinking) from the level of self-preservation to respect of others and protection of them will be recognised in D.'s political theory too. Anticipating that ch. we notify only the similarity of process which betrays a naturalistic attitude towards the problems.
   See Eric A. Havelock, The Liberal temper in Greek Politics, London 1957, pp. 125 ff.
2. Χρή - χρεών (ἐστί), δεῖ - δέον (ἐστί).
3. See: Parmenides B 1. 28 (VS I. 230.10): χρεώ σε ... πυθέσθαι.
   B 6.1 (VS I 232.21): χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε ἐὸν ἔμμεναι.
   B 8.11 (I. 236. 4): οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί.
   Cf. B 2. 5 (VS I. 231.11), B 8.45 (VS I.239.1)

2. logical-natural necessity[1]

3. logical-rhetorical fitness.[2]

A religious tone or slightly moral connotation can be seen in some passages from tragedies,[3] Dissoi Logoi and Anonymus Iamblichi.[4]

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1. Anaxagoras B 4 (VS II.34.5, II.35.4) τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων χρὴ δοκεῖν....

   B 5 (II 35.8): τούτων δὲ οὕτω διακεκριμένων γιγνώσκειν χρὴ...

   Anaximander, B 1 (I 89.14): καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών.

   Cf. also a curious biological (educational?) remark of Thucydides (I. 84.4): πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δ' εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται.

   Cf. Diog. of Apollonia B 1 (II 59.11): δοκεῖ μοι χρεὼν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναμφισβήτητον παρέχεσθαι...

2. Gorgias B 6: εἰπεῖν ἃ δεῖ....
   τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι λέγειν σιγᾶν ποιεῖν.

   B 11: τὸ δέον ὀρθῶς λέξαι.

   Cf. Thucydides II·22: περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν.

   Cf. Empedocles B 25: ὃ δεῖ, καλὸν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν.

3. Sophocles' Antigone, 74-5: πλείων χρόνος // ὃν δεῖ μ' ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω τῶν ἐνθάδε (νόμων).

   Eurip., Iphig. Aul. 565-6: ἐσορᾶν // τὸ δέον.

Notes to p. cont.

4. Dissoi Logoi 8.7 (VS II 416.3): τὰ δέοντα πράξειν.

8.9 (II. 416.4): τὸν δὲ δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς.

(logical necessity rather than moral obligation).

Cf. 8.13 (II 416.13).

Anonymus Iamblichi (VS 89, 4, p. 98, 17 (1) Vol. II, 401, 33): καὶ μὴν ἐγκρατέστατόν γε δεῖ εἶναι πάντα ἄνδρα διαφερόντως.

D.'s frr., paradoxically enough, are the first source in the history of Greek moral thought where these two concepts acquire an obviously moral connotation. To this conclusion lead both the imperative form of the aphorisms to be discussed and their content.[1]

c. It is remarkable that concepts closely connected to that of duty make their first appearance through frr. of D. Syneidesis

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1. This doesn't mean they are in the imperative mood but there is a kind of imperativeness in their structure. It is characteristic that translators were obliged to use imperative forms of their languages. See:

   a. VS 68 B 3, 39, 41, 44, 55, 92, 174, 181, 190, 191, 225, 256, 252, 259, 261, 265, 285.

   b. Enriques-Mazziotti (numbers corresponding to these in VS): 8, 29, 31, 34, 83, 112, 128, 129, 145, 163, 190, 194, 197, 199, 200, 203, 223.

   c. Luria (Democritea): 737, 649, 605, 598, 669, 680, 740, 607, 493a, 657, 598, 601, 595, 622, 624, 616, 646.

   Thanks are expressed to Mr. Miloš Ivaniš (Faculty of Divinity, Edinburgh) for his help in understanding the Russian translation of D.'s frr. in Luria's book (Democritea, Leningrad, 1970).

(conscience, fr. 297),[1] remorse (fr. 43): "Remorse for shameful deeds is salvation in life."[2] Prior to the proper term remorse as a problem is apparently present in the reasoning of fr. 174, where remorse although not named is clearer in its connotation than in fr. 43. Namely, negligence of one's duty (it is said there) to be just is followed by recollections of remorse which lead to deprivation of one's euthumia.[3]

It would not be strange if this same thinker of fr. 174 in another case made a step further, insisting that the only way for a

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1. This subject was discussed in the first ch. of this research. On the history of the concept and its connotation see:
   S. Luria, Democritea, p. 567 (no. 583) and
   P. Schönlein, Zur Entstehung eines Gewissensbegriffes bei Griechen und Römern, Rhein. Museum 112 (1969), pp. 289-305.
2. fr. 43: μεταμέλεια ἐπ' αἰσχροῖσιν ἔργμασι βίου σωτηρίη.
3. fr. 174: πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη, ὅταν τις ἀναμνησθῇ καὶ δέδοικε καὶ ἑωυτὸν κατίζει.

sinner to save himself is to feel remorse[1] (and perhaps to do something to correct his sin after having recognised it, and consequently to change his conduct).

The next paragraph will touch the problem of virtue; therefore, there is no reason to spend here time and space on this topic.

But some more comment must be added to the presentation of some statements through which the concept of a moral law appears for the first time in the history of ethics. No sophistication or elaboration is necessary, since the frr. are simple and speak for themselves. Fr. 264 says: "one must not respect himself (his dignity) less than the others' opinion; nor must one be ready to do wrong if no one will know (it) than if all mankind. One must respect one's own dignity first of all and this must stand as the law in one's soul, so that one abstain from anything improper."[2]

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1. It is true that these analyses are in the region of psychology; but our task is to study the frr. of D. as they are and not go beyond the evidence; on the other hand, ethical inquiries deprived of psychological explanation are either history of ethics or logic. See; W. Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, London (1971)[6], chs. II, IV (psychology of moral action — of moral judgement).

2. fr. 264:. μηδέ τι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτοῦ μηδέ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδήσειν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι· ἀλλ' ἑωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον.
Frr. 244, 84 are obviously shortened forms of it.

A conception of moral law is generated in men's conception of their self-respect.[1] How D. reached this idea and what content he attributed to this law, we have no more evidence; our only means to penetrate his thought is to question the fr. itself; perhaps by cross-examination of other frr. we can find some more illumination.

The attributes of D.'s moral law (implied from the passage above) are:

1. It is in the agent's soul.
2. It is demanded of the agent to regard this law as present at any time and anywhere that the agent is active (consciously).
3. It is demanded also of the agent to use this law as a guiding principle (criterion?) for his actions as if all mankind were present to judge him (as a criterion of higher sensitivity than if all mankind present were to judge him). By this demand a measure of objectivity is introduced into the agent's judgement through the idea of the silent presence of mankind.[2]

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1. W. Schumacher, Die Seele: Worte zeitloser Weisheit, Berlin (1938) p.15: Die Gesetze der Sittlichkeit können dem Menschen nicht von aussen gegeben werden. Er findet sie in sich, in seinem sittlichen Pflichtgefühl, in seinem Gewissen...bedürfen wir nach D. keines metaphysischen deus ex machina.
2. In fr.264 (and 244 as well) D.'s aim is obvious: how to reach objectivity through the decisions and actions of individuals; perhaps behind his formulation there is a belief that human beings on the ground of their common nature or social understanding have something common in themselves which gives them the possibility to reach objectivity if they adopt one principle: "judge yourself as if all mankind were present to judge you."

   It seems to be not far from Socrates' argument in Crito (the voice of law and the fellow citizens) 50 A 5 - 52 A.

The agent's soul will therefore become a kind of private court in which the agent's actions should be judged in advance or his sins afterwards (cf. fr. 174). The power of this court is not criminal, nor retributive (unless by connection to frr. 174, 43); neither is it exhortative (unless by implication); it is entirely and directly avertive from what is not right.

The moral agent's soul in its capacity as a judge (in order to adjust his actions to what is fitting) is helped by the agent's power to reason.[1] The criterion is simple and effective: "judge yourself as if all mankind were present to judge you"; thus an objective element is introduced in the subject's decisions provided that he has a strong feeling of aidōs.[2]

d. Classification of duties:

1. To oneself (3, 191, 285, 207, 174, 39, 84, 79, 190,55)
2. To others (92, 44 (225), 174, 256, 261).
3. To the State and fellowcitizens (259, 261, 262).

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1. See frr. 2, 58, 119, 197.
2. See frr. 179, 84, 244, 264.

1. Every man pursues his euthumia;[1] prerequisites for it are described as "musts"; some of them have already been presented (frr. 3, 191, 207, 174). Explanation is justified here for fr. 285: "One must realise that human life is weak and brief and mixed with many cares and difficulties, so that one take care for moderate possessions only, and that hardship may be measured in accordance with one's (actual) needs."[2] D. is in accord with his general view of the universe and life when he describes the possibility of avoiding "hardship" (and therefore of attaining euthumia) within the limits of necessity; he does'nt resort to vain complaint, but escapes by philosophical meditation.[3]

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1. See Ch. II sect 1: <u>On Euthumia.</u>

2. fr. 285: γιγνώσκειν τε χρὴ ἀνθρωπίνην βιοτὴν ἀφαυρήν τε ἐοῦσαν καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιον πολλῆσίν τε κηρσὶ συμπεφυρμένην καὶ ἀμηχανίῃσιν, ὅκως ἄν τις μετρίης τε κτήσιος ἐπιμέληται καὶ μετρῆται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις ἢ τα λαπωρίη.

3. L. Stella, op. cit. (in Sophia, 10, 1942) p. 218: La sua tristezza non si isterilisce in un vano lamento; diventa sorgente di meditazione filosofica.
   Cf. Langerbeck, op. cit. 71.
   See also T. Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, p.66: This is only another recipe of euthumia.

One's duty to become a good man (fr. 39: one must either be good or imitate a good man[1]), to avoid imitation of the wicked (fr. 79: it is a bad thing to imitate the bad, and not even to wish to imitate the good[2]), to avoid even speaking about bad actions (fr. 190[3]), to be just (fr. 174) by installing a permanent guard on his actions (fr. 264), all these "quasi imperative" instructions are a preparation by a man for his own self-perfection and happiness and for making himself a good-fellow-citizen with good intentions towards others.

2. Fr. 92 sounds like a truism concerning mutual relations (between relatives, friends or simply neighbours): "Accept favours with the intention of giving a greater return for them."[4] Human conduct or conditions of life are such that, although men recognise that it is

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1. fr. 39: ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἶναι χρεὼν ἢ μιμεῖσθαι.
   Natorp (Die Ethika, 119, footn. 44)discusses the syntax and meaning of this aphorism.
2. fr. 79: χαλεπὸν μιμεῖσθαι μὲν τοὺς κακούς, μηδὲ ἐθέλειν δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθούς.
3. fr. 190: φαύλων ἔργων καὶ τοὺς λόγους παραιτητέον.
   This advice makes sense as a psychological problem; it is of course a "banal" expression that bad companions corrupt good manners (cf. 184); but bad words also make a kind of habituation towards bad actions.
4. fr. 92: χάριτας δέχεσθαι χρεὼν προΣκοπευόμενον κρέσσονας αὐτῶν ἀμοιβὰς ἀποδοῦναι.

more polite and happy to give than to receive, nonetheless they find usually more pleasure in doing the opposite; so truisms like fr. 92 are always useful.

Although men's desire in pursuing the truth is natural[1] and insatiable (in the field of science), their avoidance of saying it (in the field of morality) or even of seeing it (in the field of psychology) is nonetheless a fact; and although the last case is of importance for individuals only prima facie, the former entails serious consequences for others. D. faces, as it seems, this problem in the form of the following precept: "One must tell the truth, not speak at length."[2] Banal at first sight, such an aphorism will retain its importance in so far as human nature will be unchanged, because to hide the truth entails serious consequences in the frame of social relations and the demand of justice. Here is not the nature which likes to be hidden, but it is human volition which meets the temptation to conceal the truth for personal reasons. The truth simple and bright has in itself the power to persuade.

In the aphorism quoted above another problem is combined, perhaps a Greek vice having its origin far in the past (unless it originates in the conditions of natural environment): talkativeness. D.'s aureum preceptum is short like a commandment:[3] "Do not say much."

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1. As Aristotle would say (Metaph. 980 a 22).
2. fr. 44 (Stob. III.12.13): ἀληθόμυθον χρὴ εἶναι, οὐ πολύλογον. Cf. fr. 225.
3. οὐ πολυλογίειν (from fr. 225).

If one is directly required to help justice (compensation of justice) by saying the truth, he has much more obligation to be just himself[1]; it is a necessary condition for his euthumia. Perhaps the motive is egoistic; but the recommendation is the strongest one since it shows the possibility to combine one's interest with the profit of others. If this is not a higher-level conception of duty, it has however a better chance to be put into practice; and this is of more importance, as a utilitarian would maintain.[2]

A nobler duty is prescribed by the next aphorism: "One must avenge the wronged to the best of one's ability, and not neglect it..."[3] To protect the wronged cannot be in any interpretation a strictly egoistic principle even if this is said in the frame of the city-state, where a degree of mutuality is implied and reasonably hoped for. A personal expectation — to be sure — of reward may be justified, but anyway to interfere against the wrongdoer actively is not without danger in the present.

Fr. 256: "Justice is for one to do what must be done; injustice is for one to fail to do what must be done, and to put it aside" sounds like an answer to a "what-is question" of the kind for which Socrates became famous.[4]

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1. fr. 174.
2. E. Hussey (The Presocratics, London (1972) p. 125) characterises D,'s political thought as Utilitarianism.
3. Fr. 261: ἀδικουμένοισι τιμωρεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν χρὴ καὶ μὴ παριέναι.
4. Richard Robinson, The what-is-x? question. In: The Philosophy of Socrates, edited by G. Vlastos, London, 1972, pp. 110 ff.

It is an obvious attempt to define justice;[1] it is vague, to be sure. It is far from being a successful definition and from being a Socratic scrutiny of the question. Our attention is drawn to the fact that the definition slips into a demand for performing justice; it is expressed as a "must" prescribing a duty: Justice is for one to do what one must do....

In the three frr. discussed above (174, 261, 256) there is a common point: Justice is met as a phenomenon arising from mutual relations. Justice is not an abstract name, it is a living practice.[2] The inquiry of D. is not (mainly) addressed to the question "what is being just" but to the demand (commandment): "be just".

3. Duties to the State.

On the ground of their imperative form a number of aphorisms will be briefly commented on here, but on the ground of their content they will be placed in the ch. on political life, so that they will be better intelligible there in the light of the historical conditions in D.'s age.

The first important advantage which an ancient state should have promised and could provide for its members was protection from external dangers (raiders, intruders, agressive neighbours or wandering tribes). The second was the dispensation of justice in the relations of its citizens. In connection with these demands three duties are prescribed to citizens, formulated by D. as "imperatives".

1. The same intention is seen in the second half of fr. 261.
2. Cf. Epicurus' sent. 33 (Us. p. 78, Arrighetti p. 133) and sent. 36 (Us. p. 79, Arrighetti, p. 133).

I . To protect one's country against enemies according to the laws and customs of the city-state. D. says: "....one should, according to ancestral law, kill an enemy of the State in every ordered society, unless a law forbids it. But there are prohibitions in every state: sacred law, treaties, oaths."[1]

II . To protect one's fellowcitizens from being victims of injustice (fr. 261).

III . To help one's mother-State to dispense justice according to the laws of it (fr. 262:.... Whoever contrary to the law acquits a man, judging according to profit or pleasure, does wrong,....).[2]

The procedure described is explicitly democratic;[3] the imperativeness of the aphorisms implies a sense of duty.

Even if one supposed that behind all these duties an egoistic or utilitarian motive is concealed, one would have to recognise that they postulate a sense of duty and responsibility and that if fulfilled can provide a high level of safety, order and justice for a civilised community.

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1. fr. 259:... κατὰ νόμους τοὺς πατρίους (χρεὼν) κτείνειν πολέμιον ἐν παντὶ κόσμῳ, ἐν ᾧ μὴ νόμος ἀπείργει· ἀπείργει δὲ ἱερὰ ἑκάστοισι ἐπιχώρια καὶ σπονδαὶ καὶ ὅρκοι.

2. fr. 262:... καταψηφιστέον...ὃς δ' ἂν παρὰ νόμον ἀπολύῃ κέρδει ὁρίζων ἢ ἡδονῇ ἀδικεῖ....

3. Cf. fr. 251, 266. Cf. implications from the term καταψηφιστέον (vote against) above.

e. Foundation of duty

The noblest moment in D.'s Ethics is his precept that one must "refrain from wrong-doing not because of fear but because of (a sense of) duty.[1] Though not expressed in this aphorism, the only alternative to fear as a power to lead a man in seeing his duty and doing it is free will. The moral agent is invited to estimate and decide what is "deon". The connotation of this term is clearer in fr. 181, which is hardly to be accepted as an aphorism; it is an explanation and defence of "deon" as a stimulus and guiding power in moral activity. We read: "The man who is led towards duty by persuasion will probably (naturally) not do anything faulty either secretly or openly."[2]

That the concepts both of "deon" and persuasion postulate free will and are accompanied by a sense of responsibility is self-evident for us (with our post-Kantian moral education); it was not so in classical Greece where the problem of freewill was not met until after Aristotle.[3]

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1. fr. 41: μὴ δια' φόβον ἀλλὰ δια τὸ δέον ἀπέχεσθαι ἁμαρτημάτων. (Stob. III. 1. 95).
2. fr. 181:... τὸν ... ἐς τὸ δέον ἠγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερῶς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές.
3. P. Huby, The first discovery of the Freewill Problem, Philosophy, 42 (1967) 353-362.

This fact is not sufficient reason to deny the connotation of duty to the term of "deon"[1] as it is used in the context of the two frr. quoted above: What is of interest is not the "grammar of ethics" but the essence of the terms in their context. Otherwise we would be justified in insisting that, if no grammar book survived from a society, no language was spoken there.

The concept of "deon" will become more intelligible, if we read (in connection) fr. 264: "one must not respect (his dignity) himself less than the opinion of others; nor must one be ready to do wrong if no one will know (it) than if all mankind. One must respect his own dignity first of all and this must stand as the law in one's soul, so that one abstain from anything improper."

In a period when traditional morals were declining and the power of law was getting more and more insufficient[2] in individual and inter-city-states relations, during and (perhaps) after a destructive

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1. A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, Oxford (1960), p. 2 ff. Nowhere in this valuable book is D. mentioned.

2. Cf. Thucydides, III 45.3: πεφύκασί τε πάντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐκ ἔστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξει τούτου.
III 84.2: ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις εἰωθυῖα καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν.....
See: Erst Topitsch, Ἀνθρωπεία φύσις und Ethik bei Thukydides. In: Wiener Studien, 61 (1943) 50-67.
Cf. also: Kritias (DK 88 B 25, 9-11).
See: Die moralischen Massstäbe des Thukydides in RE Suppl. 12 (1970) Col. 1250.

war (which had all the characteristics of financial, ideological, social, civil w ar) for the first time a voice is raised, perhaps the voice of a solitary thinker[1] declaring that in mutual relations virtue is a vigilant inspector, derived from the sense of duty, which can be taught through reasoning and persuasion,[2] not by force and compulsion, that men who will see in this way what is "deon" will be able to do it without fear or inspection,[3] but only because they will have in their soul the law of duty.[4] This optimistic belief explains why D. did not need gods to guarantee human morality.[5]

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1. Diog. Laertius, IX 36 (DK 68 A 1, 36).
   [Hippocr.] Epist. 12 (p. 330 Littré) (Luria, Democritea, p.15 No. XIIIa). As far as we know D. after his studies and travels "per orientem" (frr. 299) spent the rest of his life in Abdera.
2. fr. 181: ... τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἡγμένον (λόγου) πείθοι....
3. fr. 41.
4. fr. 264: τοῦτον νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον.
   Cf. Guthrie (Hist. II 496): Here the "psyche" is the centre of the moral and rational being as it is in Socrates, and "nomos" is far removed from the sense of mere convention or subjective belief....
   Cf. Langerbeck (op. cit. 55): Nicht der Nomos ist die Norm des Handelns sondern "to deon".
   See: VS 68 A 166: οὐ χρὴ νόμους πειθαρχεῖν τὸν σοφόν, ἀλλ' ἐλευθερίως ζῆν.
5. Cf. Kritias (VS 88 B 25, 9-11).

If the concept of duty in its history followed a gradual progress from:

(I) the requirement to fulfil a specific role, when the purpose is entirely intelligible as an expression of normal human desires, to

(II) something to be done by the individual whatever his private desires, to

(III) a highest step where duty is divorced from desire altogether, then D. readhed the second step and promoted Greek Ethics from the question: "What am I to do if I am to fare well?" to the question: "What ought I to do if I am to do right?"[1]

f. Two final questions:

a. How did D. reach this step, not anticipated and not followed (for a century or more) by other moralists? "By questioning human nature" seems to be the only possible answer. He was a physicist and entered moral problems retaining his scientific approach and equipment. "Natura non vincitur nisi parendo". This is perhaps the secret of that solitary thinker, who was not used to dogmatise about anything, but was able to observe individuals' behaviour in order to reach some generalisation.[2]

1. A. MacIntyre, A short history of Ethics, p. 86.

2. frr. like 118, 172, 173 betray his way of thinking, fr. 181 sounds very like a conclusion of personal experience.
Fr. 264 echoes a personal guiding belief.
See S. Luria, Zur Frage der materialistischen Begründung der Ethik bei Demokrit, Berlin (1964) p. 5: Der berühmte Spruch (fr. 264) .....ist ein unsterbliches Verdienst des Demokrit....

b. Did D. commit the so-called naturalistic fallacy?[1] His way of advancing the phenomenon of moral obligation is no doubt naturalistic. He presents it generating from the conditions of life (like other progress).[2] He really passes from statements of the form: "it is desired" to statements of the form: "one ought to do so".[3] He works as a "definist."[4]

I would agree that D. committed the naturalistic fallacy:

(I) if it is justified to apply conceptual structure of our days and the corresponding criteria to a period when philosophical terminology and ethical thought was coming into existence.

(II) if the defendants of the theory can provide their premises from which it is reasonably inferred that statements of the form "it is desired", "it is good", "it ought to be done" are necessarily of different origin. The fact that they are listed in different classes now, after millenia of moral thought, is not sufficient reason to certify their birth from different ancestors.

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1. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge (1968)[14], pp. 66-67, 72-3.
   Cf. Guthrie, Socrates, 118 (and footn. 3).
2. Diodor. I. 8.7 (VS 68 B 5 in II. 136, 10-15).
3. e.g. fr. 261. That a wronged man desires to be helped is a self-evident assumption for a naturalist.
4. Frankena W., Ethics, (1963) pp. 80-81.

10. On VIRTUE

There is evidence that D. had entitled one of his books "On Manly Excellence or On Virtue".[1] Disregarding this one might say that the best evidence is the surviving frr., in which many of the traditional Greek virtues (aretae) are mentioned, described or in some way analysed.[2]

Before enumerating some concepts or giving a description of them we have to consider whether D. faced the question of virtue itself and the cognate problems (origin, teachability, "being or doing" question). This inquiry is directed to the following topics:

a. Origin of virtue.

b. Teachability of virtue.

c. Virtue is action.

d. State law and individual virtue.

e. What is the meaning of fr. 83?

a. Prior to virtue according to D. is a psychological concept, that of aidōs (a sense of respect, first of all self-respect) which links and keeps together the virtues.

He says: "If children are allowed not to work, they cannot learn letters or music or gymnastics, nor that which above all things supports virtue, i.e. a sense of respect. Since it is just from these

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1. Diog. Laertius, IX 46 (DK 68 B 2a).

2. e.g. frr. 2, 119, 211, 214, 256.

studies that this sense of respect usually grows."[1]

Aidōs is obviously for him a condition necessary for virtue.[2] It explains why he warmly emphasises that the first duty of a man is to have this quality (of aidōs) in himself, so that he acquires an ever-present guardian of his actions.[3]

This role of aidōs (respect) is explicit in fr. 264: "One must not respect one's dignity less than the opinion of others; nor must one be more ready to do wrong if no one will know than if all mankind will know. One must respect one's own dignity first of all, and this must stand as the law in one's soul, so that one abstain from anything improper."[4]

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1. fr. 179: μὴ πονεῖν παῖδες ἀντιέντες οὔτε γράμματ' ἂν μάθοιεν οὔτε μουσικὴν οὔτε ἀγωνίην οὐδ' ὅπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν συνέχει, τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι· μάλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἢ αἰδώς.
   Prior to aidōs is labour and learning as was explained in the previous paragraph.
2. H. Lahe, Die Ethik des D., Sokrates 49 (1923) p. 58: Die Aidōs ist ihm das wichtige Mittel, das zur Areté führt...
3. fr. 264, Cf. Epicurus (Gnomologium Vaticanum, 70. Arrighetti, p.155): Μηδέν σοι ἐν βίῳ πραχθείη ὃ φόβον παρέξει σοι εἰ γνωσθήσεται τῷ πλησίον.
4. Frr. 84, 244. A short comment is necessary:
   Erffa (op. cit. p. 202) notes that he cannot accept a substantial distinction between αἰδεῖσθαι - αἰσχύνεσθαι which interchange in the frr. involved. In footn. 185 he adds:

Footnote 4. to page 175 ctd.

Ich betone noch einmal dass es nicht richtig erscheint, zwischen αἰδεῖσθαι und αἰσχύνεσθαι ganz scharf zu scheiden, so etwa dass αἰδεῖσθαι innere sittliche Scheu bezeichnet, αἰσχύνεσθαι Scham vor Missbilligung. But cf. Thuc. I. 84. 3. where the use of the corresponding names (αἰδώς, αἰσχύνη) suggests such a distinction. Cf. Stob. III 31.10 (Θεοφράστου): αἰδοῦ σαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλον οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσῃ.

If one respects oneself first of all and embodies in the criterion for one's actions the judgement of others (as if all mankind were witnesses) there has been enthroned in one's soul a law of morality both subjuective and objective at the same time. The fact that this fr. is repeated in slightly different or shortened form in two other cases[1] suggests that it was one of the fundamental doctrines in D.'s ethical writings.

A similar connection between aidōs and virtue can be traced in Euripides (in one of his last plays).[2] How and why did D. reach this higher-level conception of aidōs? It seems likely that a sense of the decay of Greek city-state life and consequently a feeling of moral emptiness evident in the private and public affairs of the late 5th century BC was a stimulus for D. (as it was for Euripides in the artistic sphere) to investigate the human soul and find a new foundation of moral principles. So he attempted to give a new connotation and fresh life to an old concept.[3]

When Medea was lamenting on stage the absence of aidōs which

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1. Frr. 84, 244.

2. Eurip, Iphig. Aul. 1089 ff. (chorus):

πού τό τάς αἰδοῦς ἔτι, πού
τάς ἀρετάς ἐνδένει πρόσωπον. . .
ἀνομία δέ νόμων κρατεῖ.

Cf. Thuc. I. 84.3: αἰδώς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δέ εὐψυχία.

3. Cf. Erff$_a$, op. cit. p. 203.

could free men from the undesirable results of anaideia;[1] and when a realist historian was describing (with a conspicuously pessimistic disposition) human nature as prone to crime and immorality;[2] then an optimistic philosopher replied asserting the possibility of moral autonomy and perfectibility (fr. 187 ad finem) through the power of aidōs.[3]

That the capacity of aidōs to influence men's judgement is effective not only in the present but extends also to past and future we can infer by comparing 3 other fragments.[4]

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1. Euripides, ~~Medea~~ fragment, 436:

ὦ πότνια αἰδώς, εἴθε τοῖς πᾶσιν βροτοῖς
συνοῦσα ~~ε~~ἀνάισχυντον ἐξηροῦ φρενῶν.

2. Thucydides, III 45.3; III, 84.
Cf. E. Toppitsch, ἀνθρωπεία φύσις und Ethik bei Thukydides, Wiener Studien, 61 (1943) 50 ff.

3. If aidōs with such connotation is present in the soul, it means that D. recognised, even if he does'nt explicitly say so, human autonomy (fr. 84, 244, 264).
Cf. Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos, p. 202: ....vor sich selbst schämen. Damit ist die sittliche Autonomie des Menschen erreicht.

4. Frr. 43: μεταμέλεια ἐπ' αἰσχροῖσιν ἔργμασι βίου σωτηρίη.
174: .... τούτῳ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη, ὅταν τευ ἀναμνησθῇ, καὶ δέδοικε καὶ ἑαυτὸν κακίζει.
265: τῶν ἡμαρτημένων ἄνθρωποι μεμνέαται μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν εὖ πεποιημένων.

By introducing aidōs as the foundation[1] of moral law in the soul D. set a standard of personal integrity and social responsibility; and so declared his optimistic humanism.

If this presentation of aidōs is correct, it adequately answers another related question; why religion plays no part in D.'s ethical theory;[2] it is not necessary to forge a god, D. would reply to Kritias;[3] it is enough to promote human dignity to the proper level. If a man attains this degree of dignity, he himself will recognise his own wrong-doings. This will be enough self-punishment.[4]

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1. Cf. Protagoras' doctrine (in Plato's dialogue, 320 c 8 - 322 d 5) who postulates aidōs and justice (gifted by the god) as necessary for social-political life.
   See: G. B. Kerferd, Protagoras' doctrine of Justice and Virtue, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 73 (1953) 42-45.
2. Schmid. Stählin I, 5, 291: Die Religion spielt als Erziehungsmacht bei ihm keine Rolle.
   See ch. 1 of this research: D.'s attitude towards Religion.
3. VS 88 B 25, 9-11: ἔπειτ' ἐπειδὴ τἀμφανῆ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
   ἀπεῖργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βίᾳ,
   λάθρᾳ δ' ἔπρασσον...
4. Cf. Isocrates, ad Demonicum, 16 (Stob. III, 34,9): μηδέποτε μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιήσας ἔλπιζε λήσειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους λάθῃς, σεαυτῷ συνειδήσεις.

A last remark on the aidōs-concept. It should be recognised, as Lałłe pointedly remarked, that aidōs expresses only "taedium mali" not "amorem boni".[1] If this were not so, then it would be such a remote precursor of Christian doctrines that we should suspect a forgery of frr. But, on the other hand, it seems out of place to ask such questions simply because we are acquainted with a history of ideas 25 centuries after Democritus.

The concept of aidōs does not first appear[2] in D.'s frr., but "he attributed a new importance to the old Greek concept of aidōs ....the wonderful idea of aidōs which a man feels for himself."[3]

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1. H. Lałłe, op. cit., p. 61: Vom taedium mali zum amorem boni wäre für D. ein winziger Schrift gewesen; er durfte ihn nicht tun, weil er damit seine Euthymie und damit sich selbst aufgegeben haben würde. The latin terms in Lałłe's text seem to have Christian connotation.
2. Stobaeus, III 24.2: πάντων δὲ μάλιστα σαυτὸν αἰσχύνεο (πυθαγόρου). Cf. Thucydides II 43.1 where the historians explains that great deeds were achieved by men having in them the sense of self-respect. Cf. Plato, Protagoras, 322 C. Plato makes Pr. say that aidōs was distributed by God all over mankind.
3. W. Jaeger, Paideia (Eng. trans. by G. Highet), I. 330.

By introducing the concept of aidōs with that connotation (fr. 264 end: law in men's soul) D. recognises man as more responsible and therefore he postulates human autonomy in decision and action.[1] He demands from a moral agent not fear but (self-respect) sense of duty.[2] How closely aidōs in D.'s thought is connected with duty (deon - what ought to be done) can be seen by comparison of frr. 41, 181, 264[3].

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1. fr. 41: μὴ διὰ φόβον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ δέον ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων.
   Guthrie, op. cit., 494: revulsion from wrongdoing as such and not from fear of punishment.
2. Laue, Die Ethik, 60-61: Die aidōs ist eine in uns liegende Kraft die uns Ekel vor der Sünde, Scham und Schmerz über das begangene Unrecht empfinden fässt und vom Sündigen fernhält.
3. fr. 41 (quoted above)
   fr. 181: τὸν δ' ἐς τὸ δέον ἡγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερῶς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές.

   264: ...μηδέ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδήσειν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι.

b. Teachability of Virtue

This was one of the most disputed problems of the second half of the fifth century BC[1]. Even professed teachers either denied teachability of virtue[2] or accepted teachability of virtue but denied objectivity of values generally.[3] Socrates deepened the whole problem by demanding a definition before setting out the question of teachability.[4]

It seems that the whole problem of education becomes more vital and burning during periods of social change and more crucial when it has social implications. This was the case for D.'s days. Athens, to be sure, was the arena of the conflict, but the repercussions were felt all over the Greek world. D. was living on the edge of that world, but he felt deeply the consequences of these views.[5] This explains

1. Guthrie, Socrates, 114: "the burning question of the day".

2. Meno 71 D - 72 A (VS 82 B 19). See Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, p. 182. Guthrie, Sophists, 44-5, 271. Meno 95 B-C.

3. Protagoras, 361 A-D. Theaet. 172 B.
Untersteiner, op. cit. pp. 65 ff.
Guthrie, Sophists, 166 ff., 260 ff.

4. Protagoras 361 C: (Socrates is speaking): καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅ τι ἔστι, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν.

Cf. W. Jaeger, Paideia, I, 289: The Sophistic movement first gave wide publicity and influence to the claim that aretē should be founded on knowledge.

Cf. also Antisthenes' fr. 69 (DL VI.10, Caizzi p. 47):
διδακτὴν ἀπέδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετήν.

5. J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, London [14] (1968) [1914], p.157.
Fr. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, I.1 [10](1962), p.147.

why he, although not a professional teacher, made some interesting remarks on the whole problem of education and particularly on the teachability of virtue. He touches two important points and disregards another two of no less importance and of which he was no doubt aware.

What virtue is or whether virtues are subjective or objective are not questions to be answered, at least in the surviving frr., which nonetheless cover so large a part of the field of morality, that they should have included something on these questions, if they had been faced by Democritus.

Let us see the points which he makes:

(a) Teaching of virtue must be addressed to the free will, understanding, personal choice of the individual; it is a matter of persuasion; man acquires virtue, if at all, only if he is convinced, never by conventional law or any other form of compulsion (fr. 181).

(b) Human nature and training cooperate in making a man virtuous.[1]

So the means of acquiring virtue are persuasion and practice (181, 242).[2] Therefore D. accepted that knowing what is virtuous is one condition necessary for doing a virtuous action, but willing is another condition (included in persuasion); and finally training is

1. fr. 242: πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος.
2. Cf. Langerbeck (op. cit. p. 57) who refers to fr. 33: "Der Weg zur Areté ist die Askēsis (242), in Fr. 33 die Didachē." But this fr. (to be discussed in the paragraph on Education) touches the problem of communication of knowledge, experience, judgement, and the deep influence of them, from a different aspect (more general and fundamental).

anothe condition (perhaps optional for reasons of habituation) for the realisation of virtue.

D. says: "The man who employs exhortation and persuasion will turn out to be a more effective guide to virtue than he who employs law and coercion. For the man who is prevented by the law from wrong-doing will probably do wrong in secret, whereas the man who is led towards duty by persuasion will probably not do anything improper either secretly or openly. Therefore the man who acts rightly...."[1]

In terms of the psychology of morality he explains why conviction (persuasion) is the best preparation for practising virtue. His optimism on the power of persuasion led him to fr. 264. His orientation and his effort to supply an objective foundation of morality can be contrasted with Gorgias' conception of persuasion as a means for deception.[2] In D.'s view persuasion is the result of a free

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1. fr. 181: κρείσσων ἐπ' ἀρετὴν φανεῖται προτροπῇ χρώμενος καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ ἥπερ νόμῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ. λάθρῃ μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτέειν εἰκὸς τὸν εἰργμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ νόμου, τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἠγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερῶς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές.

2. Gorgias, Helen, 8 [VS 82 B 11, 8, in vol. II 290, 15 ff.]: εἰ δὲ λόγος ἦν ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας... λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν,....

See: Guthrie, Sophists, 180.

acquaintance with the real problem and its possible consequences, presupposes mutual respect and entails free acceptance on the part of the person persuaded. In Gorgias' view logos is powerful in deceiving, in D.'s view logos/persuasion creates as a permanent orientation towards virtue, not for theorising on virtue, but for practising it.

D. reaches the subject as a moralist, whose interest is practical. He believes that a man convinced of the rightness of an action is more likely to follow his conviction, seen or not seen by others, since his own conviction is effective enough to avert wrong-doing.[1] A higher-level conception of human responsibility[2] is explicit in this fr.[3] It is worth mentioning the repetition of terms for teaching virtue (προτροπῇ καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ) It recognises the difficulty of this task but this is no reason to avoid it. More characteristic is the metaphorical term ἠγμένον : the man who is led by hand to meet virtue, to make acquaintance with it... Logos is the leader in this enterprise; man is amenable to the overtures of virtue, though in every situation he is recognised to be free and responsible to himself.[2] From this point of view something of modern existentialism[4] might be recognised in D.'s thought on ethics.

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1. Cf. per contra Thucydides' view (III.45.3): πεφύκασί τε πάντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐκ ἔστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξει τούτου. Cf. fr. 264.

2. Cf. A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, Oxford (1960), p.2. See fr. 264 (ad finem) quoted below in footn. 2. of the next page.

3. Better expounded and analysed in fr. 264.

4. Guthrie, Sophists, 256.

In this context aretē is not conceived only as intending good results but including also good intentions.[1] How far must teaching of virtue go? Until a man acquires strong sense of responsibility, until "one respects one's opinion most, and this stands as the law of one's soul, preventing one from doing anything improper."[2]

Learning of virtue is nothing more than preparation for a virtuous man. Training in virtue is also demanded. In this point D. is near to his famous fellow-citizen.[3] Fr. 242 is outspoken on this problem: "More men become good through practice than by nature."[4] D. insists like Protagoras on the need for adding training to natural ability. This doctrine is self-evident for us; but it was a burning question of ethics in D.'s age; in the development of a virtuous man (agathos) what part is played by his natural disposition and training respectively. D. recognises the importance of this factor (nature) but his aphorism does not imply any priority (242); he refers

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1. Aretē is connected with duty (deon) and opposed to injustice.
   Cf. frr. 68, 62, 89.
   Cf. P. Huby, Greek Ethics, p. 21.
2. fr. 264:... ἑωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον.
   See Erich Wolf, II.343.
3. VS 80 B 3: φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται.
4. fr. 242: πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος.

to the proportion of virtuous men not to the comparative strength of these factors.[1] This is more intelligible if we remember that aretē was understood also essentially as a skill. Perhaps this fr. makes an allusion to the question of "hereditary agathos" in order to defend the thesis that being agathos is more a matter of personal training than ancestry. In any case training is recognised as a factor in preparing virtuous character, in becoming agathos.

8 And both persuasion (acquaintance and will) and training are so much necessary since nature itself cannot be entrusted to supply the virtuous man according to the demands of life in a civilised society. Very revealing from this point of view is an aphorism attributed to D. by Plutarch: "if you open yourself you will find inside a complex store-house and treasury of ills..."[2] Inside us there is a man, our

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1. Guthrie (II 494) writes: "training is the leading part". This seems to be misinterpretation of the aphorism. If teaching generally is thought to result in such a deep change in a man's nature and become indeed a "second nature", this is implied from fr. 33 (not yet presented), in which nature and didachē are equated in some way.
2. fr. 149: ἂν δὲ σαυτὸν ἀνοίξῃς ἔνδοθεν, ποικίλον τι καὶ πολυπαδὲς ταμιεῖον εὑρήσεις καὶ θησαύρισμα.
   Questa potente grandiosa metafora (L. Stella, op. cit. p. 229).
   Natorp (Die Ethika, 119 footn. 43): D. setz mehr eine natürliche Anlage zum schlechten als zum guten voraus.
   Langerbeck (op. cit. 67) Daher die Schwierigkeit der Didachē häufig hervorgehoben. Die Didachē setzt eine Physis (Anlage) voraus, die aber doch keineswegs das entscheidende ist.

reason, and a lion, our passions, a wild animal many shaped and multi-headed, our desires.[1] At this point D.'s optimism should be emphasised, since he recognises human nature as was described above and is hopeful for the success of human logos through persuasion (fr. 181).

It is this optimism which gives an anti-Heraclitean sense to fr. 236: "It is (hard) difficult to fight desire; but to control it is the sign of a reasonable man."[2]

Now we can better assess D.'s presentation (definition) of true courage: "The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures...."[3]

To conclude: firm beleifs, through reason, plus training on the foundation of human nature form a virtuous character. Teachability of virtue is (accepted) affirmed.

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1. Cf. Plato's Rep. 589 A-B.
2. fr. 236: θυμῷ μάχεσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν· ἀνδρὸς δὲ τὸ κρατέειν εὐλογίστου. Cf. Heracl. 85.
3. fr. 214: ἀνδρεῖος οὐχ ὁ τῶν πολεμίων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τῶν ἡδονῶν κρέσσων....

c. Virtue is action

Being good or doing good?[1] There is no antithesis between the two; strictly speaking there are two sides of the same problem. Being is realised by action and action is conditioned by being. The whole question accompanies ethics from the beginning of its history. At least it is present in the late fifth century disputes.

In the matter of ethics knowledge of the good is not complete itself; it is inferior to the will to perform the good. This too takes its place behind the final end which is the realisation of good in its actual performance.

In acquiring virtue and in realising virtue the important (for D.) point is the practical one. If one has to compete in the field of morality one has to see the actuality not the verbalism of the question. In fr. 55 he says: "One must emulate the deeds and actions of virtue, not the words."[2] It is a self-evident aphorism, since moral value lies, if anywhere, in actualising virtue, not in expatiating on it.[3] In emphasising this point D. mirrors a general suspicion of much talk and little action (perhaps a criticism of the

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1. M. F. Burnyeat, in Socrates (edited by Gr. Vlastos), London (1972) pp. 209 ff.
2. Fr. 55: ἔργα καὶ πρήξιας ἀρετῆς οὐ λόγους δηλοῦν χρεών. (Stob. II. 15.36). This pair of opposites ἔργον - λόγος is emphatically frequent in Thucydides. See e.g. I, 22 (where he explains his methodology) or II 35-46 where Pericles on the occasion of a funeral ceremony describes the political philosophy of his generation (II 35.1, 40.1, 40.2, 41.2, 41.4, 42.4 ad finem, 43.1 43.2, 46.1).
3. A. Faggi, Per l'etica Democritea, Atti Acc. Scien. di Torino (1928) p. 208: Gli uomini vanno dunque giudicati dalle azioni e non dalle parole.

Sophists).[1] His conclusion is another aphorism: "logos (talk) is but the shadow of a deed."[2]

An action neither has profit nor suffers damage because of the presence or absence of good or bad advocates. D. says: "Neither excellence of speech can hide en evil act, nor a good act be harmed by abuse in words."[3]

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1. Cf. Euripides, Supplices 907-8:

φιλότιμον ἦθος πλούσιον, φρόνημα δὲ
ἐν τοῖσιν ἔργοις οὐχὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἴσον.

Antisthenes' fr. 70 (ed. by Caizzi)(DL VI. 2): τήν τε ἀρετὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων.

2. fr. 145: λόγος ἔργου σκιή.

Vlastos (op. cit. part II, p. 60) notes: "Logos is morally important so far as it is "teaching that makes nature" and thus affects action". But logos in this fr. means simply "talk", "words", not reason or teaching.

3. fr. 177: Οὔτε λόγος ἐσθλὸς φαύλην πρῆξιν ἀμαυρίσκει οὔτε πρῆξις ἀγαθὴ λόγου βλασφημίῃ λυμαίνεται.

The English transl. of this fr. is from H. S. Rose, A handbook of Greek Literature, London (1965) p. 254.

Is this fr. an attack against all professionals who used any "Dissoi Logoi"?

Cf. fr. 150. See: Plato Prot. 318 A-B.

Cf. Euripides' fr. 583 (Erffa op. cit., 164):

Ὅστις λέγει μὲν εὖ, τὰ δ' ἔργα ἐφ' οἷς λέγει
αἰσχρά ἐστι, τούτου τὸ σοφὸν οὐκ αἰνῶ.

Cf. Socrates' consistency (teaching-lawabidingness) (explained) expounded in Plato's Crito and described in Xenophon's Memorabilia, 4.4.4.

Some moral principles are necessary but not sufficient for acting virtuously; traits are also demanded. Consistency between the two is a much greater moral demand, because principles without traits are impotent and traits without principles are blind.[1]

Inconsistency between promises (words) and actions is strongly criticised by the following aphorism: "counterfeit (false) characters and seeming-good are those who do all in word, but not in fact."[2] Such conduct is a sort of deception and certainly disapproved.

The climax of criticism against these men whose actions conflict with their words is reached by this strong attack: "Many

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1. Frankena, op. cit. 53 paraphrasing a well-known formula of Kantian epistemology.
2. fr. 82: κίβδηλοι καὶ ἀγαθοφανείες οἱ λόγῳ μὲν ἅπαντα, ἔργῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔρδοντες.

whose actions are most disgraceful practise the best utterances."[1] A degree of anger is expressed by the two superlatives which emphasise the antithesis between speech and action.

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1. fr. 53a: πολλοὶ δρῶντες τὰ αἴσχιστα λόγους ἀρίστους ἀσκέουσιν. (Stob. II 15.33).

G.J.D. Aalders' explanation (The political faith of D., Mnemosyne, 1950, p. 309) of fr. 53a as pointing out "the dangers of unlimited freedom of speech, one of the most remarkable features of an ancient Greek democracy like Athens" is neither unlikely nor evident. It is difficult to know whether it reflects — if at all — a bitter experience from the political life in Athens. Such an angry expression would not be justified; after all D. was a visitor, perhaps for a short period (cf. fr. 116). About the political life of Abdera, on the other hand, we know nearly nothing to help us in explaining D.'s thought in this case. The wording of the aphorism does'nt make allusion to political life; more likely it is a strong criticism of the morals of the day.

d. State law and Virtue

It is not intended here to discuss the meaning of law or the authority of the law-giver or the procedure of law-giving, the form of the state or the function of the law. The only point to be touched on is this: the relation between state-law and the morality of men.[1] The justification comes from fr. 248: "The law wishes to benefit men's life; and it is able to do so, when they themselves wish to receive benefit; for it shows to those who obey it their own personal (individual) virtue."[2]

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1. General experience is that law and morality overlap in their function; in their essence they are different; law is a restriction of freedom, sometimes compulsion; morality postulates free will (in D.'s ethical theory room is left for it) and each case of action is an affirmation of freedom. For Plato "Ethics is but a part of politics" (V. J. Bourke, op. cit. I, 31), for Aristotle politics is an extension of ethics (A. MacIntyre, op. cit., p. 57). Socrates (recorded by Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.4.14) questioned the equation of justice with keeping the law.

2. fr. 248: Ὁ νόμος βούλεται μὲν εὐεργετεῖν βίον ἀνθρώπων δύναται δέ, ὅταν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται πάσχειν εὖ· τοῖσι γὰρ πειθομένοισι τὴν ἰδίην ἀρετὴν ἐνδείκνυται.

It is obvious that by "virtue" here D. refers to justice;[1] but whatever is the connotation of this term (justice or generally virtue) it equates virtue with keeping the law. The question arises: is this realised in political practice?

In this case D. seems to have proceeded on an idealisation of the law (the law giving procedure and the function of the law)[2] which can aim at the same ends which are aimed at by the individuals' conception of morality.

From the fr. itself the following inferences are justifiable: (a) A will is recognised in both: the law (giver) and the law-abiding citizen.[3] (b) Both (sides) "wills" can be identified on the common field of virtue. (c) Law continuously aims at virtue so rendering the city a permanent school of morality.[4]

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1. Cf. fr. 263: δίκης καὶ ἀρετῆς μεγίστην μοῖραν μετέχει.... fr. 174: ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα....
2. Cf. Pericles' pride (Thucydides II 37.3): τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν....
3. Italo Lana, L' etica di Democrito, in Rivista di Filosofia, 42 (1951) p. 27: D. non ignora quale importante fattore sia la volontá dell' uomo e como sia necessario che l' uomo voglia essere giusto. Cf. A. Faggi, Per l' etica democritea, in Atti Acc. Sc. di Torino (1928) pp. 206-10.
4. Eric Wolf, op. cit. II 344: Der Nomos besass eben für Demokrits ethisches Denken nur Bedeutung als ein Mittel individualistischer Erziehung. Cf. Thus. II 41.1: τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι.

But even in a perfect state we might hardly find an approximation of the law's will and individual's intention,[1] under the following conditions:

(a) the citizens (as voters in a democratic constitution)[2] are able to see what is right (in any particular case and detail) and prepare perfect laws, for the future, (b) they can put the longterm interest of the community over their personal interest of the moment. Such idealisation of conditions contradicts fr. 266.[3]

The only possible explanation (to escape incompatibility and save the fr. 248) might be: it is an incomplete abbreviated abstract from a context where some conditions perhaps were described (e.g. if the legislatory procedure goes on in a particular way, then lawfulness is a part of morality; since law is the work of the same people and embodies collectively the virtue - will - of the voters, therefore lawfulness becomes a matter of self-consistency; the law shows to those who obey it their own virtue, because of their personal participation in preparing the law).

1. Since law covers only a part of the actual cases of relations among individuals.
2. Any other alternative contradicts frr. 251, 260 (last word), 262 (καταψηφιστέον).
3. To suppose that an authoritarian law is meant here (248) would be straight contradiction of (a) the text itself where πειθομένοισι has a connotation known from fr. 181, (b) frr. noted in footn. above.

11. What is the meaning of fr. 83?[1]

Scholars who have commented on this agree that it sounds very Socratic;[2] i.e. wrongdoing is due to ignorance. Socrates' view is well-known;[3] Gorgias perhaps anticipated him (in defence of Helen)[4] arguing that wrongdoing is involuntary.

1. fr. 83: ἁμαρτίης αἰτίη ἡ ἁμαθίη τοῦ κρέσσονος.
2. C. Bailey, op. cit., 197: It has almost a Socratic ring.
   R. Philippson, Demokritssittensprüche, Hermes 59 (1924) 403: (quoting frr. 83, 181 and referring to 116) remarks: D. von Sokrates in seiner Ethik beeinflusst sein Kann.
3. Plato, Laws, 863 C : ἄγνοιαν λέγων ἄν τις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν οὐκ ἂν ψεύδοιτο.
   Laws 731 C : ὁ ἄδικος οὐχ ἑκὼν ἄδικος.
   Laws 860 D : οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα ἄκοντες κακοί.
   Aristotle (EN 1109 b 35) defines: δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα.
   Cf. Timaeus 86 D E, Laches 194 D.
   Xenophon, Memorabilia III.9.4.
   Arist. EE 1216 b 6. EN 1144 b 28: ἐπιστήμας ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς.
   The consequences of these views are discussed by Guthrie, History III, 459 ff. (Socrates 139 ff.): Evidently (he concludes, p.140) any who are vicious will not be vicious voluntarily. Neither, in consequence, will they be voluntarily virtuous.
4. VS 82 B 11, 6 (ad finem), B 11, 7 (ad finem), B 11, 12 (ad finem), B 11, 15, B 11, 22.

Note 4. to p. 195 ctd.

Cf. Guido Calogero, Gorgias and the Socratic Principle: "Nemo sua sponte peccat", Journal of Hellenic Studies, 76 (1957) 12-17.

See: P. Huby, Greek Ethics, 13, 18.

With reference to fr. 83 Guthrie (History, II.490) following Philippson (op. cit. p. 405) mentions the last proposition of fr. 181: "...the man who acts rightly through "synesis" and knowledge becomes brave and upright"[1] and misinterprets it by implying that it identifies right action and knowledge.[2]

Fr. 83 if accepted in a Socratic connotation gives difficulties because:

(1) it ignores another factor of morality explicitly present in other aphorisms of D.; namely, it contradicts frr. 248, 62 (Stob. III 9.29), 68, 89.[3]

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1. fr. 181: ...διόπερ συνέσει τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ὀρθοπραγέων τις ἀνδρεῖος ἅμα καὶ εὐδύγνωμος γίγνεται.
2. In this passage two conditions of right action are mentioned: synesis and knowledge. Synesis is intelligence (Philebus 19d), perception (Theophr. de sens. 71), conscience (Euripides' Orest. 396. See Luria, Democritea, 567), prudence, carefulness (D.'s fr. 77). How is it justified that synesis be included in knowledge so that Guthrie's implication be accepted? Synesis and epistēme cooperate, do not coincide, it is said in fr. 181.
3. A. Faggi, Per l' etica democritea, Atti Acc. Sc. di Torino (1928) pp. 206-10 (un aspetto volontaristico).
   Fr. Mesiano, La etica materialistica di D., Firenze (1951) pp. 95 ff.

(2) it removes human responsibility which we found in frr. 181, 84, 244, 264.

Therefore, either it is not authentic,[1] or (more probably) it needs more careful re-interpretation: "cause of failure (error) is the ignorance of how to act in a better way".[2] It implies that knowing is a condition of successful action but doesn't imply necessarily that any case of wrongdoing is due to ignorance.

If this interpretation is correct, it escapes the inconsistencies mentioned above and leaves **roŏm** for other factors evidently present in D.'s ethical theory: intention (62, 68, 89), synesis (181), phronesis (119), which cannot be identified with knowledge.[3]

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1. This is Luria's view (Democritea, p. 596 no. 696).
2. ἀμαθίη means ignorance or stupidity (cf. Heracl. 95).
   ἁμαρτίη means failure or sin (later).
3. Another possibility is this:

   If κρέσσονος refers to the stronger (the person in power, the ruler) as is the case in frr. 238, 267 and perhaps 185 and 295, and, if κρέσσονος is a subjective genitive to ἁμαθίη, then the whole fr. can be: the cause of political error is the inability (incompetence)of the ruler; such an interpretation gains probability from the fact that D. in many cases refers to such problems as who is to rule or be ruled (cf. frr. 75, 267, 49).

12. Tree of Virtues

Is there a virtue or a group of virtues from which other virtues are derived? According to the evidence we possess we cannot give an affirmative answer to this question and/or give a list of cardinal virtues.

A long list of virtues, to be sure, arises from the frr. — unexpectedly rich — perhaps an echo of the difficulties in social life of Greek city-states in the late 5th century BC. But it is impossible to analyse them and find their precise connotation, because of lack of sufficient evidence, and it is difficult even to classify them.

We are accustomed to speak about cardinal virtues in Greek Philosophy, particularly after Socrates.[1] But it would be incorrect to borrow evidence from later philosophy even to illuminate a single item in D.'s terminology, because the meaning and hierarchy of virtues were in continuous change from generation to generation[2] and from

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1. Plato usually mentions: Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, Justice.
   But compare: Meno 74A: ἀνδρεία .... σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ πάμπολλαι ἄλλαι.
   Aristotle first distinguishes: Intellectual - Moral virtues.
   (EN 1103a 14 ff.)
   See: D. Ross, Aristotle 1971 [1923] pp. 202 ff., 215 ff.
2. Compare e.g. three definitions of Courage:
   (a) Thucydides, II, 40.3.
   (b) Plato, Laws 626 E.
   (c) Democritus, fr. 214. Antiphon frr. 58, 59.
   Quotations will be included in some of the following pages.

society to society. Following the principle: "do not ask the meaning of a term, ask for its use", we will try to illuminate the whole question relying only (or mainly) on the fragments.

The difficulty in elucidating D.'s vocabulary of virtues can be seen in a short comparison of some terms in various contexts:

(i) "men without "synesis" through misfortunes acquire 'sophrosyne'."[1]

(ii) Fortune is opposed to phronesis (fr. 119).

Fortune is opposed to sophia (fr. 197).

Fortune is opposed to sophrosyne (fr. 210).

(iii) "there are young men who are 'synetoi' and old men who are 'asynetoi', because it is not time which teaches 'phronesis', but good education and nature."[2]

Two ways of working out a kind of analysis and classification are possible:

(a) Virtues directed to (i) one's own interest and happiness or (ii) other people's.

(b) (i) Intellectual and (ii) practical virtues.

In both ways the first group are not strictly speaking virtues to be included in an ethical theory, unless they are indispensable preparation for the other class of virtues, which are morally valued qualities.

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1. fr. 54: οἱ ἀξύνετοι δυστυχέοντες σωφρονέουσι.

2. fr. 183: ἔστι που νέων ξύνεσις καὶ γερόντων ἀξυνεσίη· χρόνος γὰρ οὐ διδάσκει φρονεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥραίη τροφὴ καὶ φύσις.

Although of Aristotelian flavour the second way could find an application in D.'s tree of virtues; the former, nonetheless, is more convenient, in order to show the transition from an egoistic view of life to an altruistic one, apparent in D.'s naturalistic ethical theory.

One might note in passing that Intellectualism is dominant in the list of virtues under discussion, but it is not the only source from which morality arises. Knowing the good is one condition necessary for doing it (being virtuous), but neither sufficient nor efficient.

Two main beliefs characterise D.'s thought in planting his tree of virtues: (a) that man by his nature is not an angel,[1] (b) that soul is master of the body and has the capacity to rule it and lead it to self-perfection.[2]

1. Virtues concerning one's own personal perfection and happiness:

a. Sophia (wisdom).

That it is not a gift granted by nature but an achievement of life through learning, i.e. through labour, we read in fr. 59: ("neither technē nor wisdom is attainable save through learning") in connection with fr. 182: "beautiful objects are achieved by study through effort...."[3] It is of the highest value because it leads to athambia[4] which is recorded as an alternative name for euthumia (fr. 4.)

1. fr. 149: ἂν δὲ σαυτὸν ἀνοίξῃς ἔνδοθεν, ποικίλον τι καὶ πολυπαθὲς κακῶν ταμιεῖον εὑρήσεις καὶ δησαύρισμα.
2. 187: ... ψυχῆς μὲν γὰρ τελεότης σώματος μοχθηρίην ὀρθοῖ...
3. fr. 59: οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε σοφίη ἐφικτόν, ἢν μὴ μάθῃ τις.

(Stob. II 31, 71)

fr. 182: τὰ μὲν καλὰ χρήματα τοῖς πόνοις ἡ μάθησις ἐξεργάζεται....

4. fr. 216: σοφίη ἄθαμβος ἀξίη πάντων.... Cf. fr. 4.

Sophia is what makes intellectual speculation possible; it gives men two highly valued possibilities: (a) to fight fortune (this unreliable phantom)[1] and (b) - what is more appreciated - to free their soul from passions[2], which are an obstacle to human happiness.[3]

b. Courage is not only fighting bravely against external enemies: courage is the power to control one's own passions, to defeat one's passions, to be master in one's own household;[4] it is like performing the last function ascribed to sophia (see footn. 2). As was correctly remarked, "fr. 181 (ad fin.) and fr. 214 emphasise the unity of courage with the rest of virtue".[5] The brave man is he who is stronger than his pleasures. So courage retains its old meaning (bravery in battle) and acquires a new one shared by other thinkers of the same generation

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1. fr. 119: ἄνθρωποι τύχης εἴδωλον ἐπλάσαντο....
   Cf. fr. 197, 176, 210. Cf. also: Plato, Meno, 99A: τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται.
2. fr. 31:... σοφίη δὲ ψυχὴν παθῶν ἀφαιρεῖται.
3. fr. 149 (quoted above). Compare Cicero, de finibus, 3,20: perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram accerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci πάθη appellant.
4. fr. 214: ἀνδρεῖος οὐχ ὁ τῶν πολεμίων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τῶν ἡδονῶν κρέσσων.
5. Guthrie, History, II, 490.

and the next one;[1] (viz. control over passions).

c. Reasoning (logismos) has to fulfil three serious functions: (a) to help man in his attempt to win a victory over his desires[2] like sophia and courage, (b) to lead the individual to self-perfection as can be seen in fr. 187 (ad fin.).[3] (c) From the eudaimonistic view of Greek Ethics the capacity of logismos to cast forth grief from the soul and lead man to contemplative life is of no less importance.[4]

d. Synesis is not the accumulation of any kind of learning but the

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1. Cf. Thuc. 11.40.3. κράτιστοι δ'ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν δικαίως κριθεῖεν οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν κινδύνων.
   Plato, Laws. 626 E: Τὸ νικᾶν ἑαυτὸν πασῶν τῶν νικῶν ἡ ἀρίστη... Cf. Laches 191 DE
   Antiphon, B 58: αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κρατεῖν τε καὶ νικᾶν ἐδυνήθη. Cf. B 59. Cf. also: Euripides, Supplices, 510: καὶ τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ τάνδρεῖον, ἡ προμηθία.
2. fr. 236: θυμῷ μάχεσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν· ἀνδρὸς δὲ τὸ κρατέειν εὐλογίστου.
   Apparently similar to Heracl. 85: θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλῃ ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται.
   But D.'s attitude is different; it expresses confidence in human capacities. Cf. Krokiewicz, Quaestiones Democriteae, Eos, 47 (1954-55), p. 38: Heraclito sic D. respondet.
   See: Schmid-Stählin, 1, 5, p. 293.
   Cf. Eur. Medea, 1078-80.

Notes to p. 202 ctd.

3. Since the soul is the centre of an intellectual being and logismos renders soul more perfect, it means that logismos is entitled to the higher place in the hierarchy of virtues. Cf. Natorp, op. cit. p. 98.

4. fr. 290: λύπην ἀδέσποτον ψυχῆς ναρκώσης λογισμῷ ἔκκρουε.

but the combined result of good education and natural capacity. "There are young men who are synetoi and old men without this quality."[1] This is not possessed by all men, but when acquired it becomes a guard against dangers and a companion-guide towards other virtues and right actions. Synesis is the power which helps men to keep measure and balance between two deceiving and frequently misleading partners: "glory and wealth without synesis are unsafe possessions."[2] When one possesses these two goods, danger for him comes from inside (empty ambitions) from outside (flattery, adulation)[3]; and then synesis is the only tutor for a man surrounded by such friends. As for the fools they learn synesis, if at all, only through suffering.[4]

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1. fr. 183: ἔστι που νέων ξύνεσις καὶ γερόντων ἀξυνεσίη....

2. fr. 77: δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος ἄνευ ξυνέσιος οὐκ ἀσφαλέα κτήματα (Stob. III. 4. 82).
   Cf. Eurip. Herc. 511-12: ὃ δ' ὄλβος ὁ μέγας
   ἤτε δόξ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ βέβαιός ἐστι.

3. Cf. Seneca, De vita beata, 25.4.
   In ancient Rome when a "triumphator" entered the city standing on his chariot, during the pompous parade a "servus" behind him was whispering "respice post te, hominem te esse memento" (sic transit gloria mundi!).

4. fr. 54: οἱ ἀξύνετοι δυστυχέοντες σωφρονέουσι.
   cf. fr. 76.
   Cf. Soph. Antigone, 1348 ff.
   ...μεγάλοι δὲ λόγοι μεγάλας πληγὰς τῶν ὑπεραύχων
   ἀποτίσαντες γήρᾳ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδίδαξαν.

e. Sophrosyne - Autarkeia.

Sophrosyne appears as the virtue of keeping measure in pleasures,[1] even intellectual pleasures,[1] since any excess is undesirable. Sophrosyne is referred to as the flower of old age.[2] A sōphrōn man can suffer a poor life in dignity[3], and discriminate between trustworthy men and those who are not.[4] Sophrosyne is opposed to credulity, naivity.

1. fr. 210, 211, 191 (beginning).

Cf. Epicurus, Ethika (Us. 456, 20 ff., p. 295):

ἡ μὲν οὖν σωφροσύνη βραχύτης ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τάξις ἀναιροῦσα μὲν τὰς ἐπεισάκτους καὶ περιττὰς, καιρῷ δὲ καὶ μετριότητι κοσμοῦσα τὰς ἀναγκαίας.

Cf. Arist. EN 1107 b 6: μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. 1117 b 23: μεσότης περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς.

Vlastos (op. cit. I. 588) recollects (in connection with fr. 211) fr. 233: Moderation increases enjoyment....

2. fr. 294: ...γήραος δὲ σωφροσύνη (ἐστὶν) ἄνθος.

It is characteristic that a metaphor is used here which in Greek literature was usual for hybris.

See H. North, Sophrosyne, New York (1966), p. 382.

3. fr. 291: πενίην ἐπιεικέως φέρειν σωφρονέοντος.

4. fr. 67: μὴ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δοκίμοισι πιστεύειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὔηθες, τὸ δὲ σωφρονέοντος.

The best example from which men can learn sophrosynē is their father's conduct. This aphorism is addressed rather to parents to give a good example to their children.

Sophrosynē prepares the way for another virtue: self-sufficiency (210), which here appears with clear philosophical implications.[1] In two aphorisms the precarious gifts of fortune are contrasted with self-sufficiency which comes from nature (176) and from sophrosyne (210). In a fr. of personal confession D. says: "Sojourning abroad teaches self-sufficiency; for a crust of bread and a wisp of straw are the sweetest medicines for hunger and weariness.[2]

Self-sufficiency had a distinguished history in later times: Stilpo the Megarian[3] pushed it into apatheia (Stoic principle) and

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1. North, Sophrosyne, 76 footn. 108, pp. 118-119.
   J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World, London, 1958, p.138.
   Schmid-Stählin, I. 5. 312: In keiner anderen Ethik ist die menschlich Autarkie.....so stark betont wie in der demokritischen.
   Cf. an interesting remark of Thucydides (I. 84.3): αἰδῶς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει.
2. fr. 246: Ξενιτείη βίου αὐτάρκειαν διδάσκει· μᾶζα γὰρ καὶ στιβὰς λιμοῦ καὶ κόπου γλυκύτατα ἰάματα.

   transl. (quoted above) by C. Bailey, Gr. Atom., p. 205.
3. Zeller-Nestle, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. 1.273: Für des höchste Gut erklärte er jene Apathie, die kein Gefühl des Übels aufkommen lässt.

Aristotle reduced it to intellectual dimensions.[1] For D.'s part fr. 246 seems to echo a personal experience [2] and explains the non-hedonistic and sometimes ascetic (character) nature of his ethics.[3]

2. From the egoistic to the altruistic view of life:

Justice.

It is the only one of the main virtues which refers to one's own duty to act according to others' desire; the sole but strong expression of altruism in D.'s ethical theory.

An attempt to define justice declined into an imperative "do what you must do" (provided that one has self-evidently known what

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1. EN 1176 b 28: ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ὁ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται....ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν δύναται θεωρεῖν καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον.

   Cf. Philebus 67 A.

2. Cf. DL IX 35 (VS 68 A 1, 35 in vol. II 81, 22 ff.)

   Suidas (VS 68 A 2). Fr. 299.

   Luria, Democritea, pp. 15-16: Iter in terras orientales.

3. See : ch. on Pleasure. Cf. Kirk-Raven, Presocratics, 425.

is one's duty to perform).[1] It is not, to be sure, a definition, but one can hardly deny that it is an attempted definition.[2]

Justice is conjoined with lawfulness (174); but they do not coincide; at the most they can overlap as performances, but hardly as motives. Anyway justice is described as the crown of the behaviour of a happy man or the absolute condition of happiness. In the light of this, another aphorism (45)[4] is intelligible, without a necessary assumption of Socratic influence.

How highly justice is valued in D.'s ethics is evident from the following facts:

(a) Justice is the most frequently mentioned virtue in the surviving frr. of D.; some of them refer to justice alone.[5]

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1. fr. 256:
δίκη μέν ἐστιν Ἔρδειν τὰ χρὴ ἐόντα...
Plato fought a titanic fight throughout his life for a definition of justice. See: D. McGibbon, Plato's final definition of justice, Proc. of Afr. Cl. Assoc. 7 (1964) 19-24.
2. It seems probable that if Aristotle had known it he would refer to it in his well-known passages from: de partt. anim. (A 1) 642a 24, Met. 1078 b 19 (VS 68 A 36).
3. fr. 174:
ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα...
4. fr. 45:
ὁ ἀδικῶν τοῦ ἀδικουμένου κακοδαιμονέστερος.
Cf. Gorgias 479 E:
ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι.
5. frr. 256, 261, 217, 62, 45.

(b) Justice alone impelled D. to make his best effort to investigate its various features and describe them, since he found the concept undefinable.

In fr. 261 e.g. he says: "it is a duty for every one (and it is characteristic that here he uses a generalising and impersonal, but morally imperative expression) to protect wronged people; his formula is stated without any qualification. He goes on to say: "it is good and just" (a kind of ostensive definition)[1]. No question arises whether just is by nature or by convention[2] it is anyhow a moral obligation.

What is the criterion of just and unjust? no answer can be traced in the material we possess. By applying the meaning of fr. 69 one might say that D. was a believer in the principle: "everyone is able to see what is just and he must perform it."

Doing justice is no doubt praiseworthy. Reward is of moral importance: "the glory of justice is candour in judgement and imperturbability "(athambia)"[3], which is a condition of euthumia or euthumia itself.[4]

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1. fr. 261: ἀδικουμένοισι τιμωρεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν χρή...τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν....
   For further discussion see: E. A. Havelock, The liberal temper in Greek Politics, London (1957) p. 133-4.
   Mesiano, op. cit. pp. 27 ff.: Il probleme della justizia.
   Cf. Thucydides view in V 89 -90 (political aspect in wartime).
2. Archelaus, VS 60 A 1: καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. For detailed discussion: Guthrie, History III, 55 (or Sophists 55 ff.).
3. fr. 215: δίκης κῦδος γνώμης θάρσος καὶ ἀθαμβίη...
4. Cf. fr. 4 (ad fin.)

The wording of this fr. leaves no doubt that it is morally justifiable ot hold people responsible and to praise them insofar as they act freely and in accordance with (174) or in protection of justice (261). As justice is praiseworthy, so injustice is blameworthy and followed by inward or outward punishment, lack of **euthumia** (174, ad fin.) fear of harm (215 ad fin.);[1] psychologically the expectation of harm is more than the punishment itself. For this reason fr. 45 seems to be intelligible within the framework of D.'s ethics, although Socratic flavour is obvious in it[2] and the possibility of Socratic influence cannot be excluded.[3]

The most remarkable aphorism[3a] (preserved in both collections) is that which sees justice not even in doing what is just but in willing it;[4] it emphasises will as (morally) the first factor in being just;[5] it, thus, postulates freedom of will.

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1. fr. 215: ...ἀδικίης δὲ δεῖμα ξυμφορῆς τέρμα.
2. Cf. Gorgias 475 C: ἆρα λύπη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι; ... Cf. also: 472 E, 473 D-E, 475 D-E.
3. See fr. 116.

3a C. Bailey, op. cit. 202: a remarkable anticipation of later thought.

4. fr. 62: ἀγαθὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθέλειν. (Stob. III 9.29).
5. From this point of view it agrees with 3 other frr.: 68, 89, 248. Philippson (op. cit. p. 417) remarks: Fr. 248 stellt zum ersten und einigen Male in der griechischen Philosophie den Gegensatz zwischen Legalität und Moralität auf und nimmt den Kantischen Grundsatz voraus: Gut ist allein der gute Wille.

Of the virtues briefly described above the last one surpasses selfishness and renders a man a good member of a society, an agent of what is desirable by the community. Later ages have added one more principle of action: benevolence.[1]

The list of virtues could be continued; a greater number of them are mentioned in the frr., but it is difficult to understand precisely their meaning and importance (in a system surviving in fragments) for two reasons:

a. rarity of their appearance,

b. peculiarity of D.'s vocabulary while a standardised philosophical terminology was coming into existence.

Some of these virtues affect one's own life,[2] others refer to mutual relations.[3]

Homonoia[4] and Liberty[5] sometimes appear as virtues, sometimes as goods, and anyway refer rather to political life; therefore, they will find a more intelligible explanation in the chapter on "Political Life".

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1. Frankena, Ethics, pp. 50-51.
2. See frr. 3, 191, 40, 229, 240.
3. See fr. 46, 92, 65, 225 (44), 192, 91, 63, 186.
4. frr. 250, 255.
5. 251, 226, 282.

13. Democritus's Freewill Problem

Perhaps the most important criticism directed against D.'s ethics is this: how could he find a compromise between his mechanistic universe and his ethical theory, since the soul of a moral agent consists of atoms[1] and therefore it should obey the laws of natural necessity.[2] It is a question of incompatibility and inconsistency. On this point the most serious task for students who try to explain D.'s ethical theory is reasonably focused.

To a degree this problem is but an exaggeration of the fact that we judge this system through our conceptual structure[3] and today's philosophical preconceptions. For us the freewill problem (as freedom

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1. Arist. de anima, 404 a 2-3: τὰ σφαιροειδῆ (sc. ἄτομα) πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει.

   404 a 6 ff.: τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν....

   Cf. paragraph: Body-Mind Relations.

2. Cic. de fato 17, 39 (VS 68 A 66): "omnia ita fato fieri ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret: in qua sententia Democritus.... fuit." Cicerone chiama "fato" quella necessitá meccanica (Mesiano, op. cit. 105).

   Aristotle, de gener. animal. 789 b 2 (VS 68 A 66): πάντα ἀναάγει εἰς ἀνάγκην οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις.

   Cf. VS 67 B 2: οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.

   Cf. VS 68 A 68. See ch. 1 of this research.

3. H. Weiss, Democritus' Theory of Cognition, Classical Quarterly 32 (1938) 47-56.

versus predestination and freedom versus determination) has a long and celebrated history of over two millenia.[1] But in the late fifth century BC this problem was non-existent; "it came into being in the course of the fourth century BC.[2]

A kind of determinism is apparent in fifth century thought[3], since fortune and dikē were ever-present powers to bring people who strayed into the way prescribed for them.[4]

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1. P. Huby, The first discovery of the freewill problem, Philosophy, 42 (1967) 353-362.
2. Huby, p. 353.
3. Cf. the whole story of Oedipus. Or Thucydides' remark (I. 22.4): ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται ... καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι ....
   which introduces the notion of probability into history for future millenia.
4. Cf. Heracl. B 94 (Vs. I.172.9): Ἐρινύες Δίκης ἐπίκουροι. Parm. B 1.14 (I 229.9): Δίκη πολύποινος.

Thinkers like Gorgias and Socrates (the former by rhetorical drills[1], the latter by the paradoxical equation of virtue and knowledge[2]) led to deterministic conclusions, or they were so misunderstood by their contemporaries or later thinkers.

Plato's system left room for freedom of will.[3] But even Aristotle, who wrote so much on the particular problem of the "voluntariness" was unaware of the problem of free will[4], although he criticised the logical consequences of Socrates' paradox.[5]

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1. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 325: "Gorgias had not stated such a conclusion, though his defence of Helen entails it; and there is no reason to suppose that he would have found it palatable. See: US 82 B 11. 7 (ad finem), B 11. 15.
2. For discussion of this problem, references and literature, see: Guthrie, History III, 450 or Socrates, 130 ff.
3. Adkins, op. cit., pp. 302-3:... in principle, every man is capable of directing his life according to the dictates of reason.... observation leads Plato to believe that man who is capable....is very rare indeed....
4. P. Huby, op. cit., pp. 354 ff.
   Adkins, op. cit., 327-8.
5. EN 1144 b 18 ff.: καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ὤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡμάρτανεν ....

   See Guthrie, Socrates, 132.

Paradoxically enough the first thinker to fight on behalf of human responsibility[1] which presupposes (postulates) freedom of will and denies any interference either by chance or by the gods in human affairs, was the "materialist" of Abdera.[2]

Whether he was aware of the problem of freewill in its modern dimensions, and, if so, how he could reconcile an ethical theory and an autonomous will with a mechanistic universe; these are two questions for which no straight answer can be supplied from the evidence we possess. But we have material enough from which to discover or through which to penetrate to D.'s thought on the problem of moral autonomy.

In the fragments we can trace these elements which (according to later studies) either accompany free will or presuppose it. Namely:

a. Emphasis on intention and deliberation is explicit (frr. 62, 68, 89, 96, 173, 277, 66).[3] But how can one intend and deliberate about what to do and how to act, unless one believes that it is in one's power to do it?

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1. Cf. Adkins op. cit. p. 2 (he nowhere refers to Dem.).
   See: Ch. 1 of this research.
2. See frr. 119, 197.
3. fr. 66: προβουλεύεσθαι κρεῖσσον πρὸ τῶν πράξεων ἢ μετανοεῖν.
   fr. 96: χαριστικὸς οὐχ ὁ βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ἀλλ' ὁ εὖ δρᾶν προῃρημένος.

b. The problem of remorse named in fr. 43 and obviously present in fr. 174 (second half) raises the question: how the subject experiencing remorse can have such a feeling without believing that it was up to him to have done what he sees afterwards as wrong.

c. In many cases duties are prescribed[1] and responsibility[2] is demanded; but it would be inconsistent to employ these moral concepts unless he (D.) recognised that his moral agent was a free agent.

d. Moral self-amelioration through persuasion[3] is absolutely incompatible with the absence of freedom. In this case even the wording used by D. is worth considering: "but he who has recognised his duty by persuasion is unlikely to sin...."[4] Even after persuasion the moral agent is not conditioned but expected to decide and act freely. Only probabilities for his future conduct are expected, not necessities.

1. See paragraph On Duty. Frr. 30, 41, 181, 92, 191, 207, 235, 252, 259, 174, 256, 261.

2. See paragraph: Moral autonomy, individual responsibility and the foundation of character. Frr. 43, 174 and 181 would not be intelligible unless their author was a believer in the principle of moral autonomy.

   Cf. Schumacher, Die Seele: Der Sitz des Schicksals, Berlin (1938) p. 17: Demokrits Ethik setzt also ein hohes Mass von sittlichen Verantwortungsbewusstseln voraus.

3. fr. 187:...ψυχῆς μὲν γὰρ τελεότης σκήνεος μοχθηρίην ὀρθοῖ....

   fr. 181: κρείσσεων ἐπ' ἀρετὴν φανεῖται προτροπῇ χρώμενος καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ....

4. fr. 181: ... τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἠγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς ....ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές...

e. The whole corpus of the fragments suggests and leaves room for freedom of will and thought. Fr. 83 is the only one which might imply a kind of conditioning if accepted in the Socratic sense. But it has been interpreted in the previous paragraph as not having such an implication.

Freewill is not, as it were, a gift of nature but an achievement of life. It is the prize of victory won by reason and morality:[1]

a. over nature (fr. 118),

b. over passions, since man is not an angel

by birth,[2] but has in himself the capacity to restrain his desires and passions, and triumph in the field of self-liberation (31, 159, 187). The way to freedom[3] is described as difficult but worth the effort and praiseworthy.[4]

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1. Schumacher, op.cit.,16: Bei D. entscheidet das Individuum allein über den sittlichen Wert einer Handlung nach dem in ihm liegenden sittlichen pflichtgefühl.
2. fr. 31: ἰητρικὴ μέν ... σώματος νόσους ἀκέεται, σοφίη δὲ ψυχὴν παθέων ἀφαιρεῖται.
   Cf. frr. 149, 159, 187.
3. Mesiano (La morale materialistica di Democrito) despite the title of his book doesn't acknowledge determinism in D.'s Ethics; and he first devoted a separate chapter (pp. 104 ff.) to explaining D.'s ethical theory in terms of freedom of will. Cf. book review by K. Büchner, in Erasmus, 8 (1955) pp. 615-6.

Notes to 216 ctd.

4. It should be noted that we do not refer to the proper term of Liberty (Ἐλευθερία fr. 251) because it is used with a political meaning as is the case also in all presocratic philosophy up to Kritias and Anonymus Iamblichi.

For the same reason we don't comment here on fr. 248 which is a reconciliation between freedom of individuals and State law which imposes restrictions. D. does'nt share the attitude of many people who "im Gesetz nur die Fesseln sehen" (Max Pohlenz, Griechische Freiheit, Heidelberg (1965) p. 75).

If freedom means: (1) independence of thought, (2) autonomy of will, and (3) absence or limitation of external constraints which limit one's deliberate activity, then freedom is the prevailing characteristic of the moral agent emerging from D.'s fragments, because:

(1) his irresistible effort to explore nature's secrets speaks for itself through fragments 118, 216, 299.

(2) moral autonomy is clearly declared (264, 244, 84, 181),

(3) the virtues (described in the previous paragraph), particularly autarkeia, permit a measure of self-control and therefore a certain emancipation from external influences.

From all previous explanation of D.'s ethical thought this conclusion is clear: he believed that man has the capacity to win freedom of will and action. But the crucial question returns: Did he notice (as modern scholars have) the incompatibility between his ethics and physics? and, if so, did he find a reasonable compromise?

P. Huby[1] following the traditional view that Epicurus introduced[2] "the swerve of the atoms.... (in order) to allow room for freedom of action by men, whose minds were composed of atoms and therefore subject to the same laws as everything else" (p.358), accepts that D. was unaware of the problem of freewill; she goes on to

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1. Op. cit. 358 ff.

2. Diog. of Oinoanda (fr. 33c 2 VS 68 A 50) (Grilli p. 77. Chilton, p. 57.).

conclude (p. 368) that: "it is possible for men like Plato and Aristotle to hold many educational and psychological beliefs in common with us without being aware of any freewill problem because they had no notion of thoroughgoing psychological determinism."

F. Mesiano[1] says that D. believed in the possiblility of the soul to escape the limits of necessity (although he could not demonstrate how it was possible) by defeating the passions (p. 110) since the soul is acknowledged to have superiority over the body (p. 113).

From these views it is concluded that D. either was not aware of the problem under discussion or could not find a solution of it. He had, however, specific cause to have noticed the incompatibility between two parts of his system, since he was the first thinker to have been busy with both a mechanistic theory of physics and an autonomous theory of ethics. It is reasonable to suggest that he was aware of the problem which he put.[2] What was his answer - a belief (as Mesiano described it) or a theory?

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1. op. cit. p. 110: Democrito ha certamente sentito, anche se no ha potuto dimostrarlo, che, a quella necissitá, l'anima poteve sfuggire soltanto col liberarsi dalle passioni e dagli istinti...mediante la potenza della ragione e l' esercizio della volontá. Obviously Mesiano refers to frr. 31, 149, 242 (?).
2. Otherwise his fight against fortune (frr. 119, 197), for which we have also indirect testimony from the most reliable source (Arist. phys. B 4 195 b 36, On 196 b 14 Simpl. p. 330, 14) (VS 68 A 68) would be unintelligible.

His belief is transparent throughout the fragments. His theory, if convincing, might be gathered from pieces of his thought preserved in Aristotles' works, from which we are informed that the soul's atoms are:

a. spherical[1]

b. most mobile[2]

c. therefore the soul is more mobile than any other atomic structure.[3]

Therefore these atoms are privileged atoms. And, the question reasonably arises: why this distinction? Did D. recognise some independence of these atoms? a kind of self-determination within the limits of human embodied existence?

The testimony is not enough to defend the thesis that in D.'s view the soul was able to escape from necessity to freedom, because of its different atomic composition, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that D. made this distinction (of soul atoms) in order to justify something. Perhaps in his theory these privileged atoms provided a solution of the problem which we see as "incompatibility".

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1. Arist. de anima, 404 a 2-3

2. Ibid. 404 a 6 ff. Cf. 406 b 16-22, 409 b 1.

3. Ibid. 404 b 7: κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν....
Cf. 404 a 1-10, 405 a 7-13.

The fact is that even if this hypothesis is incorrect, even if D. was unaware of the incompatibility described above, in his ethical theory there are some elements constituting ways for the soul to escape from necessity to freedom.

a. Victory over passions by Sophia. Having asserted the superiority of the soul over the body and having ascribed absolute responsibility to the soul (fr. 159), D. was able to conform that the soul could "cure" the passions through sophia[1] and lead to a gradual self-improvement (187). It is characteristic that he included this form of victory in his definition of courage (fr. 214) for the first time in the history of this concept.

b. Victory over nature by discovering the causes of events. Fr. 118 speaks for itself; so any comment is unnecessary here.

c. Victory over prejudices (e.g. belief in fortune or divine intervention and vain hopes) and simultaneous emphasis on human capacities (119, 197, 292).[2]

How does knowledge free men? Through knowing men understand that what they fear, take pleasure in, or find pain in, is in many cases the result of accidental association or of their own miscalculation.

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1. See paragraph: Tree of Virtues: Sophia. Compare frr. 149, 31.
2. fr. 119: τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ἐν βίῳ εὐξύνετος ὀξυδερκείᾳ κατιδύνει.
   fr. 58(Stob. IV.46.18): ἐλπίδες αἱ τῶν ἀρδὰ φρονεόντων ἐφικταί, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀξυνέτων ἀδύνατοι.
   fr. 292: ἄλογοι τῶν ἀξυνέτων αἱ ἐλπίδες.

To know this is to break the association and acquire the possibility of creating desirable conditions or avoiding undesirable consequences. Men recognise then that pleasure and pain arise mainly from their own power and ability. So they don't blame either conditions or other people; causes for envy, hate, guilt therefore vanish.

The wise man by self-knowledge (fr. 149, 31) by understanding of the actual conditions of nature and life recognises that even external causes are necessary limits (285) to human capacity and does not treat them as hindrances. So he is not frustrated. At the same time he understands better other people's conduct and directs better his own.[1]

The intellectual contentment of the man who has freed himself through knowledge of nature and of himself as a part of nature is a condition of happiness. At this level, knowledge, freedom and happiness are combined.

d. The discovery of duty, finally, leads from the kingdom of necessity to that of freedom, we had remarked in the paragraph "On Duty" with a particular reference to frr. 41, 181.[2]

1. Perhaps this was Socrates's view on knowledge as tutor of virtue (knowing for him included both cognition and volition in our terms).
2. If these instructions (frr. 264, 92, 207, 227, 261) become a "credo".... then they promote the individual from the level of necessity to that of personal decision (oughtness), i.e. from necessity to autonomy.

The general impression from D.'s ethical sayings is that he was a believer in man's capacity to acquire a partial freedom within the limits of natural necessity; his view can be summarised in what is nowadays called "soft determinism."[1]

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1. Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1963) p.43: The 3 claims of soft determinism are (1)... (2)... (3) that, in the absence of such obstacles and constraints, the causes of voluntary behaviour are... within the agent himself; namely, his own acts of will or volitions, choices, decisions, desires, and so on.

14. What is the "Criterion"?

To find a standard whose presence or absence may be taken as a mark of the presence or absence of what is regarded as morally good, is a permanent and fundamental question in moral philosophy;[1] we can trace its appearance in Greek Philosophy, where a close relation between morality and happiness is also evident.[2]

Modern scholars[3] who have studied D.'s ethical theory and tried to interpret it have reasonably paid attention to statements in which a kind of "criterion" appears. Pioneering in this direction was Natorp's work.[4]

1. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge[14](1968)[1903]pp.91-95,137-8.
   W. Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, London[9](1971),pp.106-7, 110.
   A. MacIntyre, A short history of Ethics, London (1971), p.147.
2. See paragraph "On Happiness".
   Cf. Vernon J. Bourke, History of Ethics, I (1970, New York) pp.15 ff., 33 ff. (Early Greek Eudaimonism, Teleological Eudaimonism).
3. P. Natorp, Die Ethika des D., 88 ff.
   A. Dyroff, Dempkritstudien, München (1899) pp. 133 ff.
   J. Ferber, Zeitschrift f. Phil. 132/3 (1908) p.92.
   H. Langerbeck, op. cit., p.56.
   C.C.W. Taylor, Pleasure, Knowledge...in D., Phronesis 12 (1967) pp.17, 26-7.
   F. Mesiano, op. cit., p.80.
   D. McGibbon, Pleasure as the "criterion" in D., Phronesis 5 (1960) pp.75-77.
4. P. Natorp, op.cit., ch.3. It is characteristic that in the list of D.'s fragments (pp.7ff.) the first places are given to those frr. in which Natorp himself and later scholars tried to find D.'s criterion.

This inquiry will be directed to the following tripartite question; are there, even in nucleus form, some criteria to justify and explain moral, social and political activity in D.'s fragments?

A) The crucial aphorism (from D.'s ethical writings) is preserved by Clement of Alexandria (VS 68 B 4) and Stobaeus (VS 68 B 188). In interpreting it scholars have found difficulty because of the fact that all terms included in this formula are ambiguous,[1] some of them are used once in the whole corpus of the surviving fragments,[2] one only is met in other fragments (and perhaps it will be the key).

A sample only of the dispute on the meaning of the crucial statement (4, 188: intellectual pleasure or lack of it is the criterion of what is beneficial or not)[3] is given by the following list of different translations (of the term ὅρος) proposed by modern and contemporary scholars:

Massstab (Zeller-Nestle, I.2.1141)

Unterscheidungsmerkmal (Natorp, 92)

Grenze (DK VS 68 B 4, 68 B 188)

Grenz -bestimmung (Philippson, op. cit. p.385)

Scheidelinie (Langerbeck, 64)

Landmark and by derivation measure (Vlastos, 588)

criterio, indizio (Mesiano, 80 f.)[4]

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1. Ὅρος συμφόρων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπίη (fr.188)
2. ὅρος, συμφόρων, ἀσυμφόρων (frr. 4, 188, which are identical) ἀτερπείη (174) ἀτερπίη (188)
3. See note 1. above.
4. Mesiano, op. cit., 80: Io interpreto e traduco il termine nel senso del indizio o di criterio e credo.

Grenzmarke (K. Büchner, Erasmus, 8 (1955), 615)

mark (Guthrie, History, II 459).

It should be remembered that although the problem of criterion in various fields of thought was apparent in 5th century BC[1], this term as such was not[2] used until Plato's days.[3]

1. Euripides, Herc. Furens, 655-72 ;

Hippol., 925 ff.

In both cases an external sign is sought to indicate the character of a good person.

Protagoras (VS 80 B 1): πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος.

Thucydides, I, 22-23.

RE Suppl. 12 (1970) col. 1238: Was ist historische Wahrheit?

Cf. Herodotus VIII 110 (βάσανος). Thucydides I 20 (βασανίστως). and I. 20-21 (τεκμήριον).

2. When this term is attributed to the Presocratics it seems to be rather an interpolation of later sources. See e.g.

(a) Heracl. A 16 (VS I 148.31) (Sext. VII.134):

τὸν κοινὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀποφαίνεται.

(b) Parmenides A 1 (VS I. 218. 9) (DL IX.22):

κριτήριον δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶπε.

(c) Parmenides B 1 (VS I. 227.38) (Sext. VII. 3):

Π. τοῦ μὲν δοξαστοῦ λόγου κατέγνω...τὸν δ' ἐπιστημονικὸν...ὑπέθετο κριτήριον.

(d) Pythagor. D. 4 (VS I. 469.32) (Stob. IV. 25. 45 H):

τοὺς δὲ πρεσβύτας ἐνθυμήσεσι καὶ κριτηρίοις καὶ συμβουλίαις δεῖν....ὑπελάμβανον....

Notes to p. 225 ctd.

3. Theaet. 178 B: αὐτῶν ἔχων τὸ κριτήριον ἐν ἑαυτῷ;

Earlier in Rep. 582 A: ἔχοι ἄν τις τούτων (sc. αἰσθήσεως, φρονήσεως, λόγου) βέλτιον κριτήριον;

Protagoras' famous formula (VS 80 B 1) ascribed to every man's opinion the criterion of truth; but this solution licenses considerable subjectivism, although it flatters humanism. Plato tried to locate the correct criterion in the judgement of the agathos Statesman, 296Dff.); but this postulates a prior definition of agathos. Finally he accepted God as the only reliable reference for human affairs (Laws, 716 C 4: ὁ δὴ θεὸς πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα...

Aristotle follows his teacher's first view changing only agathos into "phronimos" (Protr. fr. 5a W (B 39 Düring)): ἔτι δὲ τίς ἡμῖν κανὼν ἢ τίς ὅρος ἀκριβέστερος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὁ φρόνιμος;

(See: Kullmann, op. cit., pp. 134-135). Even today this criterion is invoked at law.

Therefore it seems that the only hopeful way to penetrate D.'s thought and decipher his criterion[1] is to begin questioning his terminology in his fragments and secondarily in other contemporaries or later.[2]

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1. Epicurus (DL X. 27, in the list of works of Ep. records): Περὶ Κριτηρίου ἢ Κανών.

2. The authenticity of the frr. 4, 188 was denied by some scholars (Dyroff, Lane; details in Philippson, 385) on the ground that σύμφορος, ἀσύμφορος are post-Aristotlian terms. Disregarding the fact that here evidence from two sources is strong (Stobaeus, Clement of Alexandria, who is particularly emphatic in introducing D.'s aphorism; see VS 68 B 4) we can trace frequent use of these words from the archaic period to Aristotle.

   (a) Hesiod, Works and Days, 300: σύμφορος,
   593: οὐ σύμφορα.

   (b) Sophocles, O. Kol. 464, 592: σύμφορα, οὐ ξύμφορον.

   (c) Thuc. III.47: πολλῷ ξυμφορώτερον.

   (d) Hippocrates, On Anc. Medic. 3.35: συμφέρουσα τροφή,
   On Breaths, 6: ἀσύμφορα.

   (e) Antiphon (VS 87 B 44 A col.4 vers.1-8): ξυμφέροντα.

   (f) Plato, Statesman, 296 E: μὴ σύμφορα.

We have seen (fr. 69)[1] D.'s assertion that good and true are the same for all men. His intention to find an objective criterion can be regarded as certain. He seems to have made many attempts to formulate such a criterion; having arrived at a formula (4, 188) he repeated it with emphasis (which impressed Clement of Alexandria as is seen in his words introducing fr. 4). The reason is obvious: the question is fundamental and D. believed he had found at last the basis he had failed to include in frr. 69, 74.[2] An echo of these two formulas

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1. fr. 69: ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τωὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀληθές. ἡδὺ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἄλλο.

2. fr. 74: ἡδὺ μηδὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἣν μὴ συμφέρῃ.

A passage from Sextus (VS 68 A 111) attributes to D. the following 3 criteria: a. for the apprehension of unseen.... b. for the investigation.... c. for what one may choose or avoid the criterion is one's feelings.... The third one is obviously borne out by fr. 188 (see: Guthrie, Hist., II. 459; Langerbeck, 56). It seems to be the fons of Epicurus' criteria. Cf. Epicurus' fr . 260 (Us. p. 190) and Epist. ad Menoiceum, 129 (Us. 63, Arrighetti, 113).

Cf. also Arist. EN 1157 b 16-17: μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος.

In connection with frr. 69, 74 cf. Diog. of Oinoanda, (Rhein. Mus. XLVII, 431)(Grilli 31 , Chilton 3) : τὸ τῇ φύσει συμφέρον....καὶ ἑνὶ καὶ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.

seems to be present in a passage from D. of Oinoanda (quoted in the previous footnote). Perhaps they were two steps in D.'s attempt to find a criterion. Fr. 188 seems to be the third and very likely the final step in that effort. Let us see them together and try to find (if at all) a guiding idea in them.

69: Good and true are the same for all men; but pleasant differs for different men.

(general assertion but vague).

74: Accept nothing of pleasant things, unless it is beneficial (agrees with your nature).

(acceptability restricted to what is beneficial or agreeable).

188: Criterion of what is beneficial or not (agrees with human nature or not) is the enjoyment or lack of enjoyment that we feel.[1]

(obviously it contains an elucidation of the meaning of "beneficiality" or agreeableness).

The first question raised by scholars is that of the compatibility of the two last fragments (for this part of the discussion I have to use the translation used by other scholars).

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1. fr. 69: ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τωὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀληθές· ἡδὺ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἄλλο.

fr. 74: ἡδέων μηδὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ συμφέρῃ.

fr. 188 (B 4): ὅρος συμφόρων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπίη.

B 4 (188) implies: "Some pleasures are not suitable. But if pleasure is the criterion of suitability how can something be both a pleasure and not suitable?"[1] This difficulty is removed (McGibbon believes, p.76) by interpreting pleasure (B4, 188) as: "the state someone is said to be in when he engages in a pleasurable activity" (p.75). But this illumination is only a circular definition. McGibbon did not notice that an apparent incompatibility comes from an incorrect and unreliable translation.[2]

Vlastos[3] in order to avoid the "vicious circle", as he calls it, suggests that "pleasure" be regarded only as a sign (σῆμα) of suitable action, "the appearance only of what agrees with us".[4] The source of difficulty and misinterpretation is the same: inaccurate translation of the fragments involved.

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1. D. McGibbon, Pleasure as the "criterion" in D. Phronesis, 5 (1960), pp. 75-77.
2. fr. 4 (188): Pleasure and the absence of pleasure is the landmark of what is suitable and of what is not.
   fr. 74: accept no pleasure, unless it is suitable.
3. Vlastos, op. cit. I. 588 ff. McGibbon, 75, footn.2.
4. Ibid. p. 589: "The parallel in the theory of knowledge is: appearances are the sign of things unseen."

This "prima facie" contradiction is to be resolved by regarding each of these fragments as dealing with a different aspect of pleasure.[1]

Fr. 74 is about a particular action or experience...something may obviously be pleasant in itself and yet tend to make one's life as a whole unpleasant,

fr. 188 is concerned with pleasantness or unpleasantness...of one's life considered as a whole (pp. 17-18).

Taylor sees the idea of overall enjoyment in fr. 188. This interpretation suggests an interesting solution but it is only a hypothesis and again fails to give an account of the actual terminology. Taylor concludes (p. 37): "the good for a man is identical with pleasure in the sense of the enjoyment of life." At last we have a distinction between the two words used for pleasure by D.[2]

In our paragraph "on Pleasure" we had concluded: "Τέρψις (188) can be seen to signify the highest level of pleasant life introducing man into the realm of happiness. One can actually trace close connections between these two concepts."[3]

Let us look again at the disputed meaning of the two aphorisms:

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1. C.C.W. Taylor, Pleasure, Knowledge, and Sensation in D. Phronesis 12 (1967) pp. 6-27.
2. ἡδύ (74) τέρψις (188).
3. Kullmann, op. cit. 139: Die Tatsache dass die Terpsis vor allen in den geistigen und sittlichen Bereich weist (146, 174, 194, 200, 201, 211, 232, 233) stellt sie eine Stufe mit der γνώμη γνησίη im Bereich der Erkenntniss.

a. Not all pleasant things are profitable (for human nature) or beneficial; therefore, not all of them are acceptable. But this item of advice remains vague. Many pleasant things seem profitable and attractive at first sight; where has one to stop? D. himself was not satisfied with his formula (fr. 74). He sought a more fundamental criterion. Such a criterion should be derived from his theory of happiness. If happiness (euthumia) is such and such a state of the soul, then the criterion should provide such and such conditions for the soul. So a second formula came as an improvement on fr. 74.

b. Now, he says (188, 4), among pleasant things those which lead to terpsis (intellectual pleasure) or do not push terpsis out fo the soul are beneficial. The criterion for what is beneficial is its contribution to intellectual pleasure or its non-opposition to it. Such a formula seems to be the bridge between profitability and intellectual pleasantness.

Other details in D.'s fragments about the objectivity (applicability) of his criterion cannot be traced. A number of other statements[1] include the nucleus of a criterion, but they rather describe conditions of happiness or they simply express an intellectual orientation.

1. frr. 37, 207, 189, 40, 170, 171, 61. See: J. Ferber, Über die Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der Ethik Demokrits, Zeitschr. für Philosophie, 132/3 (1908) 82-114.
   In p. 92 (commenting on fr. 207) he writes: "Eine Art Kriterium". But: "Was versteht nun D. unter dem Kalon? Die "Hedone".... muss also eine geistige Lust, das "Kalon" etwas Innerliches sein."

So far what we have described as "the criterion" refers to one's own conduct and is expected to influence immediately and mainly one's own happiness and only secondarily one's conduct towards others (it can be seen particularly in fr. 61).[1] From this point of view alone one's criterion of action can affect the well-being of others.

B) A different criterion of what is good in one's activity from the point of view of others is found in fr. 264.[2] D.'s claim that one must bear in mind what others would say about one's actions leads reasonably to the conclusion that one's criterion of action will be orientated to what is profitable to others.

C) A clearer criterion of one's social-political activity is explicitly declared in fr. 252: "One must give the highest importance to affairs of the State, that it may be well run; one must not pursue quarrels contrary to right, nor acquire a power contrary to the common good. The well-run State is the greatest protection, and contains all in itself; when this is safe, all is safe; when this is destroyed, all is destroyed."[3]

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1. fr. 61: οἴεσιν ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν εὔτακτος τούτοισι καὶ ὁ βίος συντέτακται (Stob. III 37.25).

2. fr. 264:... μηδέ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδήσειν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι.

This fr. seems not to be placed correctly among the political views of D. It would be better classified (with 244 and 84) after fr. 181 .

3. Τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν χρεὼν τῶν λοιπῶν μέγιστα ἡγεῖσθαι, ὅκως ἄξεται εὖ, μήτε φιλονεικέοντα παρὰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς μήτε ἰσχὺν ἑαυτῷ περιτιθέμενον παρὰ τὸ χρηστὸν τὸ τοῦ ξυνοῦ. πόλις γὰρ εὖ ἀγομένη μεγίστη ὄρθωσίς ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πάντα ἔνι, καὶ τούτου σῳζομένου πάντα σῴζεται καὶ τούτου διαφθειρομένου τὰ πάντα διαφθείρεται.

Here the criterion emerges clear; and is also given its justification.[1]

If one compares these last two frr. to those referring to justice (256, 261, 174 ad finem) one will reasonably infer that D.'s criterion for one's activity towards one's social and political companions can be summarised as: "do what is worthy of praise from others either as members of a society or citizens of a state (have this criterion: what is proper and just from the viewpoint of others).

D) His first criterion is postulated from his orientation towards happiness.

His second and third are stated as duties.[2]

The first criterion is eudaimonistic (intellectual eudaemonism) and egoistic; the second and third are altruistic. They are not incompatible, since they cover different fields of activity.

No question of conflict between these criteria is raised in the material we possess; but from the insistence with which D. describes justice as a duty (261) and as a necessary condition of happiness (174) one must argue that the first criterion is subordinate to the second.

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1. It is not strange that D.'s argument here is similar to that of Thucydides in II.60.2-3. The latter states (or records) the ideal of a great statesman, when the city-state was declingin; the former shares this ideal. Some kind of acquaintance between them cannot be denied.

   Cf. Anon. Iamblichi, 7. p. 101, VS II. 403, 15-19).

   Cf. Sophocles, Antigone, 189-190.

Note 1. to 233 ctd.

(Creon is speaking):

ἥδ' ἔστιν (sc. ἡ πόλις) (καὶ ταύτης ἔπι ἡ σώζουσα
πλέοντες ὀρθῆς τοὺς φίλους ποιούμεθα.

2. See paragraph On Duty, where these fragments (174, 261, 252) are discussed.

15. Moral autonomy, individual responsibility and the foundation of character.

In this paragraph no new material is to be presented; some aphorisms analysed in previous pages (on Duty, on Virtue, on Freewill) will be looked at from another aspect and put together so that from these "membra disjecta" we find the material to reconstruct an agent, a moral agent as his figure emerges from the ruins of D.'s ethical theory.

If moral autonomy is defined as subjection of the will to its own law (fr. 264) which presupposes a degree of self-determination and independence of external restraints, then autonomy is clearly traced and asserted in the fragments we have already studied (on Freewill).[1]

This autonomy, to be sure, is not unlimited; it is restricted within the limits of our natural existence, which in turn prescribes the framework of our freedom. Knowledge of natural capacity or incapacity frees from unprofitable expectations and protects from frustration (cf. fr. 285).

If responsibility[2] presupposes voluntary action and voluntary

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1. P. Natorp, op. cit., p. 110: ...so klar Ausdruck der "Autonomie" des Sittlichen...
   Schmid-Stählin, op. cit., p. 312: In keiner anderen Ethik ist die menschliche...Autonomie so stark betont wie in der demokritischen (cf. frr. 84, 244, 171).
2. Schumacher, op.cit., p.17: Demokrits Ethik setzt also ein hohes Mass von Sittlichen Verantwortungs+bewusstsein voraus.

action means: (1) the cause of an action is internal to the agent and (2) the action is not the result of ignorance (as Aristotle later analysed it),[1] then a strong feeling of responsibility emerges[2] from the fragments under study. Such responsibility postulates, of course, moral autonomy.

Both these assertions (which actually are two sides of the same coin) are compatible with a "soft determinism",[3] a doctrine which might be ascribed to D. on the ground of the evidence we possess of his system (Ethics, Physics).

If will[4] designates a sequence of mental acts eventuating in decision or choice, and if an act of will is analysable into: (1) envisaging of alternative courses, (2) deliberation[5] with reference

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1. Aristotle, EN 1110a ff., particularly, 1111a 23-24: τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις.
   See: Frankena, op. cit., p. 56.
2. Frr. 43, 174 (ad fin.), 181 would not be intelligible unless their author was a believer in the (principle) doctrine of moral autonomy and its consequence: responsibility.
3. Frankena, op. cit., 61: "a determinist may allow that we are normally free to do as we choose and act in accordance with our own beliefs, desires, character."
4. See frr.: 62 (Stob. III 9.29), 68, 89, 96, 173 (ad fin.), 248.
5. Fr. 66: Κρεῖττον προβουλεύεσθαι πρὸ τῶν πράξεων ἢ μετανοεῖν. Cf. frr. 43, 174 (ad fin.).

to the dominant ideals of the moral agent, (3) decision or choice[1] consisting of giving assent to one of the alternatives and the rejection of the rest, then will is the dominant feature (or at least a companion factor, knowledge being the other)[2] of D.'s moral agent[3] to whom freedom of will is explicitly attributed (as was shown in a previous paragraph).

The portrait of this moral agent might be presented as follows:

1. He is gifted by his nature with capacity which can be advanced by experience (fr. 172), exercise (242), instructions and persuasion (181, 248), generally by a well-designed education (179, 33).

2. Through the labour of learning (including allforms of education, fr. 179) an important psychological quality is expected to waken (or to come into existence), which in due course will affect the agent's

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1. Fr. 96: χαριστικὸς οὐχ ὁ βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ἀλλ' ὁ εὖ δρᾶν προῃρημένος.

   Cf. in frr. 181 and 248 the conception of persuasion which leads to a status of freely and continuously "making decisions".

2. See paragraph on "the meaning of fr. 83".

3. I. Lana, L'etica di Democrito, Riv. di filosofia, 42 (1951), p. 27: Democrito non ignora quale importante fattore sia la volontá dell' uomo....

virtuous behaviour; it is the so-called aidōs (self-respect)[1] which makes the moral agent able to judge his intentions, deliberations, decisions as if other people were present (244, 264, 84).

3. This self-respect leads to understanding of the moral agent's "duty"[2] towards himself and others.

4. "Duty" is expressed in a number of virtues which concern and affect both the agent (happiness) and others (justice). Fulfilling "duty" and actualising a virtuous life lead to personal happiness and good relations with others. This last consequence makes possible social and political life (on which see next chapter).

5. This moral agent personifies an ethic of intention (62, 68, 89, 96, 173) but also he is looking for the consequences of his actions (55, 71, 235, 190, 252, 248, 255, 265, 272).

6. He is expected to be sincere in his intentions and relations (91, 174, 181, 264); his motives[3] correspond to both the pursuit of happiness (egoism) and the "duty" to be just (altruism).[4] Such motives are combined harmoniously (174); our "moral agent" is "unus homo qui plures personas habere non potest".

7. With these qualities he is capable of rights and liabilities in the frame of society and state.

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1. Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos, p. 202: Sich vor sich selbst schämen. Damit ist die sittliche Autonomie des Menschen erreicht.
2. See paragr.: on Duty.
3. See paragr.: on Moral Motives (ch. 4).
4. See paragr.: Egoism or Altruism.

CHAPTER THREE

Social and Political life

Frequently in the history of Ethics this field of thought is connected with social considerations and political generalisations. In Greek Philosophy it is the rule. D. is not different from other Greek philosophers in this respect.

In the following pages the problem of Social and Political life and Education will be discussed under the following heads:

Part one: Social life:

1. The Philosopher and the family.
2. The position of women.
3. Friendship
4. Other social relations.
5. Slavery.
6. Eros.

Part two: Political life:

1. Homonoia
2. Constitutional form
3. Law
4. Participation
5. Justice
6. Defence of the State.
7. Duties-Rights. Summum Bonum in political life: Freedom in Democracy.
8. Who is to rule?
9. The philosopher and the State.

Part three: Preparation of the coming generations:

1. Education.
2. What is Education as a function?

Part one: Social life.

1. The Philosopher and the Family.

D.'s attitude to the problem of marriage, of children and their upbringing seems to be unexpected and in some ways astonishing.

A number of fragments, surviving in Stobaeus' Florilegium, and some testimony from other sources confirm that he disapproved of having children because of the difficulties in their rearing and the uncertainty about their future character and behaviour; he recognised nevertheless that it is necessary and unavoidable to get married and give birth to children. It is difficult to explain with certainty his position and his motives, since we lack evidence about his private life and the general conditions of his life (perhaps an unsuccessful marriage, either his own or his brother's, or an unhappy love acquaintance may have influenced his attitude).

Let us look first at the evidence. **Clement** of Alexandreia says: "D. disapproves of marriage and having children because of the many disappointments coming from them and the distractions from other more necessary engagements".[1] He adds: "Epicurusagrees with him."[2]

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1. Strom. II 138 (VS 68 A 170): Δ. δὲ γάμον καὶ παιδοποιΐαν παραιτεῖται διὰ τὰς πολλὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀηδίας τε καὶ ἀφολκὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων. συγκατατάττεται δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος.
2. Cf. DL X.119 (Arrighetti p. 27): καὶ μηδὲ γαμήσειν μηδὲ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν. (Cf. Usener, fr. 526, p.319)

In connection with this information strong disapproval and criticism is found in another source: "We strongly blame D. and Epicurus who recommend people neither to get married nor to have children."[1]

D.'s own thought is more definite about his own position: a. "I don't think it is correct for one to have children; because in having children I see both great risks and many griefs; on the contrary, the blessings are rare and, if at all, they are weak and poor (feeble)."[2] This view is correctly criticised[3] on the ground that if accepted as a rule it is against nature and the interests of society and state.

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1. Theodoretus XII.74 p. 317 Räder (Luria, Democritea, p. 155, no. 723, second part): Δημοκρίτῳ δὲ καὶ Ἐπικούρῳ λίαν μεμφόμεθα, παραιτεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν γάμον καὶ τὴν παιδογονίαν κελεύουσι.... (Cf. Us. fr. 526)
2. Fr. 276: οὐ δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι παῖδας κτᾶσθαι· ἑνορῶ γὰρ ἐν παίδων κτήσει πολλοὺς μὲν καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους, πολλὰς δὲ λύπας, ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ εὐθηλέοντα καὶ ταῦτα λεπτά τε καὶ ἀσθενέα.
3. Bailey, op. cit. 206. Schmid-Stählin, op. cit., p. 301: Wie unpolitisch das gedacht ist zeigt die entgegengesetzte Ansicht des Perikles (Thuk. II. 44.3), dass der Staat um nicht zu veröden und um gesichert zu sein, Nachwuchs braucht, in dem die Eltern der gefallenen....

b. D. goes on to explain his attitude: "The rearing of children is full of pitfalls. Success is attended by strife and care, failure means grief beyond all others."[1] It doesn't mean a general antipathy towards childhood, but expresses only a personal disinclination for the experience itself. Of course, this apology is not enough to disperse the impression from the previous quotation.[2]

The truth is that D.'s voice is not unique in expressing such scepticism about the rearing of children; he shares the attitude of another thinker of the fifth century BC.[3] Perhaps it was a symptom

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1. Fr. 275: τεκνοτροφίη σφαλερόν· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτυχίην ἀγῶνος μεστὴν καὶ φροντίδος κέκτηται, τὴν δὲ ἀποτυχίην ἀνυπέρθετον ἑτέρῃ ὀδύνῃ.

2. Bailey, 206: one remarkable utterance....adding the cynical reason that.... (fr. 277 follows).

3. Euripides, Medea (presented 431 BC (?); see RE Suppl. 11 (1968) col. 659): 1090-1115, particularly 1113-5:

ἔτι δ' ἐκ τούτων εἴτ' ἐπὶ φλαύροις
εἴτ' ἐπὶ χρηστοῖς
μοχθοῦσι (sc. parents), τόδ' ἐστὶν ἄδηλον.

From the woman's viewpoint Medea says (290f.):
"Fighting in the battlefield is by far preferable to once bearing children."

Cf. Antiphon B 49: αὕτη ἡ ἡμέρα, αὕτη δὲ νὺξ καινοῦ δαίμονος ἄρχει, καινοῦ πότμου· μέγας γὰρ ἀγὼν ὁ γάμος ἀνδρώπῳ.

of "taedium vitae" for the society in which Euripides lived. And, anyway, it was followed by the **Cynics** from the fourth century onward. Perhaps the phenomenon was felt even (already) in the prosperous society of prewar Athens (before 431 BC) or just after the outbreak of war, if Pericles' words (Thuc. II.44.3)[1] are explained as encouragement (from the aspect of the State) to have children.

From another point of view D.'s attitude seems excusable, if not completely justifiable, as an exception and privilege for a wise man.[2]

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1. Thuc. II.44.3: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἴσον τι ἢ δίκαιον βουλεύεσθαι οἳ ἂν μὴ καὶ παῖδας ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου παραβαλλόμενοι κινδυνεύωσιν.

   Cf. Clement of Alex., Strom. II p. 190 (ed. Stählin): Γαμητέον οὖν πάντως καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων διαδοχῆς καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ὅσον ἐφ' ἡμῖν συντελειώσεως....

2. Kirk-Raven, Presocratics, 426: it is an amusing example of philosophical rationalism, which in a Mediterranean way rejects as secondary the emotional and psychological overtones which some would consider of first importance.

   Cf. St. Paul's, Corinthians, A 7.38: so then he that giveth his daughter in marriage doeth well; but he that giveth her not doeth better.

   Plato provided (Rep. 460 D) a relief from the burden of rearing the children: ἀγρυπνίας καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόνον τίτθαις καὶ τροφοῖς παραδώσουσιν.

That this is only a personal attitude without more implications becomes clear both from the reasons supplied for an adoption (fr. 277) and from the recognition of (the naturality and physicality) of marriage with all its consequences in the following passages.

c. Fr. 277: "Whoever wants to have children should, in my opinion, choose them from the family of one of his friends. He will thus obtain a child such as he wishes, for he can select the kind he wants. And the one that seems fittest will be most likely to follow on his natural endowment. The difference is that in the latter way one can take one child out of many who is according to one's liking; but if one begets a child of one's own, the risks are many, for one is bound to accept him as he is."[1]

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1. fr. 277: ὅτεῳ χρήμη τεά ἐστι παῖδα ποιήσασθαι, ἐκ τῶν φίλων τεύ μοι δοκεῖ ἄμεινον εἶναι. καὶ τῷ μὲν παῖς ἔσται τοιοῦτος οἷον ἂν βούληται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκλέξασθαι οἷον ἐθέλει· καὶ ὅς ἂν δοκῇ ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι, κἂν μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν ἔποιτο. καὶ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅσον ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἔστι τὸν παῖδα λαβεῖν καταθύμιον ἐκ πολλῶν, οἷον ἂν δέῃ. ἢν δέ τις ποιῆται ἀπὸ ἑωυτοῦ, πολλοὶ ἔνεισι κίνδυνοι· ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὃς ἂν γένηται, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι.

d. Just after that we find a generalisation of the problem; here again the physicist appears and speaks the language of an objective observer: "For human beings it is one of the necessities of life to have children, arising from nature and primeval law. It is obvious in the other animals too: they all have offspring by nature, and not for the sake of any profit. And when they are born, the parents work and rear each as best they can and are anxious for them while they are small, and if anything happens to them, the parents are grieved. But for man it has now become an established belief that there should be also some advantage from the offspring."[1]

The main points of his argument are: (I) having children fulfils a natural (instinctive) necessity, which therefore is respectable and acceptable, (II) man in this point shares a general biological characteristic, although it entails cares, pains, and fears.

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fr. 278: ἀνθρώποισι τῶν ἀναγκαίων δοκεῖ εἶναι παῖδας κτήσασθαι ἀπὸ φύσιος καὶ καταστάσιός τινος ἀρχαίης. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοισι· πάντα γὰρ ἔκγονα κτᾶται κατὰ φύσιν ἐπωφελείης γε οὐδεμιᾶς εἵνεκα· ἀλλ' ὅταν γένηται, ταλαιπωρεῖ καὶ τρέφει ἕκαστον ὡς δύναται καὶ ὑπερδέδοικε, μέχρι σμικρὰ ᾖ, καὶ ἤν τι πάθῃ, ἀνιᾶται. ἡ μὲν φύσις τοιαύτη πάντων ἐστὶν ὅσσα ψυχὴν ἔχει· τῷ δὲ δὴ ἀνθρώπῳ νομίζον ἤδη πεποίηται, ὥστε καὶ ἐπαύρεσίν τινα γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκγόνου.

There can remain little doubt that D.'s attitude to the problem under discussion was positive rather than negative; his general sympathy for childhood is clearly known from: (i) the fact that he faced seriously the problem of education (which is dealt with in one of the last paragraphs of this study) and (ii) the warm recommendation he addressed to parents on behalf of their children's education. He says: "It is possible without spending much of one's money to educate one's children, and (so) to build round their property and their persons a fortification and safeguard."[1]

To close this page on family relations one may quote an aphorism of D. on finding (and choosing) a good son-in-law for one's daughter: "The man who is fortunate in finding a (good) son-in-law gains a son; the man unfortunate in his finding loses his daughter too."[2]

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1. fr. 280: ἔξεστιν οὐ πολλὰ τῶν σφετέρων ἀναλώσαντας παιδεῦσαί τε τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τεῖχός τε καὶ σωτηρίην περιβαλέσθαι τοῖς τε χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν.

   Cf. fr. 180.

   Bailey (op. cit., p. 206) commenting on fr. 280 writes: his cynicism seems to break down....still an egoistic motive, but with a touch of humanity.

2. fr. 272: γαμβροῦ ὁ μὲν ἐπιτυχὼν εὗρεν υἱόν, ὁ δὲ ἀποτυχὼν ἀπώλεσε καὶ θυγατέρα.

2. The Position of Women.

Closely connected with family problems is D.'s view about women and their position in society. First of all he defends the thesis of female inferiority. Woman in her inferior position is recognised only to be ruled; never to rule or even to have any influence in her household, because it would be a disgrace for her husband. We read in fr. 111: "To be ruled by a woman would be the ultimate outrage for a man."[1]

With a conspicuously contemptuous expression D. refers to those men (obviously politicians) who "are masters of cities, but are enslaved to women."[2]

A woman (according to the etymology of the Greek word, given in fr. 122a[3]) is only the instrument through which nature provides for the continuation of the species.

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1. fr. 111 (Stob. IV 23.39): ὑπὸ γυναικὸς ἄρχεσθαι ὕβρις ἂν εἴη ἀνδρὶ ἐσχάτη.
2. fr. 214:... ἔνιοι πολίων μὲν δεσπόζουσι γυναιξὶ δὲ δουλεύουσιν. Two things must be noted here: (1) the characteristic term used here for this class of men (δουλεύουσιν = they do the work of slaves), (2) the fact that their slavery is (opposed) contrasted to the meaning of true courage, which is defined in the first half of the same fragment.
3. fr. 122a: γυνή .... γονή τις οὖσα, ἡ γονῆς δεκτική.

On the other hand women are condemned for their malign thoughts;[1] the conclusion emerges self-evidently that women must not be given lessons in rhetoric, since then they become much more terrible.[2]

The following advice to women follows naturally: "Lack of garrulity is the adornment for women". And as a play of words is added another piece of advice: "Paucity of adornment is also beautiful."[3]

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1. fr. 273: γυνὴ πολλὰ ἀνδρὸς ὀξυτέρη πρὸς κακοφραδμοσύνην.
On this point of antifeminism D. shares the views of a more famous antifeminist of the fifth century, who declared his attitude (or psychological explorations) through the lips of one of his characters. See: Euripides, Medea, 263-66, or 407-9: γυναῖκες...κακῶν δὲ πάντων τέκτονες σοφώταται...

2. fr. 110: γυνὴ μὴ ἀσκείτω λόγον· δεινὸν γάρ.
Compare Plato's opinion (Rep. 452A): εἰ ἄρα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χρηστέα καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ταὐτὰ καὶ διδακτέον αὐτάς.

3. fr. 274: κόσμος ὀλιγομυθίη γυναικί· καλὸν δὲ καὶ κόσμου λιτότης.
Bailey (op. cit. 206) translates: "few words are women's adornment; and simplicity in adornment is good too." And he adds: "a Periclean sentiment with an added sly touch of humour." I suppose he refers either to Thucyd. II.45.2 or II 40.1 or both.

3. Friendship

Human feelings towards suffering companions are well expressed in two aphorisms (107a, 293)[1] which recall Isocratean advice. We read "It is proper, since we are human beings, not to laugh at the misfortunes of others, but to mourn." It is only an impersonal expression of sympathy and pity or a meditation on the changeability of human (affairs) fortunes; it is not friendship. This same basic idea is found in the **other** aphorism (293) accompanied by an interesting psychological remark: "Those to whom their neighbours' misfortunes give pleasure do not understand that the blows of fate are common to all; and also they lack cause for personal joy."

Friendship is defined briefly, accurately and clearly in this: "Likemindedness makes friendship."[2] No more no less. Perhaps it is an egoistic view[3] or anyway non-altruistic; but in its mutuality

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1. fr. 107a: ἄξιον ἀνθρώπους ὄντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων συμφοραῖς μὴ γελᾶν ἀλλ'ὀλοφύρεσθαι.
   fr. 293: οἷσιν ἡδονὴν ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν πέλας ξυμφοραί, οὐ ξυνιᾶσι μὲν ὡς τὰ τῆς τύχης κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ἀπορέουσι δὲ οἰκηίης χαρᾶς.

2. fr. 186: ὁμοφροσύνη φιλίην ποιεῖ.

3. Bailey, 208: "D.'s conception of friendship has no doubt a selfish basis." But such a verdict seems hardly compatible with frr. like 92, 94, 96. On the other hand friendship is based on mutual contentment (186).

it is just and gives the only objective foundation for this kind of relation. In the final analysis friendship is neither love (eros) nor sympathy nor charity.[1]

Kinship is, to be sure, a source of affection (and any quarrel among kinsmen is sorrowful),[2] but it does not give the foundation for friendship, since: "not all one's relatives are friends, but only those who agree about what is beneficial in human life."[3]

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1. Aristotle distinguishes the varieties of friendship as based on: shared pleasure, mutual usefulness, common virtue. Cf. A.McIntyre, op. cit. pp. 79-80. See: Aristotle EN 1155 b 34, 1156 b 7, 1156 b 20, where the reciprocity of the relation of friendship and the similarity of character of friends is emphasised.
   Cf. Plato, Laws 837 A: φίλον μέν που καλοῦμεν ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἴσον ἴσῳ ....
2. fr. 90: ἡ τῶν συγγενῶν ἔχθρη τῆς τῶν ὀθνείων χαλεπωτέρη μάλα.
3. fr. 107: φίλοι οὐ πάντες οἱ ξυγγενέες, ἀλλ' οἱ ξυμφωνέοντες περὶ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος.
   The last term must not be understood in a utilitarian sense; it must be explained in accordance with fr. 74: what is beneficial in human life, therefore acceptable. See paragraph "on the criterion".

The conditions of friendship are simple but difficult and therefore not frequent; they are described equivocally again: "censorious men are not well fitted for friendship"[1] and even if they acquire friends, they cannot keep them, since "their temperament is unsuitable".[2]

Sincerity between friends is quite essential; it originates in reverence for truth and leads to mutual respect; there is no room for flattery or adulation.[3]

The criterion of friendship (as it was for virtue generally) is action, not words.[4]

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1. fr. 109: οἱ φιλομεμφέες ἐς φιλίην οὐκ εὐφυέες.
   A much more difficult and formative task is one of blaming oneself for one's own faults; that is true courage and even self-perfection. See fr. 60 (Stob. III 13.46). Perhaps of Pythagorean origin or Socratic influence.
2. fr. 100: ὅτεῳ μὴ διαμένουσιν ἐπὶ πολλὸν οἱ πειραθέντες φίλοι δύστροπος.
3. fr. 63 (Stob. III.14.8): εὐλογέειν ἐπὶ καλοῖς ἔργμασι καλόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ φλαύροισι κιβδήλου καὶ ἀπατεῶνος.
   fr. 192: ἔστι ῥᾴδιον μὲν ἐπαινεῖν ἃ μὴ χρὴ καὶ ψέγειν, ἑκάτερον δὲ πονηροῦ τινος ἤθους.

   Cf. fr. 115.
4. fr. 53a (Stob. II 15.33): πολλοὶ δρῶντες τὰ αἴσχιστα λόγους ἀρίστους ἀσκέουσιν.

A number of other aphorisms refer to the usual tempations which betray a variety of intentions which are like friendship but not genuine. These sayings seem to continue the gnomological tradition rather than to originate in a philosophical inquiry. It would not be right to classify them under the head "banal", but, on the other hand, they do not have either the thoroughgoing character we have seen in other fragments of D. or a detailed description (analysis); and, of course, they[1] cannot be compared with Plato's or Aristotle's scrutiny of the problem of friendship.[2]

We read e.g. that men who are not able to feel friendship are also unworthy to be treated as friends.[3] Elsewhere one learns that[4] when in good fortune one sees crowds of friends around him, but when one meets misfortunes one cannot find even one friend; it is the most difficult of all problems in life. Even men who were friends are

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1. It should be noted that these fragments come from Democrates' collection (103, 106, 101, 97, 98).
2. Plato's Lysis, Laws 837 Aff., Aristotle's EN books VIII.IX.
3. fr. 103: οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς φιλέεσθαι δοκέει μοι ὁ φιλέων μηδένα.
4. fr. 106: ἐν εὐτυχίῃ φίλον εὑρεῖν εὔπορον, ἐν δὲ δυστυχίῃ πάντων ἀπορώτατον. In this saying an "antithesis" appears which can be parallelled to Thucydides' style (II 40.1): καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινι αἰσχρόν, μὴ φεύγειν δ' ἔργῳ αἴσχιον.

ready to flee when a friend is in misfortune[1]. So are betrayed and separated true friends and seeming friends[2]. With these remarks in mind one may appreciate the friendship of a "synetos" who is expected to be more worthy than crowds of "asynetoi".[3]

Perhaps all these fragments echo a bitter personal experience of D. It is not unreasonable to suppose that he did not make friends easily; not because of bad character, but because it was difficult to find companions of similar interests and attitudes.[4] It seems that the privilege of wise men is to be admired, but not easily to be friends. It is possibly the reward of their greatness; they cannot bear much of the trivialities which preoccupy the life of common men and

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1. fr. 101: ἐντρέπονται πολλοὶ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπὴν ἐξ εὐπορίης εἰς πενίην μεταπέσωσιν.
2. fr. 97: πολλοὶ δοκέοντες εἶναι φίλοι οὐκ εἰσί, καὶ οὐ δοκέοντες εἰσίν.
3. fr. 98: ἑνὸς φιλίη ξυνετοῦ κρέσσων ἀξυνέτων πάντων.
   See paragraph: Tree of virtues: synesis.
   Cf. Heraclitus B 49
4. See fr. 186 by which the first (and main) condition of friendship is defined. Cf. fr. 118 (for D.'s main interest).

they are also frequently misunderstood.[1] So people around them seem to be critical and unbearable companions.

In accordance with principles explained in the introduction of this study and followed throughout, it should be remembered that this group of aphorisms[2] belong to the so-called collection of Democrates (with only one exception, fr. 186); their content is not incompatible with what we have explained as D.'s ethical thought; but also it is not of the same importance. There is no convincing reason either to deny their authenticity or to defend it, except for fr. 107,

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1. The tradition of the "laughing" philosopher makes this hypothesis possible. To laugh at the stupidity of others is not a condition helpful for making friends. See e.g.

   a. Seneca, de ira, II. 10.5:....Democritum...aiunt numquam sine risu in publico fuisse; adeo nihil illi videbatur serium eorum, quae serio gerebantur (VS 68 A 21).

   b. Juvenal, 10.51:

   Ridebat curas, nec non et gaudia vulgi,
   interdum et lacrimas, cum fortunae ipse minaci
   mandaret laqueum mediumque ostenderet unquam.
   (VS 68 A 21).

   For more testimony and further references see:

   Luria, Democritea, pp. 21-22: Fabula de philosopho ridente.

2. frr. 103, 106, 101, 97, 98. See: Cora E. Lutz, D. and Heraclitus (Class. Journal, 49 (1953-4) pp. 309-314.

for which we find two points of correspondence: (1) its content accords with fr. 186 (from Stobaeus' collection) and (a) its last term brings it nearer to fr. 74 or 188 (4).[1]

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1. S. Luria, following his principle stated in the preface of his book on Democritus (Democritea, Leningrad, 1970) that "whenever by name attributed to D. a passage should be accepted as such, i.e. genuine", quotes (in pp. 150-152) a number of passages from Antonios Melissa (Patrologia Graeca, Vols. 91, 136). Namely:

   a. Luria, op. cit. p. 151, no. 666 (Ant. Melissa I. 25 p. 27 PG 136 p. 853 B): τὸ μὲν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τοῖς φίλοις ἀπορίας, τὸ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθαι κακίας τεκμήριον.

   b. Luria, p. 150, no. 658 (Ant. Melissa I. 24 p. 46 PG 136 p.849 D): τὸν σπουδαῖον φίλον πρὸς μὲν τὰς εὐφροσύνας κληθέντα δεῖ παρεῖναι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς περιστάσεις αὐτόκλητον δεῖ συμπαρεῖναι.

   c. Luria p. 150, no. 659 (Ant. Melissa I. 24 p. 46): οἱ ἀληθινοὶ φίλοι καὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας ἡδίονας καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς ἐλαφροτέρας ποιοῦσιν, τῶν μὲν συναπολαύοντες, τῶν δὲ μεταλαμβάνοντες.

   He alsoincludes in the list of genuine frr. a number of passages characterised "Unechte" by Diels-Kranz (VS 68 B 302):

Note 1. to page 254 ctd.

a. VS 68 B 302 (II 222, 15 no. 174)

b. (II 222, 22 no. 181)

c. (II 222, 30 no. 189)

d. (II 222, 33 no. 192)

These passages (1) on the ground of their content might belong to D., but (2) in their wording and structure they vividly recall Isocratean style (and are collectively attributed to D., Epictetus, Isocrates, see VS II. 222, 10) with clear Gorgian influence.

4. Other social relations

Friendship is not the only relation to other people; there are others equally frequent and no less important. First of all one has either to help or be helped; an attitude of sincerity and generosity is demanded and described in the following aphorisms.

One must be careful e.g. in one's conduct so as to give one's neigbours a sense of trust and respect: "do not be suspicious towards all, but careful and firm."[1] To overcome suspicion is a necessary condition for social relations, because suspicion either makes one's life difficult or makes it impossible to be asked by one's neighbours for help; or it has both these negative results.

"The generous man is he who does not look for a return, but who does good from choice".[2] A favour, even a small one, is of importance, according to the difficulty in which the receiver was, if given at the time of emergency.[3] To accept a favour is recommended, if it is necessary, but with the intention to return it with much more generosity.[4] Once more the emphasis on intention is noteworthy.

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1. fr. 91: μὴ ὕποπτος πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἀλλ' εὐλαβὴς γίνου καὶ ἀσφαλής.
2. fr. 96: χαριστικὸς οὐχ ὁ βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ἀλλ' ὁ εὖ δρᾶν προῃρημένος.

   The emphasis given to the intention is characteristic.
3. fr. 94: μικραὶ χάριτες ἐν καιρῷ μέγισται τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν.
4. fr. 92: χάριτας δέχεσθαι χρεὼν προσκοπευόμενον κρέσσονας αὐτῶν τιμὰς ἀποδοῦναι.

The motive can hardly be selfish.[1] On the other hand one is discouraged from doing favours without seeing the character of the recipient: "when you do a favour, study the recipient in advance, lest he prove false and repay evil for good."[2]

In the social environment the pursuit of honours is recognised; but not all honours are to be accepted. Worthy to be pursued are only honours from people of high reputation.[3] A more interesting aspect about recognition and attribution of honours to the citizens according to their virtue (or ability) perhaps was expressed in fr. 263, but we cannot be sure about its meaning.[4]

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1. Bailey, op. cit., 208: "D.'s conception of friendship has no doubt a selfish basis." Such a verdict seems hardly compatible with frr. like 92, 94, 96. In the final analysis friend[ship] - the distinction should be remembered - is neither love nor charity: it is a contentment (fr. 186).
2. fr. 98: χαριζόμενος προσκέπτεο τὸν λαμβάνοντα, μὴ κακὸν ἀντ' ἀγαθοῦ κίβδηλος ἐὼν ἀποδῷ.
3. fr. 95: τιμαὶ παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονέουσι μέγα δύνανται, οἱ ξυνιᾶσι τιμώμενοι. Cf. Aristotle, EN 1095 b 26: ἔτι δ' ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι....
4. At the same time we fail to find a bridge of connection between the aphorisms under discussion (91-96), surviving in Democrates' collection only, and those we possess from Stobaeus' Florilegium.

Quarrels are of course disapproved of; fr. 237 gives the explanation: "all contentions are foolish; for in studying the disadvantage of one's enemy, one loses sight of one's own advantage."[1] The following passage sounds a warning for those who dispute with people in power: "The man who strives against the stronger (the man in power?) ends in disgrace."[2]

Jealousy and envy are condemned without any hesitation; and this is done in a psychological way which finds its justification in itself. These unapproved feelings are explained as a kind of self-punishment in fr. 88: "the envious man torments himself like an enemy".[3] Envy directed towards others actually returns to the sender who thus spoils his own serenity.

If one is to recognise one's enemies one has to look not at their actions, but at their intentions; for intention is the true criterion. Fr. 89 appears as a definition of enmity: "an enemy is not he who injures, but he who wishes to do so."[4]

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1. fr. 237: φιλονικίη πᾶσα ἀνόητος· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ δυσμενέος βλαβερὸν θεωρεῦσα τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον οὐ βλέπει.

2. fr. 238: τελευτᾷ γὰρ ἐς κακοδοξίην [κακὴν] ὁ παρεκτεινόμενος τῷ κρέσσονι.

3. fr. 88: ὁ φθονέων ἑωυτὸν ὡς ἐχθρὸν λυπέει. (Stob. III 38.47).

4. fr. 89: ἐχθρὸς οὐχ ὁ ἀδικέων. ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος.

Cf. Eric Wolf, op. cit., II. 345: Soviel stärker erschien ihm und soviel höher wertete er die Gesinnung als die Tat, dass er den Anspruch gewagt hat: Unrechte Gesinnung sei gewährlicher wie unrechtes tun.

A quarrel between relatives is characterised as the worst of all forms of conflict; no reason is necessary to justify this classification.[1]

5. Slavery

One might perhaps expect a thinker who made so much effort to explore nature and human conduct, who wrote about self-respect (179, 264) and the power of persuasion (181), who recognised responsibility and spoke so warmly on political liberty (251), to say something in favour of slaves[2] who constituted in some Greek societies of his days an important percentage of the whole population. Such expectation would be more justified if one remembers that Euripides speaks with sympathy for slaves or creates sympathetic characters of slaves[3] or goes further in claiming that a slave may be (as a person) equal or even superior to his master.[4]

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1. fr. 90: ἡ τῶν συγγενῶν ἔχθρα τῆς τῶν ἀθνείων χαλεπωτέρα μάλα.
2. E. Barker, Greek Political Theory, London[15] (1970) [1918] pp. 32-37. Guthrie, History III (Sophists) pp. 155-160.
3. Alcestis 192 ff., Ion 854-6, 725-34, Helen 730.
4. fr. 511, 831; Ion, 854-6:

ἔν γάρ τοι τοῖς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει,
τοὔνομα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων
οὐδὲν κακίων δοῦλος, ὅστις ἐσθλὸς ᾖ.

But the fact is that "for most Greeks society without slavery was unthinkable"[1] at least during the fifth century. All criticism of this institution belongs (to our knowledge) to later times. It began perhaps with the last Sophists.[2]

The conditions of life, the dependence of private and public finance on slave labour made impossible any thought in favour of that class of men until Christianity came to equate them (with free men) at least as children of the same god. Even Aristotle two generations after D.'s death maintains the idea of slavery as natural.[3] There were many cases of favour towards a slave, but they had a personal character, not an ideological feature.

In the surviving frr. of D. 3 times we trace a reference direct or indirect to slavery or slaves.

a. Slavery metaphorically taken is the condition of a man defeated by his base desires.[4]

b. Slavery is as undesirable a (condition) position as freedom is the most desirable even if accompanied by poverty.[5] From these

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1. Guthrie, op. cit., 155.
2. Barker, 86 ff. (General Iconoclasm) ; Guthrie, 157; Untersteiner, Sophists, 341 (Alcidamas).
3. Aristotle, Politics, 1252a 30 ff.
4. fr. 214: ...ἔνιοι δὲ πολίων μὲν δεσπόζουσι, γυναιξὶν δὲ δουλεύουσιν.
5. fr. 251: ἡ ἐν δημοκρατίῃ πενίη τῆς παρὰ τοῖς δυνάστῃσι καλεομένης εὐδαιμονίης τοσοῦτόν ἐστι αἱρετωτέρη, ὅκόσον ἐλευθερίη δουλείης.

references one cannot, to be sure, infer that D. accepted the institution of slavery. But the following one is clear.

c. "Use slaves as parts of the body; each to his own function."[1] This passage betrays not only D.'s ideas on the question, but also the general position of slavery in the social structure of that age and the thought of Greek society.

6. Eros.

It is curious that in two very different contexts we find this concept. Perhaps it should be placed in the paragraph "on Pleasure" or "conditions of Pleasure"; but in both aphorisms to be discussed it refers to relations with others.

Fr. 271 says: "A woman who is loved may indulge desire without blame" (trans. by Guthrie, History II, 491, who in footn. 3 goes on more literally:) or purges the blame attached to sexual desire."[2]

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1. fr. 270: οἰκέταισιν ὡς μέρεσι τοῦ σκήνεος χρῶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλο.
   Cf. Aristotle's EN 1161 b 3-4: ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος.
2. fr. 271: ἐρωτικὴν μέμψιν ἡ ἀγαπωμένη [?] λύει.
   DK characterise it "nicht verständlich". K. Freeman translates: A lover's reproach is solved by (? corrupt word). Guthrie (II.491.3) adds: I cannot understand why "nicht verständlich" or... is corrupted. Luria (Democritea, p. 154, no.707 accepts the following writing: ἐρωτικὴν μέμψιν ἡ ἀγαπῶ μοῦνη (?) (Nauck, Diels 1-3) λύει.

Doubts about the meaning of this fr. were expressed first by Natorp.[1] It seems that Guthrie's optimism (on the integrity of the aphorism) and his translation cannot be shared without misgiving. Such an interpretation sounds more compatible with today's attitude to love and sexual problems (at least in the Western world) than to D.'s aphorisms (paragraphs on Pleasure, on Virtue).

Much more interesting is fr. 73: "Good eros is a longing for what is fine without hybris".[2] The wording of this aphorism in connection with some others where the term "kalos" is used[3] allow a clear elucidation of its meaning (eros for what is beauty).

From the aphorism itself these deductions are reasonable:

a. the last three words preceded by a copula give a kind of definition of eros. The last word is of particular importance in this case; we know from a previous discussion[4] that "kalos" denotes what is beauty and/or good in the field of art and/or morality,

b. a specification of eros is aimed at by the first adjective ("dikaios"),

c. the third word of the statement (anybristōs) defines the attitude in terms of respect.

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1. Natorp, Die Ethika, p. 117.

2. Fr. 73 (Stob. III. 5. 23): δίκαιος ἔρως ἀνυβρίστως ἐφίεσθαι τῶν καλῶν.

3. Fr. 207, 194, 37, 112, 56.

4. Paragraph, "meaning of good(s)".

There can remain no doubt that this kind of "eros", which is "just" and pursues with respect what is beautiful, can be classified with the "Platonic eros".[1]

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1. Schumacher (Die Seele, pp. 19-20) expressed enthusiasm for this aphorism and devoted to that a short paragraph. He writes: "Man glaubt in den Worten Demokrits bereits Platons Stimme aus dem "Gastmal" und aus dem "Phaidos" zu hören.... Höchstes griechisches Menschentum tritt uns hier entgegen, der klassische Mensch... Der Naturforscher D. wird zum Verkünder dieses rechten Eros als der edelsten Regung des Menschenherzens.
Cf. Guthrie, History, II, 490: "twin brother to Platonic eros".
See: G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought, London ^{3}(1970) [1935] pp. 87 ff. (ch. III).

Part two. Political Thought of Democritus.*

1. Peace in city life. Homonoia.

It is self-evident that private life and individual prosperity are deeply influenced by the general conditions of order or disorder prevailing in one's political environment.[1] Therefore any class-conflict which threatens the life of the community should be avoided by any peaceful means.[2]

D.'s generation had a bitter experience of civil war;[3] this perhaps explains his view of political problems. He seems to summarise a common feeling, a "taedium belli", of Greek society of the

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* This part of D.'s work is in some degree better studied by modern scholars, because it is limited to a small number of "rounded passages" all of which (save one suspected of lacuna - 266) are clear enough in their content. But in this field another obstacle makes appearance: one's preconceptions which in turn influence one's interpretations.

A good presentation is that of E. Wolf (Griech. Rechtsdenken, II. 337-52). Very interesting is a chapter in Havelock's book: The liberal temper in Greek Politics (pp. 125-154). A sample of biased interpretation seems to be Aalders' article: The political faith of D. (Mnemosyne 4/3 (1950), pp. 302-313). For a first acquaintance Bailey's pages (Greek Atomists, 208-13) are useful.

1. E. Wolf, op. cit., p. 346: Äussere Lebenssicherheit kann der Mensch aber nur in einer friedlichen Polis finden die...
2. See fr. 255 quoted below.
3. The Pelop. war (431-404 BC) was in its first stages a conflict between two imperialisms representing also (roughly) two different social-political systems; but in due course it got the character of a civil war in many city-states (see: Thucydides III.82).

late fifth century BC, when writing: "Civil war is harmful on both sides; for both to the victors and to the vanquished the destruction is the same."[1] It is not necessary to justify this statement to any man who has some experience of civil war, but some justification can be traced in another passage of Democritus: "all contentiousness is foolish; for in studying the disadvantage of one's enemy, one loses sight of one's own advantage."[2]

Leaving the negative aspect of the question D. proceeds to positive advice: great achievements, he claims, either in private life or in public are attained only by cordial cooperation.

Homonoia is a condicio sine qua non for every successful undertaking by a group of men. "The greatest undertakings are carried through by means of concord."[3]

It is characteristic that homonoia here is desirable within the limits of a city-state.[4] The time had not yet come for surpassing

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1. fr. 249: στάσις ἐμφύλιος ἐς ἑκάτερα κακόν· καὶ γὰρ νικέουσι καὶ ἡσσωμένοις ὁμοίη φθορή.

2. fr. 237: φιλονικίη πᾶσα ἀνόητος· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ δυσμενέος βλαβερὸν θεωρεῦσα τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον οὐ βλέπει.

3. fr. 250: ἀπὸ ὁμονοίης τὰ μεγάλα ἔργα καὶ ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς πολέμους δυνατὸν κατεργάζεσθαι, ἄλλως δ' οὔ.

Cf. Socrates' teaching on homonoia in Xenophon's Memorabilia, IV.4.16. Cf. also Thuc. VIII.93.2.

4. J. Ferguson, Values in Ancient World (1958) p. 119: "This is an important passage for it shows homonoia not merely within the state but confined to it; it extends no wider."

local conflicts and pursuing unification of a larger scale.[1] Because of the atrocious conflicts, nevertheless, and the destruction of civil wars after 431 BC the wish for peace was common and the idea of homonoia became a "locus communis".[2]

Homonoia is not conceived as a gift given from gods[3] or a compulsory (duty) obligation demanded from citizens. It is, as it were, only the result of good understanding between the groups of society involved. Fr. 255 says: "When the powerful (rich) prevail upon themselves to lend to the indigent, and help them, and benefit them, herein at last is pity, and an end to isolation (separation), and friendship, and mutual aid, and harmony among the citizens; and other

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1. Cf. Antiphon, on Homonoia. He puts homonoia rather in the field of personal morality.

   Gorgias was preaching homonoia among the Greek city-states (VS 82 B 8a)

   Isocrates made this declaration a slogan of his Pan-hellenic policy.

2. Aalders, op. cit., p. 350.

   Thuc. III. 82. Plato, Laws, 629 C-D.

3. Plato Prot., 322 C... ἵνα εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί.

blessings such as no man could enumerate."[1] Homonoia is welcomed as the fountain of allgoods for a society, as the foundation of ordered and prosperous social life.

The horizon, nevertheless, of D. does not surpass the border line of a city-state. Local feelings were still too strong to allow a wider view. At least the solution of social problems (within the limits of a small community), as proposed in the passage quoted above, could be labelled: "socialism based on good will, understanding and solidarity."[2] Thus D. believed that the cause of social conflicts and

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1. fr. 255: ὅταν οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσι καὶ προτελεῖν τολμέωσι καὶ ὑπουργεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐν τούτῳ ἤδη καὶ τὸ οἰκτίρειν ἔνεστι καὶ μὴ ἐρήμους εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἑταίρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἀμύνειν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ τοὺς πολιήτας ὁμονόους εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα ἀγαθά, ἄσσα οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναιτο καταλέξαι.

   Bailey, op. cit. 212: Considering the general state of class-feeling in most of the Greek cities, this is perhaps the most remarkable of all sayings...

   T.A. Sinclair, History, 65: This is perhaps the earliest reference to a charitable spirit in social relationships.

   Guthrie, History, II. 495: "remarkable passage."

2. Schmid-Stählin, op. cit., 289: Aber im Staat muss Freiheit und Glück aller Bürger...das Ziel sein.

   Cf. fr. 287: ἀπορίη ξυνὴ τῆς ἑκάστου χαλεπωτέρη· οὐ γὰρ ὑπολείπεται ἐλπὶς ἐπικουρίης.

disorder could be met. His optimism failed to see how far his scheme (based on good will and mutual help) was from a hopelessly bitter reality, which Thuc. described in a realistic way.

Such conduct - preventing confrontation of social classes - D. believed, is a matter of education; men must pursue the kind of education which leads to a better understanding on behalf of the community and each individual. He believed that it was possible by teaching to transfer to other citizens all the experience of his long life, of his many years of travel, and all his personal indifference to property. So he recommended what we read in fr. 157: "Learn thoroughly the art of statesmanship, which is the greatest; and pursue its toils, from which men win great and brilliant prizes."[1]

2. Constitutional form.

Preference of a constitutional form is prior to any discussion on other problems of political philosophy. A choice, to be sure, does not imply an elaborate system; but it expresses the ideological orientation of the person, whose choice it is, and indirectly it posits a hierarchy of values.

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1. Fr. 157: Δ. μὲν παραινεῖ τήν τε πολιτικὴν τέχνην μεγίστην οὖσαν ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πόνους διώκειν, ἀφ' ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ γίνονται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

In the case of D. fr. 251 is an outspoken advocacy of democracy. He says: "Poverty under democracy is as much to be preferred above what an oligarchy calls prosperity as is liberty above bondage (slavery)".[1] More exactly it is a hymn to democracy; it is the best - in the form of aphorism - to come from an ancient source. Aalders objection[2] to the meaning of the passage must be answered briefly here:

a. In three other frr. of D. technicalities betraying a democratic procedure (beyond any doubt) are used: in defending the state from external enemies, in applying the law of the state, in appointing magistrates (rulers).[3]

b. The procedure of law-giving is clearly democratic (see fr. 248 which will be analysed in the next paragraph).

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1. fr. 251: ἡ ἐν δημοκρατίῃ πενίη τῆς παρὰ τοῖς δυνάστῃσι καλεομένης εὐδαιμονίης τοσοῦτόν ἐστιν αἱρετωτέρη, ὁκόσον ἐλευθερίη δουλείης.

2. C.J.D. Aalders, The political faith of D., pp. 304-5: "whatever may be the meaning attached to the term "democracy" we are not justified in considering him a democrat. He only preferred democracy to extreme oligarchy, but he doesn't say that the former is the best form of government."

3. fr. 260: "by vote" (ψήφῳ),
fr. 262: "vote against" (καταψηφιστέον),
fr. 266: was elected (ἠρέθη).

c. Two items of advice are given for a good citizen (fr. 252)[1]: neither to pursue quarrels contrary to the right, nor acquire a power contrary to the common good; both are intelligible only in a democratic environment as admonition given by a democrat whose wish is to protect his favorite constitution. The justification given in the same passage is a "Periclean" doctrine.[2]

One might say, of course, that such admonition could be given by a good citizen whose main interest is to protect "eunomia"; but "eunomia" can hardly be realised outside the political constitution which gives all parties the right and the liberty to express their views.

d. Meditations on improving some constitutional details[3] are unintelligible, unless we put them in a democratic background.

e. The antithesis between oligarchy and democracy in 251 is so beautifully and warmly formulated on behalf of democracy that it can be intelligible only as the work of a sincere believer.

Provided that fr. 251 is advocacy of democracy a second question must be raised: "What is the meaning of democracy?"

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1. fr. 252: ... α. μήτε φιλονικέοντα παρὰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς
b. μήτε ἰσχὺν ἑαυτῷ περιτιθέμενον παρὰ τὸ χρηστὸν τὸ τοῦ ξυνοῦ. πόλις γὰρ εὖ ἀγομένη μεγίστη ὀρθωσίς ἐστι ...

2. Thuc. II. 60.2: ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας, ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην.

3. frr. 252, 266 will be discussed in the following pages.

The next paragraph will offer an answer to this question. In the meantime Pericles' and Diodotus' formulas would be a good stimulus for comparisons:

a. "It is true that our government is called a democracy, because its administration is in the hands, not of the few, but of the many...."[1]

b. "A good citizen must try to persuade others that his proposal (advice) is better (addressing the Assembly) on equal terms and without using threatening means against those who are (likely) expected to bring in different proposals."[2]

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1. Thuc. II. 37.1: καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται.....

2. Thuc. III.42: (Diodotus speaking after Cleon):

χρὴ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην, μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦντας, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα.

Cf. Euripides, Supplices, 429-55, 403-8.

Supplices, 403-408: (Theseus speaking):

πρῶτον μὲν ἦρξω τοῦ λόγου ψευδῶς, ξένε,
ζητῶν τύραννον ἐνθάδε. οὐ γὰρ ἄρχεται
ἑνὸς πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρα πόλις.
δῆμος δ' ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει
ἐνιαυσίαισιν, οὐχὶ τῷ πλούτῳ διδοὺς
τὸ πλεῖστον, ἀλλὰ χὠ πένης ἔχων ἴσον.

Note 2 to 270 ctd.

Suppl. 438-41: (Theseus speaking)

τοὐλεύθερον δ' ἐκεῖνο· τίς θέλει πόλει
χρηστόν τι βούλευμ' εἰς μέσον φέρειν ἔχων;
καὶ ταῦθ' ὁ χρῄζων λαμπρὸς ἐσθ', ὁ μὴ θέλων
σιγᾷ· τί τούτων ἔστ' ἰσαίτερον πόλει;

Aristotle, Politics 1291 b 31: δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος....

1290 b 1: μᾶλλον τοίνυν λεκτέον ὅτι δῆμος μέν ἐστιν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ὦσιν.

Given the constitutional form of a state legislation takes the first place as a practical and theoretical problem. Participation of the citizens in political life is a condicio sine qua no democracy can exist. Justice is the main purpose of existence of any state. Problems of ruling, defence, duties, rights, and a hierarchy of political values are connected with any existing constitutional form.

In the following pages inquiry will be directed to these questions:

a. Meaning and function of the law

b. Participation as foundation of political responsibility.

c. Magistrates.

d. Justice.

e. Defence of the State.

f. Duties - Rights. Summum bonum (in political life): Freedom.

g. Who is to rule?

h. The philosopher and the State.

3. Meaning and function of the law.

The central concept of a political ideology is its constitutional form; correlative with this is law.

A satisfactory account of the nature of law must:

a. trace its relations to morality which serves both to supply law with a content and to be a standard for criticism of it,

b. see the law as the main instrument by which a state attempts to realise its ends: security, (defence), prosperity, justice, liberty.

c.. include in the list of ends principles and methods necessary for the improvement and survival of the constitutional form (democracy e.g. in the case under research).

First comment on the law is that it is restriction of liberty,[1] if liberty is misused. Fr. 245 says: "The laws would not prevent each citizen from living according to his inclination, unless individuals harmed each other; for envious malice between individuals (citizens) brings about the beginning of faction."[2]

It is recognised even in the first words that law is a restraint, an undesirable action of the state which by the law wishes to prevent citizens from harming each other.[3] The sovereignty of law grows larger as bad conduct of citizens in their relations makes it more necessary. Law comes to impose a "minimum of morality" in order to prevent injustice.

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1. I. Lana, L' etica di Democrito, 15:..."le leggi, restritive della libertá individuale, sono, per cosi dire, un "male necessario": esse limitano la libertá di ciascuno per assicurare....la possibilitá di vivere nella societá in mezze agli altri uomini."
2. fr. 245: οὐκ ἂν ἐκώλυον οἱ νόμοι ζῆν ἕκαστον κατ' ἰδίην ἐξουσίην, εἰ μὴ ἕτερος ἕτερον ἐλυμαίνετο· φθόνος γὰρ στάσιος ἀρχὴν ἀπεργάζεται.

1. See Guthrie, History, II. 496.

This passage seems like an apology for the "restrictive" presence of law; in the thought of the author a higher value is behind and over the law: freedom; but since security also is desirable (condition necessary for the survival of political liberty) and since men are prone to injure each other, law comes as a protector and referee. A part of freedom is (must be) sacrificed on behalf of security.

Nomos[1] is not contrary to persuasion (as might be the impression from fr. 181); it is the necessary force to regulate mutual relations in the field not covered by persuasion and autonomous will. Since man is an imperfect being (fr. 149) which nevertheless has the possibility for self-perfection[2] (fr. 187) but not always the power of will, law is a necessary and helpful invention for both private and social-political life. The account of the way in which law comes into being

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1. Langerbeck, op. cit. 55: "Entscheidend ist dass Nomos hier den ganz speziellen Sinn von Gesetz und damit verbundenen staatlichen Zwang hat." This interpretation is based on a strict literary translation of words; it would be justifiable only if we had no other fragment (like 181, 248).

2. Cf. Eric Wolf, op. cit. 343: Der Mensch ist eben nicht gut..... aber habe der Mensch die Aufgabe gut zu werden."

is genetic in its first stages; it becomes teleological later.[1] No divine hand, no revelation is supposed in the lawgiving procedure.[2]

For the protection of social order the law must be powerful, if possible by persuasion, if necessary by punishment. We read in fr. 262: In the case of those who commit acts that deserve expulsion or imprisonment and in the case of [all] who deserve penalty the vote must condemn them and not absolve them. If a man in violation of [custom?] law absolve [another], using [motives of] gain or pleasure to formulate [the issue], he does wrong and inevitably this will be

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1. Cf. Lycophron's view: law is a contract (VS 83.3 Aristotle, Politics, 1280 b 8:.... ὁ νόμος συνθήκη... ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας.

For general discussions of the meaning of law in Greek Philosophy see:

E. Barker, op. cit., pp. 43-46.

T.A. Sinclair, op. cit. pp. 48-51.

M. Untersteiner, Sophists, pp. 336-39.

Guthrie, History III (Sophists), pp. 68 ff.

2. Cf. Heraclitus, B 114: πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι τρέφονται ἐξ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου.

See Guthrie, ibid. pp. 118-121.

on his heart."[1]

Reasonable implications are:

(a) a law should be obeyed anyway; a sentence must be carried out by the officials without any hesitation,

(b) citizens must be able (as judges obviously) to vote against a harmful action and to overcome a tendency or temptation for leniency,

(c) the whole procedure (as described) is a democratic one.

Now consistency is demanded by the citizens when they are to apply the laws (created by themselves, because of their participation in the whole machinery of political life)[2] for others. Leniency in private relations must be separated from such feeling in the public service and/or court. Here law is law even if it is hard. If one as judge or official is guilty of such clemency, one must know that he becomes actually a lawbreaker, he is ranked virtually with the wrongdoer.[3] Instead one's duty is to apply the law.

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1. fr. 262:

καὶ οἳ φυγῆς ἄξια ἔρδουσιν ἢ δεσμῶν, ἢ θῳῆς ἄξιοι, καταψηφιστέον καὶ μὴ ἀπολύειν· ὃς δ' ἂν παρὰ νόμον ἀπολύῃ κέρδει ὁρίζων ἢ ἡδονῇ, ἀδικεῖ, καὶ οἱ τοῦτο ἐγκάρδιον ἀνάγκῃ εἶναι.

The translation quoted above is taken from Havelock's (op.cit. pp. 140-141) except for putting brackets round the term "custom" and adding the point of interrogation.

2. See next paragraph: Participation as the foundation of the obligation to obey the law.

3. See Schmid-Stählin, op.cit., p. 296.2 where this passage is paralleled with frr. 174, 297 (syneidesis) and VS 73.10 (Vol.II p.244.4).

Respect for law is generalised in another passage: it is proper to be obedient to law, tothe ruler, and to the wiser." Thus one must obey rulers provided, to be sure, that they are lawful representatives of the State and that they first act according to the laws of the State.[1]

One exception is perhaps recognised, but not against the interests of the community; a wise man, an exceptional citizen, is entitled to the exceptional privilege to be particularly respected and consulted, and something more: to live without the restrictions of the law. At first sight such an information seems unbelievable; and probably it is a misrepresentation of D.'s thought, given that this testimony is written in obviously polemical tone.[2] Bearing in mind fr. 247[3] where wisdom is identified with "goodness of soul" we can

1. On this point no doubt can be left; fr. 252 is clear: "do not acquire a power contrary to the common good"; and fr. 251 expresses D.'s "preference", if not unconditional approval, of a concrete constitutional form: democracy.

2. 68.A 166 (Epiphanius, adversus haereticos, III.2.9):... καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν δίκαιον οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἄδικον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς φύσεως. Zeller-Nestle, op. cit., p. 1149, n.4: das ist offenbare Verdrehung.... Cf. Langerbeck, op. cit., p. 55; Guthrie, History, II. 496.2.

3. fr. 247: ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀγαθῆς πατρὶς ὁ σύμπας κόσμος.
See paragraph: "The philosopher and the state".

reasonably accept the following meaning for the information under interpretation: "The wise man does not need to submit himself to the laws of the State since he has imposed on himself, as a result of self-respect (264), much more morality than that required by the laws." This meaning accords with fr. 248:... "the law shows to those who obey it their own particular virtue."[1]

If the law demands so high a respect, there naturally arises the question: what is the source? or what is the procedure of law-giving? There is no direct information, but indirect evidence is convincing that the law is an expression (collective) of general will, since:

a. the constitutional form (democratic)[2] speaks for the legislative capacity of the citizens, and

b. some terms used in other passages[3] speak for a constitutional form in which voting was an institution.

So the law mirrors the voters' will and their areté and in turn demands their (obedience) which in this ideal circuit meets their original will. Now we can understand the meaning of a remarkable expression of political optimism: "The law wishes to benefit men's life; and it is able to do so when (and if) they themselves wish to receive benefit (by obeying the law); for it shows to those

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1. fr. 248: ὁ νόμος ... τοῖσι γὰρ πειθομένοισι τὴν ἰδίην ἀρετὴν ἐνδείκνυται. Cf. frr. 181, 264.

2. See fr. 251 and previous paragraph: State

3. fr. 260: "by vote", 262: "vote against", 265: (he) "was elected"

who obey it their own particular virtue."[1]

The last phrase cannot be interpreted as betraying a two-membered relation (law-giver, citizen); it is incompatible with the constitution envisaged in other fragments (251 e.g. or 260); on the other hand the allusion to persuasion excludes the hypothesis of a

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1. fr. 248: ὁ νόμος βούλεται μὲν εὐεργετεῖν βίον ἀνθρώπων δύναται δέ, ὅταν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται πάσχειν εὖ· τοῖσι γὰρ πειθομένοισι τὴν ἰδίην ἀρετὴν ἐνδείκνυται.

It should be remembered that in that age and in the conditions of political life in Greek city-states democracy meant an "Assembly General" of the free citizens; their participation was direct; also direct was their responsibility for fulfilment of the law's demands. See Xenophon's Memorabilia, I.2.42 where Pericles in answer to Alcibiades describes what laws are: "all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done."
Cf. Plato's Prot. 319 D.
See V. Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, London[3] (1969) [1967] pp. 216-217.
See also: Demosthenes XXIV (against Timocrates) §§ 20-24 where the orator first quotes constitutional laws prescribing the law-giving procedure (in Athens) and adds (§ 24): "these are all old-established laws....."

ruler who dictates (if we remember the analysis of persuasion[1] in connection with frr. 181, 264). Therefore this passage obliges us to ask this question: which are the two "wills" or the two sides (giver of benefit and receiver of it) suggested by the wording of the passage? There are not two different persons, but two different "moments of action" in the life of the same person-citizen: when he proposes a law and/or gives his vote for a law (or simply is an eye-witness of the decision of the majority), this is one moment of his activity in this capacity; when he obeys the law, it is the moment of self-consistency; an act of virtue, not of fear or coercion.[2]

No doubt a degree of idealisation is apparent here; it is the same optimism in fr. 264 (84, 244), where the possibility of human autonomy is described and hoped for; in both cases the individual is conceived as the person who gives and obeys the law. We must recognise that the first of the two moments for many cases, humanly speaking, is much easier than the second, because it is a single moment in which a citizen-voter may see the general immediate interest of the

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1. The value of persuasion in political affairs is discussed by Xenophon in Memor. I.2.10:... οἱ μὲν γὰρ βιαζόμενοι ὡς ἀφαιρεθέντες μισοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες ὡς κεχαρισμένοι φιλοῦσιν. Cf. I.2.44-46.

2. Such an apparent and "prima facie" misleading distinction between law-giver and lawabider is found in a passage in Pericles' Funeral Speech (Thuc. II.37.3) albeit it doesn't imply at all a real distinction between two different persons, but only two functions in the activity of citizenship.

community without knowing or even suspecting a personal future involvement; whereas there are more difficulties in obeying the law in countless cases when perhaps it is against the temporary or permanent interest of a citizen. Perhaps this explains the time-conditional character of the second proposition (of the fragment under discussion): "when and if they wish...."[1]

The whole procedure of law-giving and obedience is conceived as a function within the field of moral life.[2] Even if the law is expressing the will of the great majority of citizens or their totality (on rare occasions), although good, it is not powerful and valid, unless it has a permanent application in the citizens' activity. Just this point is emphasised in fr. 248; it is an appeal to the sense of self-consistency.[3]

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1. fr. 248: " ὅταν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται ... "

2. This close relation prevails in Greek Philosophy after D.; for Plato e.g. "ethics is but a part of politics" (V.J. Bourke, History of Ethics, I, 31); and Aristotle presents politics as "a sequel to the ethics" (A. McIntyre, A short history of Ethics, p. 57).

3. Thus the law becomes (if this interpretation is correct) a teacher of morality reminding the citizens of their obligation to keep their promise (voting act).
Cf. E. Wolf, op. cit., p. 344: Der Nomos besass eben für Demokrits ethisches Denken nur Bedeutung als ein Mittel individualistischer Erziehung.

The purpose of law is obvious from the first words: "law wishes to benefit men's life";[1] the procedure implied from the whole passage is democratic.[2] The conception of law as described above agrees with the general attitude of D. towards state organisation; it helps individuals, and does not sacrifice them for other purposes.[3]

The burning problem of the Physis-Nomos antithesis[4] cannot find a place here, since nomos is the expression of the will of citizens and is valid for themselves; if they do not apply it the question that arises is that of (personal) inconsistency.

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1. fr. 248: ὁ νόμος βούλεται μὲν εὐεργετεῖν βίον...
   Cf. Plato, Rep. 590 E: καὶ ὁ νόμος ὅτι τοιοῦτον βούλεται τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμμαχος ὤν....
2. Cf. Aalders, op. cit. 305: "here again there is no trace of anything specially democratic". Such a view: (a) ignores the meaning of persuasion, which outside a democratic frame is but a defeat and subjection because of fear (cf. frr. 268, 181), (b) isolates the fragment from the Corpus to which it belongs (245-268).
3. I. Lana, op. cit., p. 28: L'assoluto, per lui, è l'individuo, non lo Stato; non l' individuo esiste per lo Stato, ma lo Stato per l' individuo.
4. On this problem:
   E. Barker, op. cit., 74 ff.
   W. Guthrie, History III (Sophists) pp. 55 ff.

D. seems to have been aware of the fact that this conception of law was an idealisation rather than a reality; this ensues from (a) the structure and wording of the passage (antithesis between: the law wishes...it is able to..., and the conditional which follows: when and if the citizens wish...),[1] (b) the recommendation given by other fragments (249-52, 256, 261, 262).

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1. fr. 248: ὁ νόμος βούλεται μέν .... δύναται δέ, ὅταν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται ....

A last comment on εὐεργετεῖν in Hellenistic times it became "the typical activity of the good King" emphasised by a nickname: "benefactor". For D. it was the function of the law. See: T.A. Sinclair, op. cit., 170 footn.5.

4. Participation

The obligation to obey the law of the State was founded on the best foundation; it was explained as a matter of self-consistency. According to the political conditions in D.'s age democracy implied personal participation of all free citizens in legislative procedure, not indirect representation.[1] D. urges the citizens to make use of this right; or rather he presents it as a duty: "one must give the highest importance to affairs of the State, that it may be well run; one must pursue no quarrels contrary to right, nor acquire a power contrary to the common good. The well-run State is the greatest protection, and contains all in itself; when this is safe, all is safe; when this is destroyed, all is destroyed."[2] From which we can infer:

a. Well-being of the community is put in the first rank of individual interests.

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1. E. Barker, op. cit., p. 38.

2. fr. 252: τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν χρεῶν τῶν λοιπῶν μέγιστα ἡγεῖσθαι, ὅκως ἄξεται εὖ, μήτε φιλονικέοντα παρὰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς μήτε ἰσχὺν ἑαυτῷ περιτιθέμενον παρὰ τὸ χρηστὸν τὸ τοῦ ξυνοῦ. πόλις γὰρ εὖ ἀγομένη μεγίστη ὄρθωσίς ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πάντα ἔνι, καὶ τούτου σωζομένου πάντα σώζεται καὶ τούτου διαφθειρομένου τὰ πάντα διαφθείρεται.

Cf. Thuc. II. 60 2-3.

3. Cf. Arist. EN 1094 b 8 ff.:

b. Main internal dangers to a state are: individuals' pursuit of power against the interests of the community. Justification for all these is given in a Periclean way;[1] with a difference: here the argument is not formulated as a personal belief,[2] but as an impersonal principle or axiom or duty to be fulfilled by all citizens, although D. himself saw political activity (involvement) rather as a necessary burden than as a welcome and attractive profession.[3]

Even if involvement in state affairs implies a degree of negligence of private business (affairs) or danger to one's reputation, nevertheless the duty described above must be performed, since "if a man neglects public affairs, he is ill-spoken of, even if he steals nothing and does no wrong."[4]

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1. Thuc. II. 60.2: ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας....
   Cf. Antigone, 188-90: (Creon is speaking)
   ..... τοῦτο γιγνώσκων ὅτι
   ἡ'δ' ἔστιν (ἡ πόλις) ἡ σώζουσα καὶ ταύτης ἔπι
   πλέοντες ὀρθῆς τοὺς φίλους ποιούμεθα....
2. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι....
3. Aalders, op. cit. 313: For D. himself scientific work was far more attractive than political activity.
   Cf. fr. 118.
4. Cf. Thucydides, II. 40.2 (Pericles is speaking): τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ' ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν.

He goes on to examine the other possibility: "and if a (good) citizen is not negligent or does no wrong, he is liable not only to be ill spoken of, but also to suffer" (a bodily harm? a persecution or financial damage?).[1] D. closes his meditation with a remark on human weakness: "To make mistakes is inevitable, but it is difficult to forgive."

The question (philosophically considered) remains unanswered; in both directions (involvement in public affairs or not) risks lie in ambush,[2] but duty calls to participation.

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1. The whole fr. 253 is this: τοῖς χρηστοῖσιν οὐ συμφέρον ἀμελέοντας τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἄλλα πρήσσειν· τὰ γὰρ ἴδια κακῶς ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ ἀμελέοι τις τῶν δημοσίων, κακῶς ἀκούειν γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἦν μηδὲν μήτε κλέπτῃ μήτε ἀδικῇ. ἐπεὶ καὶ μὴ ἀμελέοντι ἢ ἀδικέοντι κίνδυνος κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ δὴ καὶ παθεῖν τι· ἀνάγκη δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν, συγγιγνώσκεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ εὐπετές.

   A realistic estimation of the possibilities is crowned by a realistic aphorism on human nature, which is inclined to err but finds it difficult to forgive (is there a tone of pessimism in it?).

2. Perhaps these thoughts reflect a situation of growing indifference for public affairs which is not unusual in peridds of social-political conflicts, when moderate people lose power and retire in silence, while militant extreme wings continue the struggle by all noisy means.

Participation, it should be emphasised, was an important feature of city-state democracy; with more important consequences. This democracy was a kind of General Assembly, where every free citizen was expected to take part (normally twice a month), to propose laws, to vote laws, to impeach laws, to elect magistrates to offices for a specific period, to address the Assembly, to vote in favour or against proposals brought in by others on current problems of the State. In these conditions of political participation:

a. a citizen had a kind of life-long education on political problems,

b. he acquired awareness of the current problems of the community,

c. he was expected reasonably to have a higher sense of responsibility, when he made proposals or supported those brought in by others.

In some cases he who proposed or defended a way of action (an expedition e.g.) was expected to undertake to carry it out.[1]

These implications of participation underlie fr. 248 which we analysed in the previous paragraph. The same idea of personal responsibility is used for the foundation of morality (181, 264).

1. Therefore political activity was not without high responsibility and personal risks. Cf. Zeller-Nestle, Die Philosophie der Griechen I.2. 1149: die Tätigkeit für den Staat mit Gefahr und Schaden verknüpft sei. D. ist also über diesen Gegenstand mit den Besten seiner Zeit einverstanden.

Cf. the view of a younger contemporary, Antisthenes fr.168 (ed. by Fern. Decl. Caizzi, Milano 1966; Stob. Anth. IV.4.28):

Note 1. to p. 286 ctd.

ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἄν τις προέλθοι πολιτείᾳ εἶπε: καθάπερ πυρί, μήτε λίαν ἐγγύς, ἵνα μὴ καῇς, μήτε πόρρω, ἵνα μὴ ῥιγώσῃς".

See Schmid-Stählin, op. cit. 289.2, 290.10.

5. Justice.

We have faced the difficulty of a definition[1] of Justice as a virtue. Now, it will be reconsidered as a political question.

When Archelaus had introduced the axiom that justice is not by nature but by convention,[2] when Thrasymachus was professing that justice is but the interest of the stronger[3] but also was confessing that justice is the highest "bonum" among men,[4] when Thucydides presented an imperialist to define justice (in terms of inter-state relations) as a question arising only when equally powerful parties are involved in disputes,[5] at this time our philosopher appears on the scene of political thought to explore the problem of justice in the following directions:

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1. See paragraph: Tree of Virtues.
2. VS 60 A 1: καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.
3. 85 B 6 a (Republic 338c): φημί ..... ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον.
   (see P. Huby, Greek Ethics, p. 10).
4. 85 B 8: ...οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῶν παρεῖδον (sc. δικαιοσύνην).
5. Thuc. V 89 (the Athenian ambassador is speaking):

   ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προὔχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσι.

a. Justice in the relations of citizens between each other.

b. Justice in maintaining the power of law (sovereignty) against law-breakers.

c. Justice in the relations of citizens to civil administration and vice versa.

a. The law is planned to fulfil a double duty: (1) to protect citizens from being wronged[1] and avert conflicts among them,[2] (II) to benefit citizens by imposing a minimum of morality and regulate future relations in peace (fr. 248). In either case justice is seen from the viewpoint of private interest.

b. If a state is to succeed in its effort to protect its subjects from being wronged, it must be consistent in punishing wrongdoers, because unpunished wrongdoing (law-breaking) creates new candidates for imitation. Punishment is seen as a means to prevent repetition. Fr. 262 says: "Those who do what is deserving of exile or imprisonment

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1. fr. 245: εἰ μὴ ἕτερος ἕτερον ἐλυμαίνετο...
Obviously the principle of "right is might" is rejected.

2. Havelock, op. cit., 137: "For the endemic danger the remedy is law, and the initial law has to be viewed negatively as a restraint of the use of one's own elbow-room."

or other punishment must be condemned and not let off...."[1] With a strong sense of reality he sees that public servants having the duty to impose the power of law are likely to meet the temptation of being lenient for a variety of reasons; but so they undermine (the power of law) and shake social order and peace in the long term. The instruction given by this passage recalls a principle of Roman Criminal Law: "Dura lex sed lex". D. seems to have been a believer in such a principle for reasons explained above. Cases of clemency are actions against the law of the state; clemency tends to create new crimes in addition to the unpunished ones. Perhaps numerous examples of corruption[2] in contemporary administration were the stimulus to this strict formula, which does not provide any margin of clemency. All cases are included in one single-worded instruction: "vote against" (καταψηφιστέον) repeated in negative form for more emphasis (do not release). But in such generalisations another principle of criminal law is ignored: "Summum jus summa injuria". Of course, it should be remembered, we have fragmentary material only and we do not know the context. The interpretation of the passage, however, is clear: be

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1. fr. 262: καὶ οἱ φυγῆς ἄξια ἔρδουσιν ἢ δεσμῶν, ἢ θανάτου ἄξιοι, καταψηφιστέον καὶ μὴ ἀπολύειν...
   Havelock, op. cit. 141: it is the language of Athenian democracy....
   p. 142: D. is now addressing himself to the Athenian judge and jury.
2. Cf. what Crito says to S. in the opening scene of Plato's dialogue; later on he proposes to S. to escape; guards are already bribed.

dutiful (as a judge) without exception; the lawbreaker must be punished if the state is to survive. For D., as seems clear from other passages too, the remedy of bad conduct in society is not clemency to a criminal, but a more generous and radical provision: his pre-education (on which the last section of this chapter).

The law is not the property of any one; it is the decision of the totality of the voters (potentially of the free citizens) or at least of the majority of them; no one has the right to apply it or not according to personal inclination or sympathy, because then one breaks another principle (transferred from "jus civile" mutatis mutandis): "nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet."[1]

c. Justice is a demand also in the relations of citizens with public services and vice-versa. It is astonishing at first sight to read: Men remember one's mistakes (offences) rather than one's (successes) right actions. This is just; for as those who return a deposit do not deserve praise, whereas those who do not do so deserve blame and punishment, so with the official: he was elected not to commit offences

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1. Such formulas are used on the assumption that such principles exist before being formulated; just as a language exists before its grammar is written.

but to do things well (to be just)"[1].

This consists of 3 parts:

- a psychological remark,
- admission of it as being all right,
- justification, where the last example is the case of a public servant, who was elected to do only actions beneficial to his subjects and not to expect thanks.

Nobody can deny correctness in the reasoning of the passage and austerity in the criticism. But one can ask oneself how this formula was reached. One must bear in mind that all these aphorisms were written during a period of difficult communal life, when the arrogance of power from one side and all consequent frustrations, the corruption of services and finally the overthrow of an empire and its succession by another tyranny, gave a better experience to citizens of nearly all Greek city-states. /c

In the light of these conditions this point is more intelligible; a candidate for election must know that by his very candidacy he promises to do good for the citizens; if he does so, he is not

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1, fr. 265: τῶν ἡμαρτημένων οἱ ἄνθρωποι μεμνέαται μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν εὖ πεποιημένων. καὶ γὰρ δίκαιον οὕτως· ὥσπερ <γὰρ τὸν> τὰς παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντα οὐ χρὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ πάσχειν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡρέθη ὡς κακῶς ποιήσων, ἀλλ' ὡς εὖ. ποιήσων

Havelock, op. cit., 149: he (D.) envisages a contract with time-limit.

praiseworthy; he simply does his duty, which is to keep his promise. What seems austere at first sight is simply consistent with D.'s demand for personal responsibility. If he recommended one to feel the sense of self-respect, when silently judging oneself (264), he is right to demand of people who come to power to be consistent to what they have promised to do and were elected for.[1] To keep the promise is an obligation, since it creates some expectations, i.e. a right for the others.

Perhaps the cool reasoning we found in fr. 265 is justifiable from another bitter experience which D.'s generation had. In periods of crisis in political life men of reputation avoid interfering in public affairs; then the road is open for scoundrels, who are able to promise and break their promise without any hesitation, who can swear oaths and commit perjury; as for their behaviour fr. 254 speaks clearly: "When base men enter upon office, the more unworthy they are, the more neglectful, and they are filled with folly and arrogance."[2] Three vices are enumerated, probably in a progression of wickedness: negligence, folly, arrogance. The last one seems to be more emphasised by D. What Thucydides described as arrogant behaviour of Athenian

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1. Guthrie, History II 495: A bad ruler should be blamed, but a good one deserves no special praise, since he is only carrying out the duty for which he was elected.
2. fr. 254: οἱ κακοὶ ἰόντες ἐς τὰς τιμὰς ὁκόσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀναξιοι ἐόντες ἴωσι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀνακηδέες γίγνονται καὶ ἀφροσύνης καὶ ὑβρέος πίμπλανται.

Imperialism, this same vice D. points out in the individual.[1]

Reasonably from these discussions the following question arises: are these passages a criticism of democracy?[2] do they betray undemocratic feeling?[3]

The answer will be brief:

a. We have noticed already that many of D.'s fragments with political content are understandable only in a democratic background (260, 262, 265).

b. If D. was an enemy of Democracy, his enmity would have emerged in many ways throughout his aphorisms; and, to be sure, such an enmity would be incompatible with some central concepts of his ethical theory (persuasion e.g. - fr. 181).

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1. Whether arrogance is the result of power or of having honours beyond one's worth is a question of little interest, since both these causes are usually closely connected. Both are bad companions for human weakness. Demosthenes (On Olynthus, 1.23 (16)) accepted a generalisation: "to enjoy success beyond one's abilities is a source of arrogance".

2. H. Steckel, RE Suppl. 12 cols. 211-212: Er missbilligt die Exzesse des politischen Konkurrenzkampfes in einer Demokratie attischen Musters.

3. Aalders, op. cit. p. 306.

Cf. Th. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 368-9.

c. On the contrary, one of his fragments (251) betrays - we have seen - a warm preference for democracy.

d. When one tries to improve a machine (we accept the view that D.'s remarks intended to point out what improvements were necessary for the democracy he knew) he does so because he likes it or does not dislike it. The next passage betrays explicitly such an intention: "how to improve the policy of the constitutional form we love".[1]

The disputable fragment says: (I) The constitutional form presently established has no device against wrong being done to (or by) men in authority, even if they are perfect..... (II).....(III) Somehow the constitution should be so ordered as to cover the following case also: if a man (either magistrate or a common citizen) does no wrong himself, no matter how thoroughly he censures wrong-doers (citizens or magistrates) he should never find himself in their power. If his acts are right, some defence, of ordinance or otherwise, should be there to protect him."[2]

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1. Cf. Schmid-Stählin, op.cit.,291: Nur einmal rügt er nicht nur einen Übelstand in der zeitgenössischen Demokratie, sondern macht auch einen Vorschlag zum Besseren....

2. fr. 266: (1) οὐδεμία μηχανὴ τῷ νῦν καθεστῶτι ῥυθμῷ μὴ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἢν καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοὶ ἔωσιν. (2) οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλῳ ἔοικεν ἢ ἑωυτῷ τὸν (* * *) αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑτέροισι γίγνεσθαι. (3) δεῖ δέ κως οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κοσμηθῆναι, ὅκως δ' μηδὲν ἀδικέων, ἢν καὶ πάνυ ἐτάζῃ τοὺς ἀδικέοντας, μὴ ὑπ' ἐκείνους γενήσεται, ἀλλά τις ἢ θεσμὸς ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀμυνεῖ τῷ τὰ δίκαια ποιεῦντι.

It consists of 3 parts:[1]

a. discovery of a difficulty in the constitutional form the author had in mind,

b. explanation of the difficulty (perhaps a lacuna appears here),

c. a proposal or rather a wish, that some measure be put in operation to stop this inconvenience which appeared in the beginning of the passage.

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1. Once again we find this tripartite schema of a "rounded aphorism" (cf. 265, 173, 181: κρείσσων .... λάθρη ..... διόπερ ..... , 191: ἀνθρώποισι ..... ἐπὶ τοῖς δυνατοῖς οὖν .... ταύτης γάρ...)

It consists of 3 parts: thesis or problem, explanation or justification, solution or proposal. It is tempting to infer that this schema is characteristic of D.'s style; it is a way of thinking and expounding thought with clarity and brevity. Perhaps such aphorisms occupied the place of "theorems" in a larger text; and were accompanied (followed) by longer and more detailed explanations. Collectors found it easy to collect the "theorems", which thus found a way to exist independently and finally remained the only survivals of D.'s thought.

A simpler schema is that which consists of two parts: a thesis and a justification or explanation (172, 176, 178, 179, 187, 261). This is more frequent, but not peculiar to D.'s style.

The dispute on the meaning of this text comes from the fact that the second part of it is perhaps corrupted and so we do not know the content of the explanation of the difficulty;[1] consequently we cannot(understand well) penetrate the meaning of the problem (first part) and the proposed solution (third part).

So the first question is: who wrongs whom? Is "archontas" the subject or object to "adikein"? Many scholars following Diels take "archontas"[2] as the victims in this relation.[3] According to the

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1. So Natorp (op. cit. 116) pointed out the difficulty and tried (in footn. 40) to give a free translation.
2. By this term are denoted public servants who had been elected for an annual period of service after which they had to give account of their actions. In some cases they could be wrongly accused by people whom they had treated not wrongly but rightly and perhaps strictly.
   Cf. Aalders op. cit. p. 309.
3. So Sinclair (op. cit. p. 66) who nevertheless in a footn. says that this explanation is not certain.
   Earlier Th. Gomperz (Greek Thinkers, pp. 368-69) characterised fr. 266 as a remarkable passage "in which the worst evil of democratic institutions is assailed. It attacks the dependence of the authorities on the judgement of the <u>populace</u> - on the very persons, accordingly, whom it is their bounden duty to hold in check." But from such "counterattacks" the victims are not the "archontes" but democratic institutions, on the authority of the thinker who wrote fr. 251.

grammar inversion of the roles is possible with the implication that even good "archontes" when criticised are prone to wrong their opponents by a counterattack...using the power with which they are entrusted.

But we lack certainty for the second part of the fr., for which various proposals have been made by scholars.[1] So one possibility

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1. a. Th. Gomperz accepts the following correction: οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλῳ ἔοικε ἢ τῷ τὸν αἰετὸν ἐφ' ἑρπετοῖσι γίγνεσθαι (see DK II.200. footn.) and translates (Greek Thinkers, p. 369): "as things are, it is like delivering the (royal) eagle into the power of the reptiles."

b. K. Freeman (Ancilla to Presocratics, pp. 115-116) remarks that Diels was wrong to mark a lacuna and she tries to justify the following translation:..."for it is not likely to anyone else (any more) than for oneself, that he will show himself the same man in different circumstances." She takes "archontes" as subject of adikein, adding the remark: "power may corrupt even the best." Lord Acton, as it seems to me, would recognise something of his thought in the last motto, but he would not accept the oversimplification proposed by the translator.

c. Ten years ago K.E. Chatjistefanou (Stasinos, Cyprus, 1963, pp. 137-41) after a careful reexamination of the problem proposed the following correction: οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλῳ ἔοικεν ἢ ἑωυτῷ τὸν <ἄρχοντα τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδόναι, ἢν προειδὼς τυγχάνῃ, ἑτέροις μὲν τῶν ἐγκλημάτων δίκην λαγχάνειν αὐτῷ ἐξὸν καὶ δικαστὴν καθίστασθαι, μηδέν τι δεήσειν> αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑτέροισι γίγνεσθαι.....

(Note 1. ctd.)

And he translates:.....because it is natural for a magistrate to give justice to himself and nobody else in cases where he knows that although he himself has the possibility to bring other people into court and to become himself the judge of complaints (turned) against him, he will never (be in need to) come under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of others.

d. Luria (Democritea, p. 146, no. 613) accepts Gomperz's text and translates (p. 362): according to now established order there is no possibility whatsoever that the rulers, even if they are completely well-doers, would not commit injustice. Such a ruler first of all is like an eagle directing his threat (anger) against a snake.... (My thanks to Miloš Ivaviš).

All these scholars - translators:

1. accept that there is a lacuna (Freeman's disagreement is not based on any argument),

2. accept that the text with or without the lacuna constitutes a justification or explanation of the first part,

3. take different positions on whether "archontes" is subject or object of "adikein".

Only a reply to this question (if possible) would give the final and correct interpretation of the passage as a whole. But the text as it is does not help.

remains: to try two alternative interpretations of the third part (corresponding to those mentioned above for the first) and explore the implications. Of course, it is not an orthodox solution, but it has the possibility of teaching the true meaning of the passage (and discovering the intention of the author) given that the second part of it (the lacuna) is only an explanation for the first, and not an essential part of the reasoning (problem - solution).

It is evident that the meaning of the last part depends substantially on the first; there is a kind of correspondence between their subject-verb-object schemata. In the first part the question was "Who wrongs whom?"; in the third it is: "Who is he who does no wrong?" (in order to be protected from becoming the victim of wrongdoers in the future).

a. If he is the "archōn",[1] then the whole passage is a wish for some improvement of the institution of the so called "euthunai" on behalf of the authorities.

b. But if he is a citizen, outspokenly criticizing the "archontes" and for this reason is mistreated (punished) by them wrongly, then the whole passage is a proposal for a way to be found to protect these courageous people who with a free tongue[2] criticize the "archontas" on behalf of the people (community).

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1. "Archontes" as a political power means executive authority rather than legislative sovereignty. Cf. Havelock, op. cit., p. 150.
2. Cf. fr. 226: ἴδιον ἐλευθερίης παρρησίη· κίνδυνος δὲ ἡ τοῦ καιροῦ διάγνωσις.

From both these hypotheses the following inferences are reasonable:

a. In either case we find an appeal for correction of an institution on behalf of Justice and therefore the community.

b. In neither alternative is there a proposal to abolish dialogue and criticism. Therefore:

c. One thing must be excluded: that the passage is an attack against democracy.

The question nevertheless remains: which of the two hypotheses should be adopted? (who wrongs whom? who is wronged to be protected?). The ambiguity we found both in the first and third parts (possibly in the middle too) might be intentional, since both sides (archontes-citizens) wanted (potentially) justice and needed protection from each other. D.'s proposal is not to cancel but to improve an institution, not to avenge but to compensate justice by a more elaborate system.[1]

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1. He uses a characteristic term: κοσμηθῆναι which (means) implies a continuous change towards perfection and/or beauty; his mind moves not in static forms but in dynamic relations, changing and demanding a continuous rearrangement and flexibility (adaptation). Cf. Havelock, p. 140:...both "cosmos" and "rut mos" are dynamic terms describing an animated order and a moving shape.

A final remark: at the beginning of the passage are found the "credentials" of the authenticity and intention of the author.[1] What is the meaning of "constitutional form presently established"?

a. Is it a tyranny (of any type)? then "archontas" only can do wrong (subject of adikein); and the proposal is to introduce criticism by free speech (which means democracy).[2]

b. Is it a democracy? then a proposal to improve dispensation of justice is introduced (maintaining the constitutional form).

Whatever interpretation be given to the crucial fr. we must recognise an effort (perhaps the first in the history of Justice) to introduce a court of Appeal, a Constitutional Court or something like that, for cases of dispute between citizens and the State.

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1. fr. 266: οὐδεμία μηχανὴ τῷ νῦν καθεστῶτι ῥυθμῷ....

a. No device....therefore a device is needed; such a device is proposed or wished.

b. ῥυθμός is a term the presence of which in different parts of D.'s work seems to endorse genuineness and authenticity:

- In Physics: ῥυσμός (A 38. B 139)
- In Epistemology: ἐπιρυσμίη (B 7)
- In Ethics: ῥυσμοῦνται (B 197)
- In politics: ῥυθμῷ (B 266)
- In Education: μεταρυσμοῖ – μεταρυσμοῦνται (B 33).

All of them (save ῥυθμός) are Hapaxlegomena in Greek Thought.

2. Cf. Thucydides III.42.1-5.

6. Defence of the city-State.

Some aphorisms (257-60) describe a number of "principles" which are necessary for the very existence of a community[1] (in the frame of a city-state, a conecption which prevails in D.'s political thought).

Defence of a community from outside is the first duty for survival. It includes repulsion of two dangers: from animals and men. Organised war against animals had been recognised as a necessary stage in man's social advance; it was a reality; D. takes this reality and uses it in a genetic way to establish criteria for right and wrong. He says: "if an animal does wrong or desires to do wrong and if a man kill it he shall be counted exempt from penalties...."[2] To kill dangerous animals is an action on behalf of the community; the killer is praise-worthy. And this same recommendation, continuous war against potentially aggressive creatures, is repeated in the form of a duty: "One must at all costs kill all those creatures which do hurt contrary to justice...."[3]

1. Havelock (op. cit. 127 ff.) gives a systematic analysis of them; he believes that they represent "axioms for how a community could be able to found itself". But D. seems simply to describe conditions of his environment. Cf. Thuc. I.6.1: πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐσιδηροφόρει διὰ τὰς ἀφάρκτους τε οἰκήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφόδους, καὶ ξυνήθη τὴν δίαιταν μετ' ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο Cf.I.5.1-3.
2. fr. 257: κατὰ δὲ ζῴων ἔστιν ὧν φόνου καὶ μὴ φόνου ὧδε ἔχει· τὰ ἀδικέοντα καὶ θέλοντα ἄδικεῖν ἀθῷος ὁ κτείνων, καὶ πρὸς εὐεστοῦν τοῦτο ἔρδειν μᾶλλον ἢ μή.
3. fr. 258: κτείνειν χρὴ τὰ πημαίνοντα παρὰ δίκην πάντα περὶ παντός· καὶ ταῦτα ὁ ποιῶν εὐθυμίης (?) καὶ δίκης καὶ θάρσεος καὶ κτήσεως (?) ἐν παντὶ κόσμῳ μέζω μοῖραν μεθέξει.

It is obvious that here the protection of community is prescribed as a duty to each member of it; prizes also are recognised. In their simplest form appear paired duties and rights. In both passages we recognise a formulation of principles rather than methods of action. Necessarily they appear as impersonal generalisations.[1]

From the viewpoint of the social group the concepts of just and unjust in a very primitive way could be described "as symbols of aggression on the one hand and repulsion or correction of the aggression on the other."[2]

With a simple metaphor mutatis mutandis these principles are transferred to men as aggressors: "as has been laid down regarding beasts and reptiles which are inimical (to man) so I think one should, according to ancestral law, kill an enemy of the community in every ordered society, unless a law forbids it. But there are prohibitions in every State: sacred law (religious asylum), treaties, oaths."[3]

1. Havelock (op. cit. 130-131): "Strictly speaking D. has no word for individuals, i.e. for individual self-subsistent personality". This is a misinterpretation, because principles of political conduct are necessarily generalising; the conduct of the individual is necessarily visualised as social. The agent in the frr. under discussion is not neglected: he acts impersonally, but he is rewarded individually, both directly and indirectly, since the agent as a member of the community will share security, justice, and freedom.
2. Havelock, 131.
3. fr. 259: ὅκωσπερ περὶ κιναδέων τε καὶ ἑρπετέων γεγράφαται τῶν πολεμίων, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖ μοι χρεὼν εἶναι ποιεῖν· κατὰ νόμους τοὺς πατρίους κτείνειν πολέμιον ἐν παντὶ κόσμῳ, ἐν ᾧ μὴ νόμος ἀπείργει· ἀπείργει δὲ ἱερὰ ἑκάστοισι ἐπιχώρια καὶ σπονδαὶ καὶ ὅρκοι.

In the treatment of men as aggressors some more elaboration and modification is provided: (1) there are some customary-lawful limits (oaths etc.), (2) condemnation is not applied on the assumption (suspicion) only that someone is a potential aggressor(although in other cases the intention itself was enough criterion), (3) some more sophisticated procedure is described in the following passage: "If a man kill any highwayman or pirate, he shall be counted exempt from penalty whether (he kill) by direct action or by orders or by vote."[1]

Perhaps the provision of "orders" and "vote" is reserved for captives or war prisoners when there is time for consultation, discussion, voting (cf. the case of the Thebans kept in Plataia during the first year of the Pel. War).

Again we notice strong feelings for the protection of the community, and confessedly strict principles of treatment of aggressors;[2]

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1. fr. 260: κἰξάλλην καὶ λῃστὴν πάντα κτείνων τις ἀνδρῶς ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτοχειρίᾳ καὶ κελεύων καὶ ψήφῳ.

2. Bailey, op. cit., 209: There is a Draconian sternness about this.. Guthrie, History, II 495: "His humane sentiments applied only to law-abiding citizens within one's own State."

But it should be noticed, that for lawbreaking citizens, the penal code never provides sentence of death; there is a distinction between: (a) criminals who must be punished anyway (exile, imprisonment or other punishment, fr. 262 beginning) and (b) those who fail to fulfil their own duty, i.e. to apply the laws, for which the punishment is described as their own remorse (fr. 262 end).

Note. 2. to p. 303 ctd.

On the other hand the austerity (sternness) of these Draconian principles whould be placed and judged in the historical background of D.'s age. Cf. the treatment of Theban captives by Plataians (1st year of the War), of Plataians by Thebans-Spartans (3rd year of the War). Cf. also: Plato's Prot., 322 C-D: where it is proposed that whoever could not share in aidōs and dikē must be put to death as a threat to the city's interests.

In D.'s frr. death for citizens is not provided.

again the wish or necessity to protect the community is generalised and expressed as a duty (fr. 259).[1]

So far the principles discussed have a character of collective protection and selfishness. But the next one "carries us beyond selfish considerations."[2] D. says: "one must punish wrongdoers to the best of one's ability, and not neglect it. Such conduct is just and good, but the neglect of it is unjust and bad."[3] This passage proceeds from problems of security from outside to the demand of justice inside the borders of a State;[4] it ascribes an obligation and recognises a right (to protect and be protected). (See next paragraph).

To conclude the problem of security: it consists of 2 basic ideas:

a. repulsion and punishment of aggressors,

b. punishment of law-breakers in the interior.

Problems of foreign policy are not mentioned. They should be faced in terms analogous to relations among citizens:[5] the principle

1. fr. 259: ... οὕτω καὶ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖ μοι χρεὼν εἶναι ποιεῖν....

2. Havelock, 133.

3. fr. 261: ἀδικουμένοισι τιμωρεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν χρὴ καὶ μὴ παριέναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἄδικον καὶ κακόν.

4. Aalders, 306-7: D. does not regard law as something arbitrary, but as founded on objective principles of justice and righteousness; (260,261,262) ...That he assumed...that right and good had an objective ground, is also apparent from frr. 69...193...217....

5. H. Steckel, , RE Suppl. 12 (1970) col.212: Probleme der Aussenpolitik scheinen bei ihm, wenn er sie behandelte,...von der gleichen Dimension gewesen zu sein wie die des gerechten Zusammenlebens innerhalb eines Staates.

of justice and non-aggressiveness on a mutual basis should be accepted. In cases of aggression from one side, defence by all means and if possible punishment of aggressors is the only right policy.

7. Obligations and Rights. Summum Bonum in political life: Freedom in Democracy.

It is too early to seek a clear distinction and classification and correspondence between these two concepts. But from those passages which refer to political life we can pick up some elements or some obvious implications of D.'s political thought and classify them according to our conceptual system.

A. If we accept that social or political duty is whatever is necessary or required or what one is morally obliged to do (in the frame of social-political life) as opposed to what one may be pleased or inclined to do, then from the material we possess the following duties are summarised:

a. To pursue political knowledge (technē) even at the cost of much labour (fr. 157).

b. To give attention and interest to the problems of the State (252) even if it means a direct or indirect negligence of one's private affairs (253).

c. Not to pursue power against the interests (and the wish) of the community; therefore also not to misuse office entrusted by the State (252).

d. Particularly when one is a candidate for office one must bear in mind that one's duty is to keep one's promise and this is one's only justification (265).

e. By all means one has the obligation to contribute to the defence of the State from any external danger (257-260).

f. Inside the borders of the State one has to contribute to the performance of justice; namely:

I. one must be law-abiding (248),

II. one must help the wronged (261),

III. one must help the poor (for reasons of social justice, order, peace (255, 287)) and contribute to homonoia which is the first good for the life of the community and the source of collective power for the repulsion of aggressors (250).

g. Parents are warmly recommended to educate their children (280).

B. Rights:

a. From the same passage (280) one concludes that children have an unwritten right to be educated in order to become better for themselves andthe community.

b. The right to Justice emerges automatically from the mutuality implied from frr. 261, 256.

c. If one contributes tothe defence of the State and the validity of law, one has the reasonable right to enjoy the security provided by the State and the protection of law.

d. The crown of rights is obviously liberty;[1] it is given the place

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1. In connection with frr. 248, 252, 253, 255, 266, liberty may be defined as: (a) freedom of activity in private life according to the necessary demands of social life, (b) freedom of participation in political activity on behalf of the community and in accordance with the laws, without fear of violent or improper opposition (aggression).

of criterion (fr. 251). Here a pair of constitutional forms are compared; one is condemned, the other explicitly preferred on the ground that the latter secures liberty for the citizens. No other explanation is given; and the structure of the aphorism permits the conclusion that liberty is the absolute "criterion", the presence of which makes a constitutional form absolutely preferable to any other.

What precisely D. meant by this term we cannot trace in the ruins we possess of his political thought. In fr. 226 we read that "openness (frankness) of speech is the sign of freedom."[1] Sincerity accompanies freedom, but it is not clear whether freedom of will (moral problem) or freedom of the individual (political demand, right) is meant by this term in this passage. But from the second part of it (: the danger lies in discerning the right occasion)[2] one might infer that here the meaning of freedom is social or political, since a free tongue occasionally entails risks. This remark leads also to the conclusion that freedom in D.'s view was not a "donum" without dangers, particularly when used for criticism against arbitrary rulers (cf. fr. 238, perhaps 266 too). It is one more reason for someone to prefer that kind of constitutional form which provides political liberty as

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1. fr. 226: οἰκήιον ἐλευθερίης παρρησίη, κίνδυνος δὲ ἡ τοῦ καιροῦ διάγνωσις.

2. On the other hand we have agreed that the freewill problem was not discovered until after Aristotles' days.
   See paragraph "On Freewill".

an inalienable right of the citizens.[1] Whether this right is natural or conventional is not questioned in the material we possess. But from the analysis of law (248) and the problem of state-defence (previous paragraph) one might infer that in D.'s thought liberty is a natural and self-reasonable condition, the limits of which are in some way "conventionalised" by the necessity of living in a civilised community for reasons of collective security and mutual benefit. So a man is conceived to be "at liberty to do any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons."[2]

What does D. really mean by liberty? (251)[3] Political liberty is the area within which a man can lead his private life unobstructed by others. If he is prevented from doing what he could otherwise do, then he is in that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by intervention of others (the ruler e.g., or his administration) beyond a certain minimum, he can be described as being coerced or in that way enslaved. Such an image of the transformation of a freeman into a slave is obvious behind the wording of fr. 251. Coercion of any kind and degree is openly rejected.

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1. Cf. the justification given by Thucydides (II.40.3) for freedom of speech (Pericles speaking): οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν.
2. H.L.A. Hart, Are there any natural rights? in Political Philosophy ed. by Anth. Quinton, p. 53.
3. Schmid-Stählin, op. cit. 289: Aber im Staat muss Freiheit und Glück aller Bürger...das Ziel sein.

Liberty,[1] to be sure, doesn't mean licence; liberty is accompanied by law; if law is a kind of coercion it is self-coercion, since it is voted by the citizens on behalf of the community.

Such limits of political liberty provide the right of a citizen to lead his private life and pursue happiness in his own way provided that he obeys the laws and does not coerce others. In this sense liberty includes the meaning of mutual respect and finally emerges as the "summum bonum" in political life.

If liberty is a right and entails reasonably the obligation to respect the same right for all the members of the community, then the preference of a specific kind of state-form is automatically inferred: the constitution which provides for all citizens this right-obligation: to be free and treat others as equally free; it is called democracy.[2]

Direct participation of citizens (which was a possibility in Greek city-states) is regarded as the only way to produce (pass, vote) laws which do not mean coercion of anyone by anyone else, but self-limitation. Such an interpretation of democratic legislative procedure agrees with the sense of persuasion we have seen in other pages. And such a constitution guarantees the conditions - even in

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1. It seems difficult to follow Aalders' reasoning (op.cit. p.311) and conclude with him that: "the great Atomist does not regard liberty in the first place as a political principle, but as a principle of personal life."
2. Cf. Thucyd. II. 37.1: Καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται.

poverty - for a free man to live a life worth living.[1]

If we could know with certainty the historical background of fr. 251, it would help us to understand better the conception both of democracy and of freedom in democracy. To suppose that by "despots" (dynastai) D. means "the oligarchic rulers installed by Lysander (404 BC)"[2] is reasonable but not demonstrable. One thing may be regarded as certain: this beautiful aphorism is a reply to some opponents: believers in tyranny, oligarchy, but not democracy. Their advocacy included the same hymn which is used throughout the centuries of dispute on such problems: "Tyranny (perhaps under a different title) guarantees prosperity among other privileges". D.

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1. Cf. Plato's irony (Rep. 562 a-c): ....τὴν δημοκρατίαν εἶπον· τοῦτο γάρ που ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει ἀκούσαις ἂν ὡς ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μόνῃ ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκεῖν ὅστις φύσει ἐλεύθερος.

2. Aalders, 304. On the other hand, the use of the term "dynastes" seems not to be without a specific purpose; for D., we have noted, had a strong sense of the literary meaning of the words (see frr. 26, 129-140); and "dynastes" here speaks loudly of the use of force (dynamis), which, to be sure, strengthens the preference for freedom and its political dress: democracy.

answers: "I would prefer poverty but in a climate of freedom,[1] therefore I would prefer democracy, where law is the king[2] (not the caprice of the tyrant), where law is a ruler created by us, ruling on our behalf (248)."

Of course he does not seem to have accepted that prosperity really is a privilege of tyranny; he uses an expression (: of the so-called prosperity) betraying that it is only a concession to his (personal or impersonal) interlocutor. Thus, on the other hand, he succeeds in giving much more emphasis in his preference-advocacy of democracy.

Even in the best days of classical Greek democracy advocacy of tyranny could be heard; but it became more frequent after the Athenians' unsuccessful expedition to Sicily (415-413); and the dispute was at its height after 404 BC. If we say that fr. 251 mirrors political disputes of the period around 400 BC., we are likely to be near the true chronology of D.'s utterance.

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1. Cf. Arist. Politics, 1310a 29: δύο γάρ ἐστιν οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία δοκεῖ ὡρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ.

2. "Νόμος βασιλεύς".

8. Who is to rule? (axiocracy)

Whatever constitutional arrangement there may be, there will remain the crucial question: whose authority is to rule?[1] and why has one the obligation to obey the laws, when someone else is in power?

There are (roughly speaking) two answers:

a. The stronger has the right to rule.

b. All(the) citizens have the right collectively to decide for their problems.

In the first case obedience equals subjection; it means superficial order, but internal dissatisfaction and possibly conspiracy or decline. In the second the procedure of decisions sometimes is turbulent and order is shaken, disobedience appears and perhaps a feeling of disappointment temporarily prevails.

Some thinkers, seeing the apparent advantages and disadvantages of both solutions and believing that the "stronger" may coincide with the "best", propose an "authoritarianism of the best". Others, believing in the "best" but not in authoritarian methods, try to find them in a climate of freedom and of democratic procedure. D. seems to have been a believer in "the best by free election". In what degree it is attainable is another question.

In fr. 268 we read: "fear engenders flattery, but it has no good will." We should remember how strongly flattery as a feature

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1. Frr. 47, 49, 75 to be discussed among others in this par. come from both collections; on the other hand their content is by fr. 267.

of human characters was criticised;[1] it is impossible for D. to adopt methods in political life which encourage this hateful characteristic of the individual's behaviour. This aphorism speaks for freedom,[2] against any kind of forceful rule, on the ground that fear (result of suppression) is not a creative power.

This view does not imply acceptance (and forgiveness) of mistakes of a democratic arrangement. A free thinker, free also from passions and prejudices, must be able to see these mistakes (misuse of freedom e.g. or power).

Bad citizens when in power display themselves at their worst (254). Such an experience is a source of disappointment for good citizens who conclude (fr. 49): "it is hard to be governed by one's inferior."[4]

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1. See paragraph "On Friendship". Cf. frr. 192, 97, 113, 114, 115.
2. Freedom of speech is the essence of democratic procedure. Cf. Thuc.III.42.
3. fr. 254: οἱ κακοὶ ἰόντες ἐς τὰς τιμὰς ... τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀνακηδέες γίνονται καὶ ἀφροσύνης καὶ ἀλογίης πίμπλανται.
4. fr. 49 (St. IV.4.27): χαλεπὸν ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ χερείονος.

Bailey, op. cit. 211: "Strangely Platonic aphorism...This suggests that D. didn't think that public office was in itself the best thing for his philosopher, but that occasionally the philosopher must be king for fear of a worse ruler." It seems difficult to follow these implications; the aphorism under interpretation expresses dissatisfaction if one (good citizen) is to be governed by a bad-mannered ruler. D. would not happily accept a position of ruler; at the most he would not reject that of a counsellor (adviser) (see fr. 47 Stob. III.1.45).

It is not unusual for political thought to begin from the disappointment a good citizen feels when ruled by a bad ruler or a corrupt administration or both. One can, then, condemn the whole system which opens the way to power for all, or can seek for an improvement of the system. D. seems to have followed the second solution. He says: "for fools it is better to be ruled".[1] The justification is self evident; they will not render themselves nuisances and will more probably feel the benefits of other more effective rulers. It is better for people to be ruled by a phronimos leader.[2] Such arrangement of political affairs is in accord with nature, on the ground that: "by

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1. fr. 75: Κρέσσον ἄρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνοήτοισιν ἢ ἄρχειν.
   Cf. Plato, Laws, 690B: τὸν κρείττονα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὸν δὲ ἥττω ἄρχεσθαι. See also: Alcibiades I 135 B 7.
   Aalders (op. cit. 308-9) writes: ...some traits are to be found in his frr. which seem even antidemocratic (quotation of 49, 75) ...a strong contrast to the words which were spoken (Thuc. III. 37) by the pur sang (?) democratic Athenian Cleon, viz. that mediocre people are the best to rule the state..." But,
   (a) Cleon speaks for his political interest,
   (b) Cleon does not represent democracy,
   (c) democracy does not claim the right of fools to become rulers.
2. Cf. Plato, Rep. 590 d: ἄμεινον ὑπὸ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι.

nature it is more fitting for a better man to rule."[1]

D.'s ethics are founded on self-respect and persuasion and leave room for freedom of will and responsibility (frr. 264, 244, 84, 181); it would be unexpected and inconsistent for him to introduce force in political life. We remember the analysis of fr. 248 (Law) and 251 (Constitutional form). In the same sense D. recommends: "to obey the law and the magistrate and a wiser man is an ornament (is political

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1. fr. 267: φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκήιον τῷ κρέσσονι.
Cf. Gorgias, on Helen 6 (DK II. 290 1-3): πέφυκε... τὸ μὲν κρεῖσσον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἧσσον ἕπεσθαι.
See Plato, Gorgias, 483d.

Two remarks are necessary:

a. φύσει does not imply any kind of force, but (in accord with D.'s educational views) the use of reason and persuasion.

b. κρεῖσσον and χεῖρον (or ἧσσον) do not necessarily mean stronger and weaker respectively, but also better or worse in character. This is the first choice of meaning, unless the context itself shows the sense of strength (see e.g. fr. 238 or paragraph: on the meaning of fr. 83).

Thucydides, who saw in power the source of arrogance and aggressiveness, found clearer expressions for his aphorisms: ἀεί κατεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατειργέσθαι (I. 76. 2).
Cf. IV. 61. 5. See: E. Toppitsch, op. cit., p. 51.

wisdom)".[1] His recommendation sounds like advice addressed to free citizens, an appeal for good understanding for reasons of mutual cooperation on behalf of the community (cf. fr. 255).

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1. Guthrie, History, II. 495: As a child of his time D. had to show where he stood in the controversy of "Law versus nature". Should one bow to "nomos" (custom or convention crystallised in law) or follow physis, nature, which some Sophists exalted in contrast with it? .....in practical life.....he (D.) upheld it, in the narrower sense of law. "It is proper to be obedient to law, to the ruler, and to the wiser."

9. The Philosopher and the State

If a city-state with its conventions and laws is the place for a good citizen to live, and if this place is also the seat for a wise man, since he has to stay somewhere, this does not mean that a wise man recognises this as a necessary limitation for his thought; his thought can embrace the whole universe.[1]

D. as a scientist was a child not of his birth-place, Abdera, nor purely of Greece, but of the world. He owed much of his scientific experience to his visits to eastern countries. His confession of this fact takes a tone of pride in fr. 299,[2] but it might also be interpreted as an expression of favourable memory. Such gratitude may well sometimes overcome the artificial or emotional borders of a native place and recognise the fact that the scientist and the wise man has the right and the duty to belong to the world. His native place, on the contrary, could not understand his greatness

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1. Natorp, op. cit. 117: "...der "Weise", d.h. der Wissenschaftliche Forscher auch dem Staat gegenüber seine Freiheit wahrt und selbst an das Vaterland sich nicht schlechthin bindet, denn sein Vaterland ist die Welt." Perhaps in the light of these thoughts and of fr. 247 (to be quoted in the next page) and 264 a correct interpretation might be found for A 166.
2. Fr. 299 (spurious according to DK) will be discussed in the next paragraph: On Education.

and occasionally brought him sorrows.[1] Such an experience and such feelings may have dictated this aphorism: "To a wise man, the whole earth is open; for the native land of a good soul is the whole earth (universe)."[2] Wisdom overcomes barriers as do bravery and glory in a famous aphorism of Pericles.[3]

Is this passage a declaration of cosmopolitanism[4] in the sense

1. On the trial for D.'s "squandered" property see: DL IX 36, IX 39. Cf. Luria, Democritea, p. 17: D. in patriam redit, in jus vocatur, gloria potitur.
2. fr. 247: ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀγαθῆς πατρὶς ὁ σύμπας κόσμος.
3. Thuc. II.43.3: ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος.
Is the relation between these two passages one of accidental similarity or of imitation? Both may be true; a number of similarities mentioned throughout this investigation suggest that a hypothesis that Thuc. and D. had acquaintance of each other's work (or thought) should not be rejected.
4. H. Steckel (in RE Suppl. 12, col. 212): Fraglich ist (neben des iambischen Trimeters in B 247) ob bei ihm schon der Gedanke eines Weltbürgertums des Weisen ausgebildet ist.

Cf. I. Lana, L' etica di Dem., 16, footn. 4: Non v' é ragione di dubitare dell' autenticitá dell' franmento.

To suspect the genuineness of a passage on the ground that it is in a kind of poetical "metre" is risky and mistaken; if generalised such a criterion would deprive of authenticity numerous fine aphorisms - not

Note 4. to p. 318 ctd.

only of D. - the genuineness of which is beyond any doubt. Why suspect e.g. the following passage (attributed to X?):

"O innocent lamb of God / sacrificed on the Cross..."?

And why deny that an author, a famous stylist, deliberately tried sometimes to agglomerate an aphorism giving it euphony and beauty as much as possible, particularly if it embodied the central idea of a chapter?

we know from later centuries?[1] In fact, no; but it is from the point of view of a wise man a declaration of independence of artificial barriers. He feels himself a child of the world, since he was a pupil of the world; and he regards it a duty to recognise that he owes to the world the acquisition of science and wisdom (299).

D. lived in a period of general challenge to traditional distinctions between men of noble origin and others, freemen and slaves, Greeks and Barbarians.[2] Therefore it is not strange or

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1. a. Cf. Hippias of Elis (Plato, Prot. 337 C): ὦ ἄνδρες, ... ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ.

Cf. W. Jaeger, Paideia, I. 326: T.A. Sinclair, op. cit., p. 66.

b. Diogenes (disciple of Antisthenes) the Cynic (in DL VI.63):

μόνην ἔλεγε ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ... Ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη, "κοσμοπολίτης" ἔφη.

Epictetus, Discourse III. 24. 66 (about Diog. the Cynic):

πᾶσα γῆ πατρὶς ἦν· ἐξαίρετος δ' οὐδεμία.

c. Crates (Theban, Cynic, c. 315 BC) according to DL VI 98:

οὐκ εἰς πάτρας μοι πύργος, οὐ μία στέγη // πάσης δὲ χέρσου καὶ πόλισμα καὶ δόμος // ἕτοιμος ἡμῖν ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι πάρα.

See: Sinclair, op. cit. p. 246.

2. Barker, op. cit., pp. 77, 78.

unexpected for an experienced and obviously unprejudiced man to declare the destruction of local barriers, at least for wisdom. In his view he would say: "laws of nature are the same everywhere; wisdom and goodness can be found everywhere; local customs and laws are respected as such." Between Pericles' utterance on heroism (ἀνδρῶν ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα μὴ τάφος) and Diogenes' cosmopolitanism (πᾶσα γῆ πατρίς) D.'s (scientific? or ethical?) cosmopolitanism (ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή) sounds like an intermediate stage.

I. Lana's interpretation of fr. 247 as a full cosmopolitanism[1] seems to be rather optimistic and premature for D.'s age; this idea developed in the course of the fourth century. A cosmopolitanism should be accompanied by fitting ethical and political theories. Such ideas were developed 1 or 2 generations after D.'s death. His beautiful utterance might be better characterised as a personal emotional outburst, as a flight of recognition over the barriers of the city-states into the immense field of mankind.

Two final notes will be helpful for a better interpretation of fr. 247:

a. What does D. mean by "wise man"?

b. Why has he conjoined the "wise man" and the "good soul"?

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1. Lana, op. cit., p. 16: questo e' l'ideale del filosofo

..... p. 23: ma egli ha anche conscienza della difficoltá estrema....

a. Renzo Vitali[1] referring to Empedocles (A 86), Kritias (B 25) and Democritus (247) thinks that the "wise man" is the "homo sapiens", "peritus", "capace" (capable).[2] This does not seem to cover the specific meaning which must be attributed to the "wise man" in this particular passage (247); in this occurrence at least, there is an obvious differentiation: the conjunction of wisdom with goodness, which leads to our second question.

b. This conjunction comes so naturally in the fragment under discussion that one reasonably has the impression of an identification of the two concepts (wise man = good, kind soul or good will). A paraphrase of the passage would run: "for a wise man all the universe is accessible, because his goodness opens the roads, destroys the walls and barriers." This leads to: either the wise man by his wisdom and good understanding of other people is welcomed everywhere, or by his wisdom forming a good will he renders himself so good that he is welcomed everywhere. The wording of the passage makes more likely the second interpretation.[3]

1. Gorgia: Retorica e Filosofia, Urbino (1971?) pp. 19-22.
2. Vitali in his pages discusses many other cases, which also have no relation (in their meaning) with D.'s fr. 247. See for instance: Krit. B 29, Democritus B 26 (VS II. 148. 11), B 47, Heracl. 108, Gorgias B 23, Emped. B 146 (VS I. 369, 24 ff.).
3. Cf. a title of D.'s works given by DL (IX.33 VS 68 A133): "περὶ τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ διαθέσεως" (mood or intention?).

Wisdom is the antecedent, good will the consequence, wisdom is a condition for good will, perhaps necessary and certainly[1] not a sufficient, but an essential condition. And, if wisdom is a high level of knowledge and understanding of human problems and conduct, then we are not far from the Socratic view that knowledge (such a knowledge) influences (will) conduct so deeply that the doctrine "virtue is knowledge" must be asserted.

This does not mean that we try to trace imitation (although it is not impossible or deniable in principle). But these two thinkers lived in the same age, had some common acquaintance (philosophers-sophists), faced similar problems, both tried to reconstruct confidence in human knowledge[2] and morality and met the same difficulties; one of them was that in the philosophical vocabulary of their age no term was (forged) standardised for what we call volition. And, although human passions play their part in human behaviour, nevertheless, it is also true that the more knowledge the better morality, forgiveness (particularly if knowledge mainly is confined in human feelings and is accompanied by a virtue: moderation). If this connection is true, then knowledge influences volition (Democritus: wisdom is followed by goodness) or forms and includes volition (Socrates: virtue is knowledge). Both these thinkers followed the same road, stopped in different places and reached similar conclusions, differing in the degree (of inclusion of virtue in knowledge).

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1. See paragraph: "What is the meaning of fr. 83?"
2. Cf. J. Burnet, op. cit., p. 157.
   See the preface of this research.

Part Three: Education:*

Whatever the necessary conditions for acquiring education and the labour necessary for attaining it may be, education is believed to be the best companion for men whether they meet good fortune or misfortune; "education is ornament for a happy man, refuge for an unhappy".[1]

That this idea betrays a degree of personal experience and pride is very likely given that: (a) D., when prosecuted (according to the law of his birth-place, Abdera) for having wasted all his property,[2] he presented a "product" of his education (and wisdom)

* Two good contributions on this subject are:
F. Mesiano's "La Paideia" ch. XII in his book on Democritus' Ethics.
G. Silberer, "Natur" und "Lehre" bei Demokrit, in Paedagogica Historica, 10/2, Gent (1970) 243-250.

1. fr. 180: ἡ παιδεία εὐτυχοῦσι μέν ἐστι κόσμος ἀτυχοῦσι δὲ καταφύγιον.
Cf. Plato, Gorg. 470 D-E where paideia and justice are described (by implication) as sufficient conditions of happiness.

When reading the second part of the aphorism one reasonably recollects Boethius' work (written in prison): "De consolatione Philosophiae".
Cf. Bailey, op. cit., p. 198: anticipation of the thoughts of a later age.

2. DL IX 39-40. Luria Democritea, pp. 17-18.

and was admired for it and acquitted, (b) he was proud of his educational travels in eastern countries.[1]

It should be remembered that education was a burning problem during the second half of the fifth century BC, and other thinkers had explored it before Democritus.[2]

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1. fr. 299: Ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν κατ' ἐμαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων γῆν πλείστην ἐπεπλανησάμην ἱστορέων τὰ μήκιστα καὶ ἀέρας τε καὶ γέας πλείστας εἶδον καὶ λογίων ἀνδρῶν πλείστων ἐπήκουσα καὶ γραμμέων συνθέσιος μετὰ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς κώ με παρήλαξεν οὐδ' οἱ Αἰγυπτίων καλεόμενοι Ἀρπεδονάπται σὺν τοῖς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἔτεα † ὀγδώκοντα ἐπὶ ξείνης ἐγενήθην.

Diels has classified this in the list of "Unechte";
Cleve (The Giants of Presocr. Greek Philosophy, p. 400) defended its authenticity.

Three reasons favour acceptability of this fragment:

a. It does not express unjustified pride (or unbearable boast).

b. Its content agrees with other evidence (frr. 180, 68 A 2, 68 A 1, 35).

c. A rare term in it (λογίων) is found in another genuine passage of D. (fr. 30). Cf. p. 317.

2. DK, VS 80 B 3 (Protagoras).
W. Jaeger, Paideia, I.
E. Barker, op. cit., 41-43.
M. Untersteiner, op. cit., 64 ff.

Education, as this idea emerges from D.'s fragments is a life-long function, divided into three levels:

1. acquiring skill (necessary for adaptation to the needs of life),
2. acquiring virtue (as a quality necessary for mutual relations in society),
3. acquiring knowledge as a mental joy, which is a condition of happiness.

In the first stage education fulfils practical purposes, in the second it prepares the individuals for their social activity by "persuading" them to subdue their passions (149, 159) and overcome their natural egoism and reach an altruistic outlook on life.[1] In the third (and highest) level acquisition of knowledge is not only an improvement of adaptation, but also in some way a power of liberation (from passions and fears); on this level the roads of freedom and happiness and knowledge cross each other (118, 216, paragraph: conditions of euthumia).

Now it is easy to understand why D. advises parents to spend a part of their money for giving education to their children on the ground that by doing so they will build round their children "a fortification and safeguard."[2] It is reasonable to suppose that he himself thought he was lucky to have spent his money for his education.

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1. See paragraph: "Presuppositions of Happiness".
2. fr. 280: ἔξεστιν οὐ πολλὰ τῶν ὀφειλόντων ἀναλῶσαντας παιδεῦσαί τε τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τεῖχός τε καὶ φυλακὴν περιβαλέσθαι τοῖς τε χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν.

1. Education as a result of need and experience.

As expected from D. he sees the problem in its genetic way. Men's first teacher is need,[1] his second external nature in its multifarious appearance, and his third (in fact an accumulation of the previous two) experience, coming from acquaintance, observation, and imitation.

Let us examine his view through the evidence: In fr. 172 he says: "Those same things from which we get good can also be for us a source of hurt, or else we can avoid the hurt. For instance, deep water is useful for many purposes, and yet again harmful; for there is danger of being drowned. A technique has therefore been invented: instruction in swimming."[2] The passage speaks for itself; the physicist now becomes an observer of the human fight for adaptation; with an optimistic view he finds out (ascertains) that nature itself helps men in their necessary adaptation. Bitter acquaintance becomes experience for the future.

Experience is enlarged by observation and imitation of the life of animals. The struggle for survival is common to other species too; and man with his superior ability can acquire useful knowledge by studying animal behaviour. We read in fr. 154: "We are pupils of the

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1. See: Diodor. I. 8.7. (VS 68 B 5 in II. 136, 8-15).
2. fr. 172: ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ' ἄν, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκτὸς εἴημεν. αὐτίκα ὕδωρ βαθὺ εἰς πολλὰ χρήσιμον καὶ δαῦτε κακόν· κίνδυνος γὰρ ἀποπνιγῆναι. μηχανὴ οὖν εὑρέθη νήχεσθαι διδάσκειν.

animals in the most important things: the spider for spinning and mending, the swallow for building, and the songsters, swan and nightingale, for singing, by way of imitation."[1]

Another kind of experience is attained by personal acquaintance with difficult conditions of life; these are sometimes a source of virtues: "Life in a foreign country teaches self-sufficiency; for bread and bed are the sweetest cures for hunger and fatigue."[2]

2. So far we have not met the idea of education as we understand it nowadays. Nevertheless, it is necessary and desirable to transfer to coming generations by way of teaching what mankind has learnt throughout the centuries of its bitter experience (by way of teaching). The aims of such an education are: (a) to give the necessary knowledge, (b) to make easier mutual understanding by introducing young people to the demands of social life. "If children are allowed not to work, they cannot learn letters or music or gymnastic, nor that which above all things supports virtue, (namely) a sense of respect. For it is

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1. fr. 154: ὁ Δ. ἀποφαίνει μαθητὰς (τῶν ζῴων) ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις γεγονότας ἡμᾶς· ἀράχνης ἐν ὑφαντικῇ καὶ ἀκεστικῇ, χελιδόνος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ, καὶ τῶν λιγυρῶν, κύκνου καὶ ἀηδόνος, ἐν ᾠδῇ κατὰ μίμησιν.

2. fr. 246: ξενιτείη βίου αὐτάρκειαν διδάσκει· μᾶζα γὰρ καὶ στιβὰς λιμοῦ καὶ κόπου γλυκύτατα ἰάματα.

Cf. frr. 54, 76.

3. Diodor. I. 8.7 (VS II. 136, 8-15).

precisely from these studies that the sense of respect usually grows."[1]

Learning is labour; it has the power to waken in the soul the feeling of self-respect (aidōs), which is a condition of all virtues. And virtue is the most important aim of education. The insistence on this aim is justified since man is gifted by nature with much vitality, passions, desires (fr. 149) which must be in some way disciplined through the virtues of the soul (frr. 159, 187).

It is remarkable that virtue in D.'s view will come not as a result of particular instructions or compulsory regulations, but as a product of labour (179) and by persuasion (181). Self-respect and virtue are desirable as aims of education because they give the foundation of social life. All other qualities of character form the basis of private life.

Following fr. 181 (where the power of persuasion is emphasised as opposed to the ineffectiveness of compulsion) one might accept that virtue - strictly speaking - is not the subject of teaching - the communication of ideas - but of explaining situations and showing ideals.

If persuasion operates effectively - this seems to be an optimistic belief of D. - law as a restriction of freedom is unnecessary; and if necessary for others, it is simply a good protection for those who are virtuous by persuasion (248).

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1. fr. 179: μὴ πονεῖν παῖδες ἀνιέντες οὔτε γράμματ' ἂν μάθοιεν οὔτε μουσικὴν οὔτε ἀγωνίην οὐδ' ὅπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν συνέχει, τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι· μάλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἡ αἰδώς.

So far education is described only as an achievement attained by continuous labour; the goods of learning are acquired by industrious men through effort. But two other factors are presupposed: natural ability (fr. 56, 183)[1] and training (242);[1] all these factors together are conceived as sufficient and necessary conditions for the whole procedure of the educative function. It would be deceitful to suppose that either labour or training[2] is prior to natural ability as a factor. If this was D.'s belief then fr. 277[3] would be incompatible, since in it the assumption is clear: nature is by far the first and decisive factor.[4]

So education is by no means the only basis of knowledge and virtue: nature gives the raw material, perhaps "wild" stuff (159) which needs manipulation. A systematic education therefore is necessary and professional teachers are required; parents have the task to pay what is necessary on behalf of their children; if they fail to do so, the result will be to the cost of their children (228).[5]

1. fr. 183: .. χρόνος γὰρ οὐ διδάσκει φρονεῖν ἀλλ' ὡραίη τροφὴ καὶ φύσις]
   fr. 56: τὰ καλὰ γνωρίζουσι καὶ ζηλοῦσιν οἱ εὐφυέες πρὸς αὐτά.
   fr. 242: πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος.
2. Per contra see: Guthrie, History, II, 494.
3. See paragraph: "The philosopher and the family".
4. Cf. Protagoras' aphorism: φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται (VS 80 B 3). See analysis of fr.33 in the following pages.
5. fr. 228: οἱ τῶν φειδωλῶν παῖδες ἀμαθέες γιγνόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ ὀρχησταὶ εἰς τὰς μαχαίρας ὀρούοντες....οὕτω δὲ καὶ οὗτοι....φιλέουσι διαφθείρεσθαι.

3. On a higher level further education is a target for gifted personalities only; it is rather a problem of personal interest, orientation and devotion. Fr. 118 (D. used to say that he would "rather discover one cause than gain the kingdom of Persia."[1]) speaks clearly for D.'s attitude towards science. It becomes the main purpose of life and absorbes all other interests; it is a life-long education. Now acquisition of knowledge does not (serve) help simply for adaptation or good social terms; it helps personal happiness and indirectly all mankind in its effort to defeat nature and use it on behalf of human life.

Another aspect of education we have already touched when discussing political life; through "participation" citizens acquire acquaintance with problems of the society in which they live.

What is education as a function?

Here, as it seems, is the most important contribution of D. to the whole problem of education. He says: "Worst of all things is laxity as a means to educate youth, for it breeds those pleasures from which vice comes."[2]

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1. fr. 118: Δ. ἔλεγε βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι.
   Cf. 68 A 2, B 299.
2. fr. 178: πάντων κάκιστον ἡ εὐπετείη παιδεῦσαι τὴν νεότητα· φύτη γάρ ἐστιν ἥ τίκτει τὰς ἡδονὰς ταύτας, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κακότης γίνεται.

From this two implications are probable:

a. the passage is addressed to some educators who thought superficially on the question of education,

b. the belief is expressed that wickedness (result of pleasures) can be avoided by some correct education. What is that? From this question another arises: what is the denotation of pleasure in this passage? it seems that here this term includes something more than bodily pleasure; perhaps vain hopes, vain ambitions, hunger of power and vanity, which (when fed by inefficient educators) can, in due course, give rise to wickedness.

If this interpretation is correct, then this passage seems to be an attack on Sophistry.[1] For D.'s part, the problem of education is met not as a step to a political career but to a moral personality.

How deep (thoroughgoing) a function education is is explained by fr. 33: "Nature and teaching are very similar; for teaching transforms man and in transforming effects his nature (i.e. embodies or transplants the object of teaching in the natural structure of man)."[2] As it concerns the personality of a man - according to this passage - one's educator is in some way made the author of one's nature. But it would be misleading to suppose that teaching is

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1. Cf. Protagoras' programme of education in Plato's Protag. 316-320, particularly in 318D-319A. As contrast to 318 D-E see D.'s fr. 179 (quoted above).
2. fr. 33: ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ.

a substitute for nature or that it is of higher importance. It is accepted that teaching changes the "rusmoi",[1] perhaps affects their position and influences their function in due course and therefore is embodied (incorporated) in the natural structure. But otherwise nature is the main and leading factor; it says the first and last word.

To summarise these pages on Education: D. seems to have believed that:

a. Nature is the foundation for a man's personality,

b. Teaching can add skill, knowledge to natural abilities and perhaps modify natural inclinations and increase natural capacity.

c. As it concerns moral conduct instruction by persuasion can influence a free and self-determined agent. (181).

d. Training is helpful to the whole procedure of personal development (242).

e. An organised education can in some way and to some degree show (ways) methods of improvement of coming generations (individually and collectively).

f. Education is offered: generally by nature itself, by social environment, by the State (as an Institution); particularly or specifically by professional teachers who must be paid by the parents of the pupils.

A final question should be raised: is education a kind of "conditioning" of future conduct and therefore of personal happiness? does it really determine the future of a person? and if it had the

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1. μεταρυσμοί. Cf. 68 A 38.

possibility to "condition" the whole life of an individual or of a whole generation, should such a possibility be used?

In these forms of the same question it is not assumed that D. faced such implications of his doctrines (33); but his formula reaches the vicinity of such thoughts which really are modern problems in psychology and education.

Teaching is not a "conditioning" factor in the strict sense (cause or set of causes - result or set of results); but it is a "condition" in a loose sense: knowledge, instruction, training can influence a future decision (life is conceived as a chain of decisions - actions within perpetually changing conditions). Education can create the frame within which a number of possible decisions are placed; but these antecedents cannot prescribe the only one actual decision to be taken by a person at a given moment. Better knowing of things, better habituation in virtues, better understanding of social necessities, can increase the probability of a virtuous and social decision; but this decision, in the final stage, is a choice for the person involved, who, at the moment given and under the conditions given, will act freely.

D. speaks to a free person, who freely can accept some restrictions on his activity and freely can impose rules of conduct on himself. He could not therefore conceive of a person "conditioned" by education to such a degree that his decisions and actions are "predetermined".

And if he could imagine such a powerful educational system able to "condition" the whole life directed unmistakenly to - let us

accept it - happiness, would he have adopted such a system? In the light of analyses of D.'s beliefs (181, 248, 264, 244, 33) one could not answer this question positively. Such a "conditioning" education would deprive a person of the right to decide for himself. And it would mean deprivation of happiness, because one's happiness is happiness in one's conception of happiness, provided that one is free and responsible for it. A man can be described as happy only if he is creator of his happiness. There are no "happy" computers. Nobody has the right, on the other hand, to determine somebody else's happiness.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Historical position of D.'s ethical theory

It is proposed that a number of questions be briefly answered before a final judgement is made on the problem in the title:

1. Is D.'s ethical theory worthy of the title?
2. What are the moral motives prevailing in it?
3. Is this ethical theory compatible with D.'s physics?
4. What is D.'s position on the question of the Nomos-Physis antithesis? and finally
5. What is D.'s place in the history of Ethics?

1. Is D.'s ethical theory worthy of the title?[1]

A comparison with the modern conception of Ethics would be wrong and misleading; a comparison with Aristotle's Ethics favours, to be sure, the latter;[2] but it is the best available.[3]

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1. In ZN's Phil. d. Griechen, 1. 2. 1154 the problems raised by the study of D.'s ethics are summarised under the following heads:
   a. whether we can speak of a system,
   b. what is its central concept,
   c. whether and to what extent there is a connection between the Ethics and Physics of D.

   Cf. Schmid-Stählin, 1. 5. 277; Guthrie, History, II. 492.
2. Aristotle had many predecessors in the field of Ethics (Socrates, Plato, Antisthenes, Aristippus). D. had only gnomologies and (his contemporaries) the Sophists.
   See: Friedländer, Aufsatz zum Ὑποθῆκαι Problem (Hermes, (1913) pp. 603-616).

Notes to 335 ctd.

3. Some similarities to Socrates' teaching have been pointed out throughout this thesis; they might be summarised for the purposes of this conclusion:

   a. mental joys are by far of higher value than bodily pleasures.

   b. justice is a necessary condition of eudaimonia,

   c. the intellectual character of Ethics (fr. 159, 83, 197, 229, 282, 289, 290); but for D. knowledge is only one factor of morality (good will being the other; cf. frr. 173, 62, 68, 89).

On the other hand it is not intended here either to investigate Aristotle's ethics[1] or to show which of the two (D.'s or Aristotle's) is more complete or to trace imitations which perhaps are non-existent. Our intention is strictly limited to these points:

a. Did D. include in his ethics the problems currently included in Greek Ethics?

b. Can these points be understood as having been parts of a consistent ethical theory?

c. What is the central concept of such a theory?

Following the preceding study (chs. II-III) we are justified in saying that round the nucleus of eudaimonia (euthumia) D. touched on these problems:

presuppositions of euthumia (virtuous life),
meaning of virtue (virtue is action),
virtues (moral - intellectual),
measure (moderation),
pleasure (bodily - mental),
the problem of responsibility (freewill),
some problems of social life (friendship etc.),
problems of political life (law, justice, obligations and rights, constitutional form).

These problems with much more elaboration, to be sure, and

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1. We will use for our purpose here a recent publication on Aristotle: G.E.R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The growth and structure of his thought, Cambridge (1968).
Or an earlier one: D. Ross, Aristotle [6](1971) [first ed. 1923].

thoroughgoing scrutiny one can find in Aristotle's ethics.[1] Of course there is, as it were, a fundamental point of difference between them: no question of teleology can be found in D. But it is a matter of general orientation. The formulation, nevertheless, of ethical problems covers the same area in both cases. There is no reason (from this point of view) to deny that D. produced a theory complete within the boundaries of Greek Ethics.[2]

That his theory is self-consistent has been pointed out through the pages of this thesis.

The central concept of D.'s ethics is euthumia, an alternative for eudaimonia; which is a characteristic pervading Greek ethics.

2. What are the moral motives in D.'s ethical theory?

The question is this: why should I be virtuous? or Why should a society adopt such an institution as morality?

For the purposes of this inquiry a motive can be defined as a conscious mental process which moves a man to act in a particular way either to satisfy a personal desire (egoism) or from a sense of duty towards others (altruism).

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1. See: Lloyd, op.cit. pp. 202 - 271.
   Ross, op. cit. pp. 187-269.
2. P. Shorey summarised Plato's investigation of morality in the following points: a. Socratic paradoxes,
   b. definitions of virtues,
   c. the problem of hedonism
   d. the attempt to demonstrate the inseparability of virtue and happiness (Vlastos, PlatoII, p. 7.).

   With reference to points b, c, d cf. Ch. Two, sections 10, 12, 6, 2 of this study.

Let us trace the evidence for D.'s view:

a. Egoistic Motives:

In frr. 3, 191 the motive of doing or avoiding some acts is clear: principles are formulated or instructions are given which lead to personal profit. The consciousness of consequences is not vague awareness, but a well thought out plan or policy where a man has a scheme of activity covering a period of years, or a whole life-time.

On a larger scale (of a city state) the egoistic view (is present) appears in fr. 258.

Friendship also is treated in an egoistic way (frr. 107, 186).[1]

An egoistic explanation might be given also to passages like 276, 293 (cf. 107a, 88). But it is equally justifiable to recognise in them either an expression of personal attitude (276) or human sympathy (293, 107a) or an observation of human nature (88).

b. Altruistic motives:

Nobler motives are present in a number of aphorisms describing justice and recommending performance of justice.[2] Closely connected is the problem of will and good will.

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1. But cf. Aristotle's definitions: EN VIII 2. 3-4: εὔνοιαν .... ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι.
VIII. 3.6: τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων.

2. On p. 210 we had concluded: "(justice) surpasses selfishness and renders a man a good member of a society, an agent of what is desirable by the community."

Between desire and action will and deliberation have to find a place; but will as a permanent disposition and a determinant of decisions is not clearly placed and described in Greek Ethics. Some of the frr. we have discussed, nonetheless, penetrate the soul to express the value of intention (62,[1] 89[2], 68, 96). They transfer the problem of doing right into willing it.

Obviously good will is touched from two sides (individual and collective) in fr. 248. And in managing affairs will is presented as a cpmpanion of knowledge (173).

Passages like 256, 261, 174 do not put the question: "what ought to be?" but "what ought we to do?" The will is orientated to what is just without any hesitation or calculation; the only or the prevailing motive is to reach the best result, which is justice. Injustice, on the contrary, should be eliminated even from hidden intention (62). Only thus a man is approved even by the gods (217),[3] which means that good will is highly appreciated.

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1. Bailey, 202: a remarkable anticipation of later thought.
2. E. Wolf, II.345: Soviel stärker erschien ihm und soviel wertete er die Gesinnung als die Tat, dass er den Anspruch gewagt hat: unrechte Gesinnung sei gefährlicher wie unrechtes Tun (fr. 89).
3. It is very improbable that MacGibbon's interpretation is correct; he argues (op. cit. p. 393) that: "these words (fr. 217) suggest that...a man...might enter into communication with the gods."
   Cf. ZN 1.2. 285: it is merely a form of expression.
   Schmid-Stählin 1.5.282: Von einem göttlichen Sittengesetz scheint D. nicht gesprochen zu haben.
   Luther, Wahrheit, 156, note.

Good intention makes unnecessary the presence of witnesses. And if any wrong is done the wrong-doer is more unhappy than the wronged man (45).

The highest level of noble motives is expressed in fr. 96; it gives a clearly altruistic definition of generosity as an action inspired by good will without any expectation of reward.

Finally, fr. 255 prescribing a framework of a kind of "socialism of good motives" generalises the problem of good will and mutual help within the limits of a city state; through good motives D. believed (it is perhaps an utopia) that social justice and social order and other goods for the community could be provided (255).[1]

3. Is D.'s ethical theory compatible with his Physics?

The main difficulty which one might face when attempting to settle the question of compatibility is this: In a materialistic system is there room left for Ethics? or, if determinism is logically extended from Macrocosmos (natural necessity) to Microcosmos (human conduct) does there remain room for free will? and therefore for responsibility and morality?

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1. T.A. Sinclair, History, 65. Ferber, op. cit. 103.
On p. 233 commenting on D.'s criteria we had concluded: The first criterion is eudaimonistic (intellectual eudaimonism) and egoistic; the second and third are altruistic. They are not incompatible, since they cover different fields of activity (private life, social-political relations).

At the risk of some repetition it should be remarked first that these problems were non-existent in D.'s days.[1] He, for his part, either did not notice this problem or more probably he saw it, but he believed that in the case of human beings the soul atoms, privileged as they are,[2] have the possibility to escape the laws of a mechanistic world and establish the foundation for a kind of self-determination.[3]

That he admitted the possibility of freewill there can remain no doubt after the explanation of his ethical theory (see e.g. frr. 181, 244, 264). Whether such a conception of freewill could be compatible with a strict determinism is a question put today, but had not yet been discovered and was not until after Aristotle.

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1. Lortzing, Gymnasium, Berlin (1873) p. 1: Allerdings ist das System des D. materialistisch; aber diese Eigenschaft teilt es mit der ganzen vorsokratischen Philosophie, der der Unterschied des körperlichen und unkörperlichen überhaupt noch nicht zum klaren Bewusstsein gekommen war.

   P. Huby, The first discovery of the Freewill problem, Philosophy (1967) pp.

   P. Shorey, Plato's Ethics (in Vlastos' Plato II p. 8): The modern Freewill controversy arises out of two conceptions not connected with this problem by Plato: the infinite foreknowledge of god, and the absolute continuity of physical causation.

2. 3. See details in ch. 2, section 4 (:Body-Mind relations), section 13 (The Freewill problem).

D. saw another aspect: responsibility[1] (which presupposes free will, whether one is aware of it or not); and tried to solve this question in two directions:

a. he recognised that, if a man overcomes his passions and lives with moderation, he is able to be free and responsible,

b. he freed his moral agent of prejudices and misbeliefs that either gods or chance have anything to do with human affairs.[2]

Therefore the following question must be answered: are there elements which (seen from D.'s point of view and age, not from our scope and conceptual structure) assert consistency between ethics and physics in D.'s system? and consequently consistency in his thought?

There are two classes of such elements:

a. Terminological b. Factual.

a. Terminological consistency:

In fr. 191 (cf. 101) is found a term (metapiptein) which obviously pervades D.'s thought; it is used in his theory of sensation[3] and his theory of knowledge.[4] In all these cases it seems to be a technicality.

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1. See Ch. 2, section 15 (Moral autonomy, responsibility)
2. See Ch. 1.
3. A. 135.63 (Theophr. de sens. 135.63): μεταπῖπτον.
4. B 9: μεταπῖπτον, B 191: μεταπίπτειν.

It is not without a particular importance that the concept of necessity returns again and again[1] to the purpose not of denying human freedom but of denoting human limits (that freedom should be understood as a possibility within the limits of reality, of natural necessity).

Consistency of thought must be recognised also in the steady effort of D. to introduce into the field of ethics a characteristic term of his physics (in a remarkable number of compounds).[2] A comparison of the meanings of these cognate terms shows that D. sought not to introduce natural necessity from physics to ethics but to modify its strictness and find a compromise between nature as a general term and human existence as a privileged existence within the limits of nature. Wisdom as a power for self determination is emphatically opposed to natural necessity (fr. 197).

b. Factual consistency and compatibility

In leaving room for freewill D. is not inconsistent with his system (soul also consists of atoms, given perhaps the unique privilege of escape from blind necessity) but he was perhaps unaware of a

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1. necessity: 253, 262, 277, 181, 239, 289.
   necessary: 144, 278, 285.
2. ῥυσμός (67 A 6, 68 A 38), ἐπιρυσμίη (68 B 7), μεταρυσμοί-οῦσα (33), ἀμειψιρυσμίη (139), ῥυσμοῦνται (197), ῥυθμός (266).

problem which came into existence a long time later as a logical consequence[1] of his physics (cf. paragraph: Mind-Body relation).

On the other hand his insistence on founding an ethical theory independent of the gods' will and fortune's caprices[2] is completely consistent with his physics, where such entities had no place to dwell.

Thus terminological and factual similarities show that there was a guiding thought (throughout the system) which attempted to settle a "modus vivendi" between two "realities": natural necessity and self-determined and responsible human conduct.

4. D.'s position regarding the Nomos-Physis antithesis.

The reason for touching on this question is obvious: "these two "key words" (or "catch-words") came to be commonly regarded as opposed and mutually excluded".[3] The antithesis denoted by them was applied to many fields of Greek thought: religion, political organisation, social equality (free citizens-slaves)[4], morality.[5]

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1. In the same degree all the tragedians were unaware of the fact that when claiming interference of gods or chance or daimons in their plays they were depriving their characters of the possibility and the right to make responsible decisions. Such questions when pushed to their logical consequences first are anachronistic and second close the road for any constructive discussion. Cf. p. 57 n. 1 .
2. A 66, A 68. See ch.1.
3. Guthrie, History, III (Sophists) p. 55.
4. Ibid. pp. 57-58.
5. Barker, Greek Pol. Thought, pp. 74 ff.

D. on this question followed (with an exception) a reconciliatory way and extended the application of the "catch phrase" to other fields:

a. In the paragraph on Education it was explained that a man, a mature personality, is the result of cooperation of two factors: natural gifts and education.[1]

b. In the field of morality fr. 264 (combined with 181) allows a reconciliation and compromise of natural motives and social convention; a bridge between them is traced in fr. 174 where justice (social obligation) is put as a condition necessary for euthumia (individual, natural pursuit).

c. In a similar way individual pursuits and political convention (law) are linked in fr. 248; again a link between them might be seen in the concept of persuasion (248, 181).[2]

d. In the field of religion such an antithesis was non existent for D. If people have some belief in gods, chance, or daimons, it is a question of epistemology.

e. In the field of social class-distinction, and the existence of state barriers and the distinction between Greeks and Barbarians the evidence we have is not sufficient to decide definitely. Fr. 247, shows, nevertheless, a reconciliatory policy and tolerance.

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1. The pairs: nature and education (183), nature and teaching (33), nature and training (242) are repeatedly mentioned; the second member in all three cases represents the nomos.
2. Cf. Herodot, VII.104: ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσιν· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδείμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ/οἱ σοὶ σέ.

f. To complete this review one can look at D.'s theory of knowledge and find that senses and mind cooperate (frr. 11, 125) in the human pursuit for knowledge, although at the first contact the senses grasp a conventional image of reality (frr. 6-10) and the truth is hidden in the depth (117).[1]

To sum up: his View is that nomos-physis are not mutually excluded but can cooperate and coincide in a synthesis; this view acquires particular evaluation if we remember that D. is a child of the sophistic movement. The same reconciliatory attitude can be seen in certain ethical passages where natural necessity and life or reality are brought together (289, 278, 267, 277, 278, 253, 297, 285, 144). Necessity is the face of nature; man's duty is to acknowledge what nature is and organise his free life within the framework prescribed by his human nature.

The place of D. in the history of Ethics.

Whether and to what extent his ethical theory was known to and influenced his contemporaries and/or later Greek Philosophers has been a question for dispute. The thesis has been defended that even Socrates received influence from the Abderite.[2] Some scholars have tried to find similarities between D.'s doctrines and passages in

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1. Felix Heinimann, Nomos und Physis, Basel (1945) p. 88.
   Max Pohlenz, Nomos und Physis, Hermes 81 (1953) p. 427.
2. L. Stella, Valore e posizione storica dell' etica di D.
   (Sophia, 10 (1942), 208).

Plato;[1] in their investigations they were inspired by D. Laertius' comment on this question,[2] which anyway will remain unanswered, since Plato himself nowhere mentioned D.

Some scholars correctly speak of a School of Abdera.[3] Epicurus denied any dependence on his Abderite forerunner; but the similarities are frequent and surprisingly convincing; and have been shown passim in this study. D.'s influence on the Cynics has also been mentioned.[4]

This study (apart from the attempt at a reconstruction of D.'s ethical theory from the surviving fragments) has been intended to show:

a. D. produced the first Greek ethical theory to be written down; it was consistent in itself, complete (within the terms of Greek Philosophy) and compatible with his physics.

b. Of course he did not create from nothing; the raw material was dispersed all around him. Eudaimonia as a goal, measure as a means,

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1. P. Natorp, Die Ethika, ch. 8, p. 157 ff.
   J. Stenzel, Platon u. D. (Kleine Schriften, pp. 60-71).
   O. Gigon, Platon u. D. (Helv.Mus. 29(1972) 153 ff.)
2. IX.40.
3. Clem. of Alexandria, Strom. II.130 (VS 68 B 4)
   VS 67-78 (II. 70-251).
   Natorp, Die Ethika: 122. Guthrie, History, II. 382 n. 1.
4. Z. Stewart, D. and the Cynics (HSCP, 63 (1958) pp. 179-191).
   Th. Cole (Democritus and the sources of Greek anthropology, Cleveland, Ohio (1967) tried to explain how D.'s doctrines survived in Diodorus, I. 7-8. Cf. VS II 135-136.

certain virtues as ornaments of the personality, the problem of pleasure, the question of law and state organisation, friendship, eros, criterion, are not concepts which make their first appearance in his theory. He offered:

I. his personal moral orientation (self-reliance and moderation, a strong sense of justice, altruism),

II. his scientific character (accustomed to contemplate, to trace causes, to discover links and classify and organise),

III. in some cases his personal terminology,

IV. moral ideas collected from his environment (Greek tradition and contemporary discussions).[1]

c. He raised first with consistency and insistence the question of human autonomy as a presupposition and culmination of any discussion of moral problems. Autonomy postulates both independence of thought (freedom from prejudices and superficial beliefs)[2] and free will (whether or not one has explicitly put such postulates).

d. His theory, far from being a materialistic hedonism, at many points overlaps Socrates' intellectualism and idealism, as

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1. Traditionally Democritus is regarded as a brilliant expounder of Leukippus' atomic theory. But his own ethical theory - it must be recognised - is his own original work in which we have found (discovered) D.'s own originality and systematic thought.

2. See e.g. frr. 118, 119.

we had often occasion to note. From this point of view D. stands side by side with Socrates.[1] That his ethical theory remained in the margin of the main stream of Greek ethical thought was a result of historical conditions or coincidences (as we have explained in the introduction) and of chance (the phantom which D. consistently and insistently denied).

1. Cf. Ferber, Über die Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der Ethik Demokrits, Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 132-3 (1908) 114: so darf D. neben Sokrates mit als Begründer der Ethik genannt werden.

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